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ABSTRACT
Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education
A Case Study of the University of Massachusetts
Amherst Election - November 1973
(May 1978)
Anne L. Bryant, B
. A.
,
Simmons College
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor William Lauroesch
The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that when
there are no traditional union issues (e.g., salary or working conditions),
the political predisposition and socialization, or political culture, of
a faculty member is more influencial in determining voting behavior than
the indices of achieved status of the faculty member (i.e., tenure, rank,
school affiliation, etc.)*
A stratified random sample (N = 76) of tenured and non-tenured
faculty members from the major schools of the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst were interviewed following the November 1973 vote, which re-
jected the MSP-AAUP as bargaining agent on that campus. The results of
the 1973 election (510 pro-union votes; 718 anti-union votes; 174 chal-
lenged votes; 2 voided votes) demonstrated that there was growing unrest
among the faculty, but the absence of clearly defined issues left in
doubt the reasons for faculty support or opposition to collective bar-
gaining.
iv
The five-part interview queried faculty members on: (1) attitudes
toward unionism in general, (2) attitudes toward the (then) current Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, Amherst situation, (3) perceptions of university
governance, and (4) attitudes toward the November 1973 election. The
fifth section gathered demographic data similar to that used in other
national studies (age, department affiliation, professorial rank, number
of years at the University, voting behavior, sex, tenure, and administra-
tive status).
Results of the interview provided clear support for the hypothesis
substantiating that: (1) there were no major issues except that of union-
ization itself, (2) a faculty member's professorial rank, departmental
affiliation, tenure status, or age had little influence on his/her voting
behavior, and (3) a faculty member's prejudgment about unionism in general
was a greater determinant in his/her voting behavior than either number (1)
or number (2).
A few of the more interesting results of the study were:
1. The Social Science faculty's vote, predicted to have been strongly
pro—union, resulted in an even split between the MSP-AAUP affiliate
and no union.
2. Faculties from Natural Science, Nursing, and Physical Education
voted predominantly against the union.
3. In direct contrast to all predictions, the School of Agriculture
faculty voted in a clear majority for the union. A feeling of
disenfranchisement about their status in the University was the
primary reason for such an outcome.
v
A. Administrative" faculty members, particularly department heads, a
group appointed by the provost, voted against the union while de-
partment chairmen were more evenly split.
5. Faculty members generally expressed the view that faculty in higher
education should be able to unionize ( a similar conclusion had
been drawn by Everett C. Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset in a
1972 study) but the majority felt that the situation did not warrant
such a drastic change, nor were faculty comfortable with (what they
viewed as) an outside entity representing them.
6. Directly relating to conclusion number five was the dominant theme
in the interviews of "professionalism." One’s status as a Univer-
sity professor at a major university was viewed as the most critical
aspect of one’s career. The majority of faculty seemed to feel
that the present informal system of communication and governance
was working satisfactorily and wanted to be seen as autonomous
professionals. There was a strong minority, however, who believed
that the traditional form of academic governance was losing effec-
tiveness, causing a loss of power for the faculty. A few faculty
mentioned that the real problem lay in the increasing influence of
the state legislature over University budgets and priorities. In
retrospect, this small group predicted the results of a successful
multi-c.ampus election by the MSP in 1977 , four years after the
Amherst Campus faculty had rejected such an action.
vi
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
Introduction
On November 15 and 16, 1973, a collective bargaining election
was conducted at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst involving its
faculty and some staff. It was the culmination of one and one-half
years effort by the Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP, an affil-
iate of the Massachusetts Teachers Association, MTA) and the Amherst
chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
.
Why did the election culminate in the manner it did? What were
the issues in the University of Massachusetts/Amherst election? Which
faculty members were pro-union? Which were against a collective bar-
gaining agent on campus? What were the prevailing attitudes during the
election of the faculty toward the University administration, toward
the various "election" issues, and toward each of the opposing faculty
groups, the coalition favoring collective bargaining, MSP-AAUP , and the
ad hoc Committee of Concerned Faculty (CCF)?
The purpose of this study was to determine how faculty members
at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst reacted to the campaign and
election, how their reactions appeared to shape their vote, and what
their attitudes were toward the University and its system of governance
in light of the election which had recently taken place.
1
2A sample of seventy-six faculty members was taken. These fac-
ulty members were interviewed during April of 1974, nearly six months
after the election. The interview contained five sections, each of
which pertained to an area of the study's concern:
Section 1:
Section 2:
Section 3:
Section 4
:
Section 5:
Faculty Attitudes Toward Unionism;
Faculty Attitudes Toward the Current University of
Massachusetts/Amherst Situation;
Faculty Perceptions of University Governance;
Faculty Attitudes Toward the November 13-16 Election;
Demographic Data.
The University of Massachusetts has campuses at Amherst, Boston
and Worcester. Amherst, the largest of the three, is considered the
"flagship" campus. Its origins were humble, beginning with the founding
of Massachusetts Agricultural College in 1863. "Mass Aggie," as it came
to be called, accepted its first class of under one hundred students
in 1867. These were small beginnings for a college founded to provide
"economical and sufficient instruction in practical arts and sciences
to the class of persons who do not desire or are unable to obtain a
collegiate education."^ One hundred years later, in 1973, the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts at Amherst employed nearly fifteen hundred fac-
ulty members and professional staff, and had over twenty-three thousand
undergraduate and graduate students. The growth of the University had
been sporadic over the hundred year period. In 1960, there were only
lliarold Whiting Cary. The University of Massachusetts^ A His-
tory of 100 Years . Springfield, Massachusetts: Walter Whittum,
Inc.,
1962, p. '6.
36,495 students, necessitating 366 full-time faculty members; by 1967,
the enrollment had more than doubled creating employment for 729 faculty
members. By 1973, fifteen hundred professional staff were needed to
accommodate the twenty-three thousand students. The University's growth
was fast but not unique. Higher education was experiencing enormous ex-
pansion during the sixties. In fact, it has been said that this fast-
paced growth, combined with the onset of the current recession, was one
of the key reasons behind a collective bargaining movement in higher ed-
ucation.
Although the election campaign at the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst raised a number of issues concerning university governance,
personnel policies and job satisfaction, the unionization movement at
the University of Massachusetts had to contend with one major disadvan-
tage. In 1973, the faculty at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst
were the highest paid faculty in public higher education in the state
and in the top twentieth percentile in the nation. Faculty work load
was no greater than that at a major research-oriented institution, and
general living conditions included adequate office space and rolling
Amherst hills. Thus, what are normally thought to be the major issues
/ influencing a decision to unionize—namely, wages and working conditions,
were missing from this campus.
But there were issues of concern to the Amherst campus faculty,
among them the more intangible matters of tne faculty share in academic
governance
,
possible future tenure quotas and general anticipation about
future job security . T.n addition, some faculty and administratoi s felt
that such particulars as a campus snafu over parking in the summer of
1973, the appointment of Dwight Allen (former Dean of the School of
2Education) to a University President's Committee, and several other
smaller administrative decisions had angered the faculty and enhanced
the position of those who favored unionization.
This study hypothesizes that when there are few major campus
issues in a collective bargaining election, the political predisposi-
tion and socialization, or political culture, of a faculty member are
more influential in determining voting behavior than the indices of
achieved status of the faculty member; i.e., tenure, rank, school affil-
iation, number of years at the University, or "administrative" office.
Two factors mutually reinforce one another in the context of
faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining. First, the attitudes
a faculty member holds toward unionism in general will help to determine
his or her perception of which campus issues are important and why.
Second, these perceptions in turn help to determine that faculty members'
attitudes towards unionism in general.
This study seeks to show that it was the predisposition of the
University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty member towards unionism that
2 In 1974, Dwight Allen resigned as Dean of the School of Educa-
tion. Although his resignation was concurrent with other personnel and
legal problems taking place within the School during the spring of 197a,
Allen was not implicated in that situation. He continues to hold a ten-
ured professorship at the School of Education.
3The political culture of an individual refers to a composite of
socialization fat tors, upbringing, choice of occupation, lifestyle, and
philosophical attitude.
5was the principal determinant of his or her vote in the November elec-
tion, rather than either the faculty member's perception of current
local issues, or his or her place in the demographic stratification of
the University. In this way, this study departs from other researchers
who have argued, based on their analyses of faculty voting behavior in
various elections, that local and demographic factors are highly signif-
icant forecasters of election outcomes.^
Significance of the Study
The examination of the outcome of the election on the Amherst cam-
pus offers a useful case study of factors affecting the movement towards
faculty collective bargaining. Many of the issues discussed by the
University of flassachusetts/Amherst faculty during the election were not
peculiar to this campus but remain of concern to many university and col-
lege campuses. An analysis of the University of Massachusetts/Amherst
experience is particularly significant because it was, in 1973, one of
the few major public universities to vote "no" on collective bargaining,
as well as one of a limited number which has voted at all.
Current published research has dealt far more extensively with
the colleges and universities which have elected an agent rather than
^Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset. Professors ,
Unions and American Higher Education . Carnegie Commission Report, Berkeley,
California, 1973. This book, which provides an analysis of two major
studies of faculty attitudes with regard to collective bargaining, is
used as a basis for much comparison throughout this study.
6with those voting "no" on unionization. This study is the only inter-
view case study of the November 1973 election.
The decision reached, whether affirmative or negative, in the
November election would have major ramifications upon the life of the
University community, administration, faculty, and students. Previous
to November 15th and 16th, there was an abundance of activity seeking a
large voter turnout from all segments of the University. The Chancellor's
Office urged all eligible persons to vote as did each of the faculty
groups. The importance of this vote to faculty members is given simple
testimonial in the proportion of those voting: ninety-seven percent
or 1,404 faculty members out of 1,449 eligible to vote.
Different researchers have suggested a variety of theories to
explain the differences in outcome among collective bargaining elections
on various campuses. This study seeks to test, and to confirm or deny,
the applicability of these "predictive" theories to the balloting at the
University of Massachusetts/Amherst campus.
The benefits of such a study are varied. Faculty members who
were involved in the organization of both the MSP-AAUP coalition and the
Committee of Concerned Faculty have expressed interest in obtaining the
findings. One obvious reason is to enable them to design a strategy for
any future election. They may be disappointed. If their assumption is
that this election depended upon a faculty member’s perception of local
campus issues, they will learn otherwise in this study, which argues
that local issues were absent in November of 1973. Of course, when local
issues are present in potent form, the outcome may well hinge upon
how
faculty perceive them.
7Delimitations of the Study
The delimitations of the study are those limits imposed within
the research design itself, and under the control of the researcher.
The sample size of the study (N = 76) constitutes five percent of the
University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty population. Although a five
percent overall sample can be representative of the total faculty popula-
tion, the small number of faculty members within each of the professional
schools
—
particularly Home Economics, Nursing, Business Administration,
Physical Education, Education, and Engineering could not serve as an
adequate sample of faculty attitudes within those schools. (Each of
these schools represents less than ten percent of the total faculty pop-
ulation. See page 13 for breakdown by schools, the percentage and actual
number
.
)
Although librarians above a certain rank were eligible to vote,
the sample population did not include librarians. Nor did it include ad-
ministrators and students which groups were not eligible to vote.
The timing of the interviews was crucial. When they were con-
ducted, four and one-half to five months had passed since the November
election. The emotion of the moment had ebbed, which may have been an
advantage, in allowing faculty members the time to sort through their
thoughts on the subject. However, with the passage of time, an oppor-
tunity also emerged for a consequent alteration of their
attitudes at
the time of the election.
8Another aspect of the timing of the interviews was important.
Although the departments had already forwarded their recommendations on
faculty promotions and reappointments to the administration, final de-
cisions had not yet been issued. Within the same month, an announcement
from the Provost's Office had been made calling for no new faculty posi-
tions, although there were no positions cut from the budget. Thus, ten-
sions were higher in the spring of 1974 than they were immediately after
the election.
The most accessible of the published and unpublished literature
seems biased toward the administrative viewpoint. If it had not been
for the NEA, AFT and AFL-CIO journals as well as the writings of Belle
Zeller and Israel Kugler, the researcher's perspective on the issues
would have been sorely one-sided.
Definition of Terms
Arbitration .
*
Arbitration is the reference of a dispute by voluntary agreement
of the parties to an impartial person for determination on the basis
of evidence and arguments presented by such parties, who agree in
advance to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and b ind-
ing
.
Arbitration, therefore, is a judicial proceeding and different
in nature from mediation, conciliation, negotiation, and t act- find
-
5ing.
*Unless otherwise noted, these terms were prepared by Dr. Keith
Groty, Michigan State University, for his collective bargaining
work.
5 Lab or Arbitration: Procedures and Techniques. American
Arbi-
tration Association, 140 51st Street, New York, New York
10020 (from
the Pamphlet's Glossary of Terms).
9Another definition, found in Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 6 has a more
informal connotation: "The submission of some disputed matter to selected
persons, and the substitution of their decision or award for the judge-
ment of the established tribunals of justice, thus avoiding the formali-
ties, the delay and the expense of ordinary litigation."
Bargaining Agent . An organization designated by an appropriate
government agency, or recognized voluntarily by the employer, as the ex-
clusive representative of all employees in the negotiating unit for pur-
poses of collective bargaining.
Bargaining Unit . A group of employees recognized by the employer
or designated by an authorized agency as appropriate for representation
by an organization for purposes of collective bargaining.
Collective Bargaining . 7 Collective bargaining is a procedure
looking toward making of collective agreements between employer and ac-
credited representatives of employees concerning wages, hours and other
conditions of employment; and requires that parties deal with each other
with open and fair minds and sincerely endeavor to overcome obstacles
existing between them.
Fact-finding . An individual or group of individuals appointed
to receive facts in an employment dispute to establish what they perceive
6Ballantine , s Law Dictionary . Rochester, New York: The Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing Company, 1948.
7 Black’s Law Dictionary , 4th Edition. St. Paul, Minnesota: West
Publishing Company, 1951.
10
to be the facts, and generally, but not necessarily, make recommenda-
tions for settlement.
Mediation. An attempt by a third party to help in negotiations
or the settlement of an employment dispute through suggestion, advice
or other ways of stimulating an agreement, short of dictating its provi-
sions.
A mediator is a person who undertakes mediation of a dispute.
Conciliation is the same as mediation.
Industrial Union Model . In the industrial union model, an agency
whose structure is external to that of the university is certified under
law upon affirmative vote of the faculty within a designed unit to serve
as the exclusive representative for all persons within that unit. Some
or all of the faculty within the unit are members of the agency or union.
Either the members of the union or of the unit select faculty and/or non-
faculty persons to represent them in bargaining with the employer with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment. Normally, negotiations result in a written agreement
which constitutes a contract between the employer and members of the
,
... 8bargaining unit. . . .
Faculty Professional Union . Same legal standing as the indus-
trial model but a major difference is that the leadership and the union
members also stress the professional standing of the faculty. Most groups
^As defined in the "Report of the Ad Hoc University Committee on
Collective Bargaining," Michigan State University, January 31, 1972,
pp. 16-17. Unpublished.
11
contending for certification as the bargaining agent in major universi-
ties reflect the professionalism of the faculty in their position state-
ments on aims and purposes.
Rationale for Research Methodology
The researcher sought to obtain as open-ended a set of responses
from faculty as was possible. Therefore, the interview technique was
adopted rather than the questionnaire or survey method. The interview,
although more obtrusive than the impersonal techniques of questionnaires,
is believed to produce richer data and to provide the researcher with
more access to the informant's thoughts. If there were to be felt issues
of local significance, a questionnaire might be incapable of eliciting
them. The questionnaire may fail to anticipate the necessary question,
and the informant must remain mute. A directed interview, however, can
remain open-ended and permit a flexibility within the interview situa-
tion by permitting the unsolicited reply as well as the opportunity for
,
9
follow-up questions.
Another reason for choosing the interview arose during the re-
searcher's preliminary discussions with campus faculty. Many faculty
members seemed to be skeptical of any attempts to document the election
9
Por an excellent discussion of the interview technique, see
Maurice Duverger, An Intr0ductlo_n_toJ:he_Social^Scjenceg_WLthJ?B££igl
R^fprnnre to Their Methodology , New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964,
and Diobold V: Van Dalen, Understanding Educational Research,
New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, inc., 1962.
12
for fear that the research would be used for the wrong purposes. An in-
terview format allowed the researcher to ease these anxieties. She feared
that a mailed questionnaire might produce a low rate of response.
Methodology
In order to interview a cross-section of University of Massachusetts/
Amherst faculty, the researcher constructed a sample designed to represent
the respective percentages of tenured and non-tenured faculty within each
of the schools and departments. These two criteria— tenure status and
school affiliation—were considered by other researchers on faculty col-
lective bargaining to be the most potent variables for the study. Boyer,
Lipset and Ladd, Carr and Van Eyck, Haehn, and Moore, in their respective
studies, cited these criteria as principal determinants of the outcomes
of a union election.
The University administration allowed the researcher access to
its current list of tenured faculty. Unable to reproduce the listing,
the researcher copied every fourth tenured name within each school.
From this listing, she was able to draw the final sample. The total
sample of tenured and non-tenured faculty within each major school rep-
resented five percent of the University faculty population.
The reason that the number of the researcher's population total
was 1,324 instead of 1,449 (the number of total faculty eligible to vote
in the November 1973 election) is that she took only "01" full-time fac-
ulty in the ten major schools. She could not include, without greatly
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increasing the size of the sample, "Provost Office" program faculty,
which incorporated faculty in special programs, the Labor Relations
Center, and other important programs in the University. Nor did the re-
searcher include librarians who have faculty status. These groups were
eligible to vote.
^ letter (see Appendix 1) was sent to each of the 130 names taken
from a 1973 faculty listing. Approximately seventy percent of the names
represented tenured faculty members and thirty percent non-tenured fac-
ulty members. In the letter, the interviewer explained the reason for
the interview and gave the names of the interviewer's doctoral disser-
tation committee members, inviting the recipient to call if he/she had
any questions."^ Within ten days of the faculty's receipt of the letter,
the researcher called each faculty member to inquire (1) whether he/she
would be willing to be interviewed, and (2) if yes, could he/she set up
a convenient time for the meeting. The interviews usually took between
forty-five minutes and an hour. The interviewer allowed one and one-
half hours per interview so that after each meeting, she could pause to
review her notes, write down any additional thoughts, and get to the next
interview on time. The interviewer found that she could conduct effec-
tively no more than five interviews per day, and, therefore, limited her
scheduling accordingly.
Very few individuals said that they would/could not be inter-
viewed and, therefore, the population to whom the initial letter was
^Doctoral Committee members changed because of the death of
Joseph Burroughs. Professor Harvey Friedman was added.
15
sent (130) was large enough to obtain the correct sample size (N = 76).
During each of the interviews, careful notes were taken on the faculty
member's responses to each of the thirty-seven questions (see Appendix 2).
A tape recorder was not used for several reasons. The inter-
viewer held preliminary discussions with faculty members in February
and March, and asked them whether they would feel less or more comfort-
able being interviewed with a tape recorder present. They all responded
that they would feel less comfortable being recorded. In two of the
test interview situations, the interviewer used the tape recorder and
got wh3t she felt were more elusive answers than she had obtained with-
out the tape recorder. In addition, the Watergate tapes had heightened
people's general nervousness about being recorder "for posterity."
If, during the interview, the researcher neglected to ask one of
the questions in Section 5, she called the individual to get the desired
information. The blank (0) responses in a few of the tables in Section 5
indicate the people whom the interviewer could not reach.
The Interview Format /
The thirty-seven questions in the interview were conceived to
get faculty attitudes on a variety of subjects—unionism, faculty col-
lective bargaining, academic governance, and other local issues.
The
order and position of the questions were carefully outlined
so that in
each section the responses of the faculty member could
best reflect
their genuine attitudes, with as little prejudice as possible
overlapping
16
from his/her previous responses. The following account provides a
description and rationale of each of the five sections of the inter-
view schedule.
,
Section 1: Faculty Attitudes Toward Unionism
1. When the term "collective bargaining" is used, what comes to
your mind?
The first question was calculated to be entirely general so as
to limit the association a faculty member might make to the specifics
of the November election. The aim was to uncover his or her general
views on unionism in society. Often, this question was answered with
a short, standard definition of collective bargaining to which the in-
terviewer did not respond. She waited for the faculty member to fill
the void by talking. This proved to be an effective device because it
was usually this second response which demonstrated the person's deeper
attitudes toward unionism.
2. Is there a distinction in your mind between collective bargain-
ing for blue collar workers and white collar workers? If yes,
what is the distinction?
Question number 2, concerning the difference between blue and
white collar unionism, then followed as an immediate step from the fac-
ulty member’s response to question number 1.
3. Should faculty at a university /college be involved in collective
bargaining?
17
4. Should collective bargaining in higher education include any
or all of the following:
a. economic issues; i
b. working conditions;
c. job security;
d. governance.
5. Should faculty in higher education be able to strike?
6. Have you or has any member of your family ever been a member of
a local or national union? Which union?
7. (Explain what a bargaining unit is.) Who would you include in a
bargaining unit?
Question number 3 dealt with the faculty member’s attitude toward
bargaining in higher education generally. The interviewer tried, in ques-
tions 4, 5 and 7, to keep the discussion at a fairly generalized level,
again in an attempt to evoke the individual’s most general attitudes
towards unionism and higher education before introducing the issues and
specifics of the Amherst campus balloting. The interviewer found that
question number 6 would be answered during the discussion produced by
questions 1 and 2. If the faculty member had not already discussed a
personal or family member's membership in a union, that membership was
likely to be unimportant to the individual. Although the question was
still asked, it never produced an answer in contradiction to the re-
sponses given in reply to question numbers 1 and 2.
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Section 2: Faculty Attitudes Toward the Current
University of Massachusetts/Amherst Situation
1. What did you perceive tio be the major issues affecting the MSP-
AAUP no-agent election on November 15 and 16? Could you state
which, if any, of these affected your vote? (Please prioritize)
Responses to the second half of question number 1 often surfaced
in a faculty member's answer to the main question. In this case, the in-
terviewer proceeded to question number 2 without further elaboration.
2. Is salary an issue to you? Are you satisfied with your current
salary?
3. Are "working conditions" an issue for you?
4. Do you feel that you have been fairly treated in terms of promo-
tion and tenure at the University of Massachusetts?
/ 5. Do you think that the personnel policies are fairly implemented
at this university? Are they effective?
Questions number 2 and 3 usually got brief responses because
neither salary nor working conditions were felt by faculty to be an im-
portant issue. Since both of these subjects are traditional parts of a
union's collective bargaining agreement, the researcher felt they should
be asked. If there were dissatisfactions with the university as an em-
ployer, they surfaced in the faculty member's answers to questions 4 and
5.
If a faculty member had had a negative experience concerning promo-
tion or tenure, the hypothesis was that this individual would be more
apt
to vote for a union. When it could be determined that the faculty
member's
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reaction to a personnel issue did not influence his/her attitude toward
unionism, the interviewer would proceed to the next section.
I
Section 3; Faculty Perceptions of University Governance
By placing this important section in the middle of the interview,
the researcher hoped that the faculty member would feel both relaxed and
unhurried. This proved effective. In most cases, faculty would take
the opportunity to turn their attention away from the issue of collec-
tive bargaining and towards their views concerning governance on the
Amherst campus. Because his/her ideas on personnel policies had already
been articulated in Section 2, the faculty member could allude to the
earlier remarks by reaffirming his/her positive or negative opinions
about unionism and its possible effect on university governance. At
other times, the faculty member sensed that he or she was contradicting
statements made in Section 2 and, in a few cases, these perceived contra-
dictions led the faculty member to volunteer the admission that if the
election were held today (April 1974), his or her vote would have changed.
1. In what areas should faculty have influence in University gov-
ernance?
2. Should faculty have final authority over these matters, or should
they make recommendations to the Chancellor? To the President?
To the Board
.
3. In your opinion, does the present system of faculty governance
provide adequately for faculty voice over these matters? Very
well? Fairly well? Not very well?
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4. Do you think students should be involved in collective bargain-
ing?
5. Are you fully familiar with the grievance procedures?
6. How much time would you say you spent on faculty governance
matters?
Questions 1 through 4 focussed upon the faculty member's percep-
tions of shared governance. Question 5 was fairly routine. Having re-
viewed many of the studies conducted by students of university collec-
tive bargaining, the researcher recognized the critical role that griev-
ance policy played in the forming of collective bargaining contracts.
She was interested in the relative importance of this area of governance
before the period of contract negotiation itself. It would, of course,
be up to another to study the University of Massachusetts/Amherst fac-
ulty in order to determine whether the relative weight of this issue in-
creased under collective bargaining. The responses to question number 6
varied according to the faculty member's role within the department.
Presumably, a department chairperson or a member of a departmental per-
sonnel committee would spend considerably more time on administrative
detail then would other faculty members. One question was whether the
increased familiarity with administrative functions, accompanied by an
increased sense of power presumed to characterize faculty holding those
offices, would lessen the. need for collective representation on the part
of such faculty. Question number 6, in conjunction with the faculty
member's vote, attempted to address this inquiry.
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7. How do you think a union contract might affect the quality of
education?
>
Question number 7 returned to the issue of collective bargaining
so as to introduce the subject of Section 4 — Local Campus Issues. In
asking question number 7, the researcher often prefaced it by asking the
faculty member to define the phrase, "quality of education." This phrase
is heavy with connotation (especially when asked by an Ed.D. candidate);
and so, the interviewer felt that it would be best to seek to clear the
air on this matter, and thereby avoid its pejorative entry into the re-
maining discussion. Faculty responses to this inquiry often confirmed
their attitudes articulated in Sections 1 and 2.
Section 4: Local Campus Issues
Section 4 contained four questions all geared toward the campaign
of the MSP-AAUP and the CCF. Questions number 1 and 2 attempted to gain
insight into the faculty member's knowledge of the campaign issues and
perceptions of the MSP-AAUP staff and faculty members.
1. How did you become aware of the issues surrounding the election?
From another faculty member? At a department meeting? Through
CCF or MSP-AAUP newsletters? Via "The Collegian"? University
Bulletin"? Others?
2. Would you explain your perceptions of the MSP-AAUP
coalition?
3. On November 26th, Governor Sargent signed a
law enabling all
public employees to bargain for wages and hours.
Would the
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earlier passage of this law have affected your vote at the
University of Massachusetts/Amherst? Yes? No?
A. Prior to November 15th and 16th', had you heard about any of the
state college contracts negotiated in the past sixteen months?
Question numbers 3 and 4 attempted to reveal the faculty's aware-
ness of issues pending off-campus, the former of which would have direct-
ly affected their own bargaining rights with the trustees.
Section 5: The Demographic Data
The fifth section was placed last in order to permit as much in-
formality as possible. It was in question number 10, placed in an other-
wise routine series of questions, that the faculty member was asked to
disclose how he/she voted in the November election. If this question had
come any earlier, the faculty member might have been waried of making a
frank reply.
All other questions in Section 5 were the result of conclusions
derived by other researchers that such indices as age, faculty rank, ad-
ministrative status, tenure, years in service were significant factors
affecting collective bargaining balloting (see Appendix 2, Section 5).
In order to correlate the findings of this study with those of earlier
demographic researchers, this data from the sample of the Amherst faculty
needed compilation.
The responses to the questions in Section 5 were tabulated and
cross analyzed by computer. The tables incorporated in the discussion
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of Section 5 are copies of the actual printouts obtained from the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences," (SPSS) Program.
Organization of the Study
It is important to set the University of Massachusetts/Amherst
collective bargaining election into the wider context of the history of
American higher education. Thus, within Chapter II, an historical con-
text is developed, pertaining not only to the history of American higher
education, but to the society within which American academe came of age.
A society bent on creating egalitarianism was to have a great
impact on the tradition of elitism from which the European scholars ben-
efited. American laws and the cases which tested these laws led to a
dilemma which American faculties would face through the years. This con-
flict between the traditional elitism of academe and the societal egal-
itarianism is a component of each individual faculty member's predis-
position. The purpose of Chapter II is to trace how this dilemma arose
and the nature of the impact on each faculty member's vote.
Chapter III includes the analysis of the seventy-six faculty in-
terviews. In the course of each interview, the faculty member was quer-
ied on his/her perceptions of (1) personal attitudes toward collective
bargaining and higher education; (2) his/her curren t gob status at the
University; (3) the faculty's role with respect to governance at the
Amherst campus; and (4) the local campus issues. These perceptions were
than related to (5) demograph i c data . Section 5 of the interview has
24
been placed before Sections 1 through 4 in Chapter III. The reason is
that having described and cross analyzed the demographic data, the re-
searcher can refer back to it in her analysis of the questionnaire sec-
tions. Finally, an analysis of the sample interviews would have been
incomplete if it had not included a discussion of the current collective
bargaining literature as it related to each of the issues arising from
the interviews. The researcher elected to intersperse related litera-
ture with the interview results in order to place the University of
Massachusetts/Amherst faculty sample findings in juxtaposition with
other studies and opinions.
Chapter IV provides a summary of the findings and a discussion
of each of these findings as they relate to the hypothesis of the study.
Because the interviews were computed in the spring of 1974 and a collec-
tive bargaining election has since taken place, the context of the en-
tire study has changed. Faculty attitudes concerning unionism, however,
may not have changed so radically. Rather the set of circumstances in
1973-1974 and 1976-1977 were indeed different, the former having been a
rare period of relative stability among faculty bread and butter issues,
the latter a period representing the state's fiscal turmoil. An histor-
ical viewpoint is taken, therefore, in order that the reader gain a
clearer sense of what the faculty member was thinking in the spring of
1974. Thoughts and sentiments had obviously changed drastically by
February of 1977 when the faculty at the University of Massachusetts
(from both the Amherst and Boston campuses) voted overwhelmingly in a
/ run-off election to support the Massachusetts Society of Professors (an
NEA affiliate).
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The purpose of this study has been to assess whether, in fact,
the predisposition of the faculty at the University of Massachusetts '
was the major determinant in the outcome of the collective bargaining
election of 1973. The nature of predisposition and of the cluster of
associated faculty attitudes composing predisposition are, therefore, /
central to the inquiry. The specific cluster of attitudes with which
this study is concerned are:
1. Individual faculty attitudes toward the role of the academic
profession;
2. Faculty attitudes toward their individual role expectations
within the profession;
3. Faculty attitudes toward membership in professional faculty
interest groups;
4. Faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining.
To understand the origins and development of these attitudes,
it is necessary to explore the historical and social roots in both
Europe
and America of the academic profession, the professional
associations
serving faculty interests, and of collective bargaining in
higher edu-
cation.
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These topics are treated in extended form as follows: first,
in an explanation of the origins of academic governance in European and
American higher education; second, in a study of the development of fac-
ulty professional associations; and third, in an historical sketch of
the growth of collective bargaining as a feature of American higher ed-
ucation.
The first section of the chapter provides an historical review
of the origins of American higher education, its European roots and the
intrinsic elements of that tradition which, when transplanted to America,
took quite different forms.
The America which first demanded and created higher learning was
interested in a different product than what the European universities
had created. American ideals were different; American laws were new,
and the code of behavior for all those involved in higher education
would be seen differently by the American citizenry. The faculty mem-
ber’s view of himself and his role is an important dimension of his pre-
disposition.
His role expectations within academe become the framew'ork from
which he views major professional issues such as academic freedom, ten-
ure, scholarship, and professionalism. These are value-laden elements
of the profession which evolved over centuries but which are now being
challenged by a demanding public. To protect themselves and these ele-
ments of their profession, faculties have created and become members of
interest groups.
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The history and objectives of associations like the American
Association of University Professors, the American Federation of Teachers
/ and the National Education Association provide a modern parallel to the
guilds of Europe which the American academic never developed. Finally,
^ the collective bargaining laws themselves which have a direct impact on
higher education and the future of the public employee have recently
come to be a part of what the faculty member has recognized as the na-
ture of an egalitarian society. Whether or not he chooses to use these
laws to enhance his own position is at least partially influenced by his
attitude toward the union movement, its objectives and its procedures.
The teacher associations, which once protected the academic, now have
minimal control over the important issues in the profession. The asso-
ciations themselves, therefore, have used these new laws to increase
their own power and legitimize their continued existence.
The manner in which these collective bargaining laws evolved
and the groups affected by them contributed toward shaping the faculty's
-/ collective predisposition before the collective bargaining election at
the University of Massachusetts in 1973.
All of the elements mentioned above— the historical setting of
the academic profession, the faculty member's view of major issues and
how they affect his specific role, faculty membership interest groups,
and the collective bargaining laws—were in combination the components
of each faculty member's frame of reference or predisposition.
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Origins of Academic Governance
Although the number of faculties represented by collective bar-
gaining agents continues to grow, it nevertheless remains only a minor-
ity within the total number of faculty in America (150,000 of 600,000).
Why has the impulse towards unionism come so late on the campus? It is
suggested here that while the reasons are complex and are shaped by the
history of the emergence of shared governance responsibilities in high-
er education, much of the reluctance on the part of faculty members to
undertake to bargain collectively has been the result of the relatively
privileged status faculty members have enjoyed both in European and
American cultures. The "professor", unlike any ordinary laborer, has
traditionally inhabited more the life of the mind than the world of what
William Wordsworth scorned as "getting and spending." This status of
standing apart from "the madding crowd" is of crucial significance in
the reluctance of faculty, even when their material rewards have been
less than sumptuous, to take up symbolic arms against their employer .
The Guild
The beginnings of university governance are found, according to
Richard Hofstadter, in the creation of the two medieval universities
in
Paris and Bologna. In Bologna, the students were in charge.
Coming as
they did from the wealthy and noble families, they took
it as quite nat-
ural that they should dictate to their faculty the
form their studies
should take. Although the students might be
clergy, studying canon law
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or lay, studying civil law, their teachers were usually laymen, and were
both free of ecclesiastic supervision and the protection of its order.
They were, thus, vulnerable to the power of their students who had be-
gun to organize guilds through which to hire their masters and in the
process to subject them "to a rigid and detailed academic discipline." 1
At the University in Paris, however, it was the faculty who or-
ganized strong guilds more typical of the powers of faculty over students
which were to become characteristic of higher education. In Paris, the
teachers were primarily clerical (principally) offering studies in the-
ology and philosophy. In both universities, the scholars were influen-
tial. At Paris, the masters were looked to for interpretations of ec-
clesiastic law, and at Bologna for rulings on civil law. And in both
universities, the faculty, in order to elect their own officials and to
set rules about teachings, sought to form "autonomous corporations con-
2 ....
ceived in the spirit of the guilds." In such guilds, in their capacity
to protect the rights of faculty members, are the origins of the norms
of faculty governance in American higher education.
The powers of the masters from the University of Paris included
what would today be called a "strike". They could and did stop giving
lectures whenever they needed to "bargain" for increased pay or benefits.
Another strategy was to move to another town, taking with them as many
1
Richard Hofstadter. Academic Freedom in_the,_Age_of,„thg_CQjJiggg.«
New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 4.
^ Ibid
. ,
p . 6
.
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devoted students as possible. During a period of "town-gown" unrest in
1228, a number of the masters migrated from the University of Paris to
Oxford and Cambridge which developed as faculty-or icntcd institutions
and were the models upon which Harvard College, the first American col-
lege, was built. The masters were determined to protect their preroga-
tives and banded together in their daily activities to assume their cor-
porate power. They were often obligated upon admission to a university
to take oaths, affirming allegiance to their disciplines, to their col-
leagues, and to the university statutes. The masters went further and
spelled out regulations governing their teaching itself. Mary McLaughlin,
in her doctoral dissertation, concluded:
For the liberties which enabled them to exercise their intellectual
functions made possible also the corporate (researcher's emphasis)
imposition and enforcement of restrictions. Now it was the insti-
tution and its parts which not only claimed freedom but exercised
control .
^
When scholarship and teaching were synonymous with the laws and
beliefs of the church, there were few problems for the masters of Paris.
Trouble arose, however, as teachers began researching areas within the
arts and sciences, the results of which were in direct cont lict to the
tenets of the church. A scholar so motivated might quickly become a
"heretic", such as John of Brescain who was expelled from the city of
3
Mary M. McLaughlin. "Intellectual Freedom and Its
in the University of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
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Paris in 1247 when he tried to introduce theological issues into the
teaching of logic.
^
The lay board . The tradition of faculty self-rule in the col-
leges of Oxford and Cambridge universities, born in the Catholic prac-
tice of faculty hegemony at Paris and the effort to protect the prerog-
atives of clerical academics from the intrusions of lay power, ^ did not
survive the passage to America. In the New World, there was not one de-
nomination but several, and Protestantism looked with suspicion on the
guild mentality of faculty corporatism. In the words of Richard Hofstadter,
American Protestants did not consider that they were destroying in-
tellectual freedom by extending the policy of lay government from
churches to colleges. Indeed, they considered it one of their con-
tributions to civilization that they had broken up the priestly
autonomy of advanced education and had brought it under the control
of the community.^
Once the step had been taken to admit laymen into church gover-
nance, it was not a "very drastic step," Hofstadter added, to admit into
positions of authority over the college men who were not academics, al-
though clergymen themselves typically dominated the board membership of
the early colleges.
7 Designed to supervise the administration of the
colleges, legally the lay board became the college. Whether or not they
^Hofstadter
,
Academic Freedom , pp . 81-83.
5 Ibid., p. 121.
^Ibid
. ,
p. 122.
7 lb id
.
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were clergymen, its members were the worthy and prosperous citizens of
the community, and their authority depended not a little on the precar-
ious financial standing the college by itself possessed. Indeed, the
dominant theme throughout the development of American higher education
would be the dependence upon one or another "benefactor"—whether pri-
vate or public from whose final authority all powers were delegated.
Faculty members in the earliest American colleges were not only
subject to the authority of the lay governing board, their circumstances
also differed from those of European faculty in that there was little
demand in the colonies for professional interpretation of legal matters,
for there was no canon or civil law requiring scholarly exposition. The
first "tutor" at Harvard was by no means the heir to the authority of an
Abelard. The first faculty members at Harvard, for example, were in al-
most all cases studying for the ministry, and spent more time at their
own studies—a required three post-baccalaureate years of residence for
the Master of Arts degree— than they did in teaching undergraduates. So
brief was their average length of stay at the college that the tutors
resembled far more the modern graduate student than modern faculty mem-
ber. Henry Dunster, the first president of Harvard College, lamented in
1653 that tutors came and went so fast that "ever and anon all the work
g
committed to them falleth agen on my shoulders."
In this way, with the truncation of faculty power, all of the
real decision-making "falleth agen" on the shoulders of the president
8
Ibid., p. 85.
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whose immediate powers stemmed not from his faculty but from the board
who held the college charter. These powers were to become deeply en-
trenched in American higher education,, and were almost never seriously
challenged
.
Yet, there were a few early cases in which the faculty of a col-
lege attempted to enlarge their powers in the governance of the institu-
tion. One such instance occurred at William and Mary College during the
1750 s. The faculty members of the college were mostly Oxford graduates
and were, therefore, accustomed to the practice of faculty authority at
Oxford. After trying fervently to attain what authority they could from
the Board of Visitors, the faculty at William and Mary eventually had to
9
acquiesce before the Board.
Thomas Jefferson's dream for the foundation of the University of
Virginia presupposed that its principal powers would be exercised by its
faculty, although nominally overseen by a Board of Visitors. In the words
of Hofstadter,
. . . there were to be eight schools altogether, including schools
of law and medicine. The best available professors were to be se-
cured, and they were to be sought abroad as well as at home, at
whatever risk of criticism from provincials and chauvinists. They
were to be paid ample salaries. They were to give lectures, not
merely preside over recitations. The students, who (with a few ex-
ceptions) would not be allowed to enter until the age of sixteen,
would be somewhat more mature than those at most American Colleges.
. . . Professors would have relatively secure, although not abso-
lute, tenure. Moreover, there would be democracy within the faculty:
an inoffensive rotating chairmanship would replace the customary
university presidency, after the fashion of the rotation of the rec-
tors in the German universities.-^
^Ibid., pp. 133-134.
^Ibid
. ,
p . 239
.
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The Jeffersonian aspiration for broad faculty authority was
never realized for many reasons, among them the slow but steadfast con-
trol of the lay board over academic governance described above. The lay
board of trustees in turn incorporated its power in the president, the
chief academic administrator. As the years turned into decades and high-
er education became mass education, the offices of these administrators
became vast bureaucracies of administration.
The American belief in the pre-eminence of "practical" men was
powerfully held as expressed in 1848 by the Harvard historian, Samuel
Eliot
:
Gentlemen almost exclusively engaged in instruction and discipline
of youth are not, usually, in the best condition to acquire that ex-
perience in affairs and acquaintance with men which, to say the least,
are extremely desirable in the management of the exterior concerns of
a large literary institution. Arrangements for instruction must be
adapted to the state of the times and to that of the world around as
well as of that within the college walls; and of this state, men en-
gaged in the active business of life are likely to be better judges
than the literary man. -*-*-
In this "epitaph" for faculty governance, as Rudolph termed it,
Eliot expressed the conviction of his era that the president and the lay
board should retain fundamental control of the institution. But, at the
same time, the professional status of faculty members was growing. In-
deed, it had begun to improve as early as 1767 when at Harvard College
the job of tutor was shifted away from monitoring a class of students
towards teaching a specific subject. This shift, in emphasis from
1
^Samuel A. Eliot. A Sketch of the History of Harvard College
and of Its Present State, Boston, Massachusetts, 1848, p. 49. Quoted^
by Frederick Rudolph in The American College and University , New
York
Random House, Vintage Books, 1962, p. 167.
35
students to subject matter, became more widespread in the latter quarter
of the nineteenth century, and eventually "transformed tutors into schol-
ars or instructors with professional ambitions," and would prefigure the
emergence of discipline-based departments with their hierarchy of instruc-
tors, assistant professors, associate professors, and prof essors .
^
With the imitation in America of the German emphasis upon re-
search and post-graduate instruction, American academic man evolved from
"jack of all trades" to the specialist of the department. The Ph.D. be-
gan to be a prerequisite for a teacher to enter the "better institutions."
These "organization men" were more and more unlike their predecessors on
campus whose only badge, in Rudolph's words, was "an honest face and
13
whose only uniform was a rumpled, baggy old suit of clothes." By the
turn of the century, the doctorate had become the emblem of professional
competence, of that "sameness of training, experience and exposure to the
14
ideals, the rules, the habits of German scientific scholarship." But
such an accent upon the unrestricted right of research was flawed by the
realities of the American campus and the absence of job security.
Academic freedom in America . The concept of academic freedom was
not new to the American professor even at the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury; it had been developed and strengthened in the German university
many centuries before. The word "lehrfreiheit translated meant the
^Frederick Rudolph. The American College and University . New
York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1962, p. 163.
^ lb id
. ,
p . 395
.
14 Ibid.
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right of the university professor "to freedom of teaching and to freedom
f . . „15o inquiry. To this substantial definition, American higher education
would add the notion of freedom of speech.
This attempt to assimilate the doctrine of free speech into the
doctrine of academic freedom (generated)
. . . the greatest amount of aca-
demic friction." For it was during this same period that the American
professoriate would turn to the studies of evolution, many following the
research of Charles Darwin. The conflict over the content of Darwin's
hypothesis and research became enmeshed in the struggle for academic
freedom, little of which did the governing "lay boards" fully understand.
The academic struggles over Darwinism dominated the latter half of the
nineteenth century and, as Metzger so succinctly states,
. . . implicated all that was problematic in the area of human judge-
ment. . . the great Darwinian debate was richer in significant issues
than any in the American annals of disputation. It went far beyond
the substantive problem of whether evolution was true, and far beyond
the psychological problem of how to hold to acquired science while
retaining birth-right beliefs. Touching on the nature and sanctions
of authority, the methods and problems of verification, the standards
of scientific debate, the Darwinian controversy eventually implicated
all that was problematic in the area of human judgement. . . we can
summarize these conflicts by saying that science and education joined
forces to attack two major objectives— the authority of the clergy
and the principles of doctrinal moralism—and that one of the effects
of this coalition was the hastening of academic reform.-*-'7
15Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger. The Development of
Academic Freedom in the United States . New York: Columbia Lniversity
Press, 1955, pp. 386-387.
16
Rudolph, American College , p. 413.
^Hofstadter and Metzger, Development of Academic Freedom , p. 346.
37
In all of this turmoil, however, no organization existed to pro-
tect the academy. The reason, Metzger explains, has its correlation to
the twentieth century development of collective bargaining. Professors
work in relative isolation, in library stacks, not factories; and al-
though other types of professionals had representative organizations,
the professor did not, precisely because he did not consider himself
/ primarily a teaching professional, rather a professor of social science
or of economics. His allegience, therefore, was greater to his colleagues
within his discipline than to any peer group of college professors.
"Most important," continues Metzger, "there was a deep aversion among
academic men to entering into an4 organization whose purposes smacked of
trade unionism. The dignity of the profession, fashioned on a genteel
.
„18
code of manners, was opposed to the tactics of a pressure group.
The expansionist period . Thors tein Veblen's work, The Higher
Learning in America
,
was published in 1918. Although written during the
nineteenth century, Veblen*s book provided a major statement depicting
the polarity between the culture of teaching and learning and the culture
of "big" business during the early twentieth century. Veblen foresaw the
bureaucratization inherent in big business creeping into the expanding
institutions of higher education. The university was quickly becoming
an ordinary business establishment both because of its governing
board
and by way of the changing role of the college president—no
longer an
academic but a manager under the domination of these
businessmen who
18 Ibid.
,
p. 470.
38
were not only college presidents but members of the governing boards.
Metzger paraphrases Veblen's gloomy but predictable role for the college
professor. "The universities of the nation have adopted the hierarch-
ical gradation of staff common to business management; the techniques of
salesmanship and promotion native to competitive enterprises, and they
have reduced American professors to the status of business hirelings."19
This trend toward bureaucratization, as Metzger indicates, was
stimulated by the growth of the modern university. Expansion was American
higher education's code name during the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury; and because of this new phenomenon, institutional practices were
changing to keep pace. What every self-respecting small college wanted
in 1910 was to become a university; and what every university desired
was to become bigger . The changes brought about by institutional expan-
sion were vast. As each college grew in student enrollment, so too would
its faculty increase. As institutions grew, personnel policies were de-
veloped until the concept of academic tenure became synonymous with these
new policies; so much so that its original reason for existence
—
protec-
tion for academic freedom—became obfuscated by the personnel policies
themselves. Today, faculties and governing boards alike are questioning
the true meaning of academic tenure and its forerunner (and reason for
existence)
,
academic freedom. They are asking what role these two corner-
stones of academe will be assigned in the implementation of a collective
bargaining agreement. One example of the growth of higher education can
19Hofstadter and Metzger, Development of Academic Freedom , p. 452.
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be found in the history of a small agricultural college in Western
Massachusetts
.
A Case in Point: The University of Massachusetts
Harold Whiting Cary has written the only history of the University
of Massachusetts. It began in 1825 with the legislative appointment of
a committee, headed by Theodore Sedgwick, to study the feasibility of a
state seminary which would supply "economical and sufficient instruction
in the practical arts and sciences to that class of persons who do not
v 20desire or are unable to obtain a collegiate education."
By the spring of 1826, the committee had produced a highly pro-
gressive and unique document calling for land to be given to the commun-
ity for use as an experimental farm. The legislature was asked to give
twenty thousand dollars a year for the first two years, five thousand
dollars a year over a ten-year period for a literary fund, the total of
which the committee believed would sufficiently support the new institu-
tion. Unfortunately, the legislature did not find the committee's study
worthy of funding. However, the ideas of the 1826 document had captured
almost precisely the essence of the future Land Grant Act. It had fore-
cast a social revolution in post-secondary education forty years before
its time.
20
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When the Morrill Land Grant Act was signed by Abraham Lincoln
on July 2, 1862, a new direction was born for higher education. In less
than one year and only ten days after the conditions of the Morrill Act
were accepted by the Massachusetts General Court (April 28, 1863), the
charter for a new college was outlined and adopted. There was one major
snafu. No state money had been allocated for the project. Apparently,
it was of little consequence to the General Court that the Morrill Land
Grant Act required a state share a funding within five years of receiving
the federal funds or forfeit the grant.
President French, the college's first president, had a consider-
ably difficult task on his hands. The combination of reluctant taxpayers,
farmers and legislators formed some of the roadblocks to what might have
been a swift beginning. After two presidents, numerous bills and much
conflict over the curriculum, the college opened its doors to thirty-
four students on October 2, 1867 under the leadership of William S. Clark.
Two-fifths of the students came from within a twenty-mile radius of the
Amherst site, and only two students were from outside the state. Three-
quarters of those first students had had some experience on a farm. The
faculty, though small, was an experienced group: President Clark, Levi
Stockbridge who was in charge of the farm, Henry Hill Goodell, a profes-
sor of rhetoric and foreign language from Amherst College, and Professor
E. S. Snell in mathematics, constituted the faculty, staff and adminis-
tration.
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As could be predicted, the major battles confronting the small
college were over state support. 21 According to the Morrill Act, the
state had to support the college to a minimal extent. Even with the
state’s initial capital investment of 350,000 dollars, the college
quickly ran short of cash and soon ran into debt. In response to a re-
quest for additional monies, the Massachusetts legislature, believing
that the college should be completely self-sustaining, surrendered its
power of appointment over the college's Board of Trustees and, at the
„
same time, withdrew its limited financial support. In effect, the state
was saying, "You keep within your own budget and be accountable to your
own Board .
"
In 1871, the last thing that Massachusetts Agricultural College
wanted was fiscal autonomy. The college went into even heavier debt.
President Clark continually requested funding from the legislature and
was as often rebuffed. At one point, out of shear spite, Clark offered
tuition-free scholarships to eighty-eight students. The debt increased.
This pattern continued until 1882 when Paul Ansel Chadbourne, who had
been the college's second president, was brought back to the college to
serve as its sixth president. During his term, the budget improved, en-
abling a slight expansion of the liberal arts curriculum and a dual set
of courses to be offered: "agricultural and scientific' and scientific
and literary." Following Chadbourne was perhaps the best known of all
/
University of Massachusetts' presidents, Henry Hill Goodeil. Goodell's
21
It is interesting to note here that in 1977 , the battle rerm-.ins
the same. The amount of State support still provides the bone of conten-
tion for University of Massachusetts administration, faculty, and for
State officials.
tenure at the college was marked by a growth in faculty, expansion of
the Experimental Station and the introduction of a modified "elective"
curriculum. By 1892, there was a graduate school, the first women stu-
dents and a two-year non-degree course in "practical agriculture."
Hindsight may prove that the most significant era for the
Massachusetts college would come during the term of Kenyon Butterfield
(1906-1924). Several major events took place during Butterfield's pres-
idency. First, he reorganized the administration by creating two new
posts—a Dean of the College and a Director of the Graduate School.
Second, and perhaps his most extraordinary innovation, was Butterfield's
reorganization of the faculty into academic divisions.
The activities of the college staff— teaching, research and the newly
established extension work—were to be administered in departmental-
ized units, and the twenty-three departments - grouped into divisions
having common interests. The chain of responsibility was computed
by the recognition of the group of division heads as a cabinet which
would meet regularly with the president to advise on college policy. 22
Butterfield had introduced the day of specialization. The area most af-
fecced by Butterfield's reorganization was the Department of Agriculture
which, within a few years, grew from two full-time faculty to nineteen,
creating a division with six different departments instead of the original
one. Included in this division's expansion was the additional function
of the training of agricultural teachers for the state high schools. Es-
tablished in ]906 with financial assistance from the state, the "Normal
Department" offered courses in educational psychology, school problems
and extension work.
22Carv, The University of Massachusetts , p. 106.
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During this time, large numbers of faculty were added to staff
the new university extension. The idea of continuing education was not
new to these "experts" who, instead of delivering a lecture in their
classroom, went out into the community to convey the newest method in
agricultural technology.
All of these developments were not going unnoticed by the state
legislature which, having abandoned Massachusetts Agricultural School
in its hour of need, now saw this dynamic college as a potential source
of revenue. Nineteen hundred and eighteen proved to be a fateful year
for the college. The state, in reorganizing its own constitution, re-
claimed the college and placed it under the supervision of a commissioner
of education. Fiscal control was the objective of the legislature and
control it took, through a series of procedural changes. First was the
introduction of the line budget which "made it virtually impossible for
the trustees to meet unusual demands for expenditure by transferring
23
funds." The second innovation deprived the college of the money gained
from student tuition and from the sale of agricultural products. These
revenues were no longer paid to the institution but had to be deposited
in the state treasury and spent only through the appropriation process.
At the same time, the state supervisor of administration created a sys-
tem of controls over all administrative and faculty appointments, sal-
aries, titles, duties, and even the publications of the college’s staff
members. One can easily see the beginnings of increased legislative pow-
er. One result of these new rules and regulations was the resignation
of
#
23
Ibid., p. 141.
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a most capable and certainly one of the strongest presidents of the col-
lege. In May of 1924, Kenyon Butterfield submitted his resignation and,
in writing to the commissioner of education stated, "I was driven out by
9 /
this whole business of State House Control." A more lamentable cry
was never heard.
Tight state control would continue for many decades, but not with-
out some fiscal struggle from Massachusetts Agricultural College. Her
students were beginning to campaign for more of a broad-based education
and access to higher degrees. Their efforts were finally rewarded in
1930 when the small college was renamed Massachusetts State College.
Nine years later, the trustees voted to grant a Bachelor of Arts degree.
After an enrollment decline caused by the depression and World
War II, applications began to increase in the middle 1940’s. By 1945,
the returning veterans added vast numbers to a college which was hardly
able to provide for the seventeen hundred students already enrolled. A
large building program was planned and begun; faculty were hired; and
programs were designed to reflect the needs of this new type of student.
The "GI Bill," encompassing two laws passed in May of 1973 and June of
1944, added equal pressure to the college’s enrollment figures.
In partial response to the new demands, a two-year extension
college program was established at Fort Devens. By October of 1946,
, ,
25
1,310 students were enrolled at the army base.
2A Ibid., p. 143.
25 Ibid., p. 172.
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Increased enrollments and an extension campus were two of the
many reasons why Massachusetts State College made the quick transition
to become the University of Massachusetts in 1947. Only five years be-
fore, a petition for such a change had fallen on deaf ears.
During the decade of the 1950's, student enrollment doubled,
and new schools were introduced as quickly as faculty could be hired to
teach the new courses. John Paul Mather, Provost of the University, as-
sumed the presidency in 1954; and in his succeeding six-year term, estab-
lished an even stronger college of arts and sciences, several new profes-
v 26
sional schools and a well-developed graduate school. One of Mather's
most important goals was his commitment to "the development of inspired
undergraduate teaching." Cary quotes Mather's inaugural speech, "It
will profit us nothing if we build many new buildings fully equipped
with modern gadgets and then fill these shiny new tin cans with half-
27
baked beans. . . staff or students."
Mather worked strenuously toward the reinstatement of power by
the Board of Trustees over all fiscal matters. He was partially success-
ful. It was not until President Lederle's term, however, that Chapter
648 of the Acts of 1962, giving complete autonomy to the Board, was
passed. Section 14 has become an important passage in that piece of
legislation
:
The trustees shall have complete authority with respect to the
elec-
tion or appointment of the professional staff including terms ,
con-
ditions and periods of employment, compensation, promotion,
26 Ibid., p. 178.
27
Ibid., pp. 189-190.
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classification, and reclassification, transfer, demotion, and dis-
missal within funds available by appropriation of the General Court
* * * * ^he trustees shall establish and make public a policy on
j faculty tenure which provides for removal for just cause, hearing
upon dismissal, and judicial review.
The law gave final authority to a Board of Trustees each of whom
is appointed by the governor for a three-year term. This group of in-
dividuals has the power to dismiss and hire the staff of the University.
With the passage of this bill in 1962, the University joined other insti-
tutions of higher education in what was by then a fairly typical American
governance system.
Under President Lederle, the University grew from an enrollment
of 6,495 students in .1966 to 20,462 in 1970, the biggest ten-year growth
in the history of the college. The increase in faculty matched the growth
in enrollment and rose from 360 faculty in 1960 to 1,134 faculty members
in 1970.
As was typical for most land grant colleges and universities dur-
ing the 1960's, "UMass" experienced an era of growth, experimentation and
lavishness. The effects of this period could be seen in a multitude of
ways. Expectations of those brought in during the expansionist period
remained high. Students were promised a "great university education";
jobs were plentiful and were believed to utilize the talents of these
university graduates. Faculty and staff were given a free hand in both
curriculum development and use of facilities. If existing university
28Act of July 1, 1962, Chapter 648 (amends Chapter 75 of the
Acts of General Laws).
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resources were incapable of fulfilling a need, outside funding was -
sought and often gained.
A problem occurred in the 1970’s, however, as expectations rose
and financial resources fell. The faculties of universities and colleges
were seeing the effects of a receding economy as their personal cost of
living continued to rise. In many institutions, especially community
colleges, faculty members have watched the institution grow in terms of
enrollment but have seen their own salaries remain constant.
The University of Massachusetts at Amherst has provided its fac-
ulty and staff with competitive salaries for the last decade. Exception-
al cases had been brought to the University's attention; but on the whole,
faculty members agreed (see Chapter III) that they were adequately remun-
erated. The process by which faculty members received payment were pro-
moted and were granted tenure was an extremely different issue. The
academic personnel policy of a university requires in-depth study, con-
tinual monitoring and equitable implementation in order for faculty mem-
bers to feel that they are being treated fairly. When financial resources
are on the increase and budgets flexible, salary and personnel policies
are usually not thought to be a great issue. It is when a university
has to face hard times, when budgets are cut and faculty not replaced
that personnel policies and salary schedules become critically important,
and fall under everyone's watchful eye.
During the fall of 1973, the effects of a recession were yet
to
be felt. Although general inflation was rising at a high
rate, the fac-
ulty, staff and administration at the Amherst campus
based their predic Lion.,
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for the future University of Massachusetts budget as they had in the
past—on a bigger budget. By the spring of 1974, however, some members
of the Amherst campus had seen the foreshadowing of decreased spending.
Those department heads who were involved with budget planning had been
asked to address this issue—not yet in budgetary terms, but in tenure
projections. Some of the interviews conducted for this study began to
point toward these realities. On the whole, however, the faculty's per-
sonal basic needs were being fulfilled.
The Development of the Faculty Professional Association
What the University of Massachusetts faculty was soon to discover
was that a traditional recourse— the faculty association—would not be as
effective as they imagined, precisely because of a new era of collective
bargaining laws for public employees. Other faculty groups employed by
the state were speaking to the legislature through unions which presum-
ably would carry more weight in their bargaining efforts. National pro-
fessional faculty associations were in the process of re-evaluating
their reasons for existence while union groups were proselytizing the
faculty.
A brief history of the major faculty associations will be included
here in order that the faculty member's attitudes toward his/her member-
ship in those interest groups can be better understood.
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The Histories of the American Federation of Teacher
s
(AFT), National Education Association (NEA)
. and the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP)
Although colleges and universities bargain collectively with
many more unions than AAUP, NEA and AFT, these are the major bargaining
agents of faculties within higher education. The American Federation of
Teachers, founded in 1919, was the only one which began as a labor organ-
ization as part of the American Federation of Labor. It was not until
1955, however, that the AFT began to stress the importance of collective
bargaining. Prior to that time, the AFT had negotiated what have been
termed "de facto" collective bargaining agreements between boards of ed-
ucation and teacher unions. In fact, it was not until 1962 that the first
AFT contract was signed between the New York City Public school system
and the United Federation of Teachers, an AFT affiliate.
AFT’s history with universities and colleges began in the 1930'
s
29 it
at several prominent institutions."" The purpose of these "locals" was
to identify professors with the American labor movement for the long-run
benefits that might accrue to both sides. Many decades later, the AFT
was elected to represent Boston State College, Southeastern Massachusetts
University, Bryant College of Business Administration, and the
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, all by 1969. By June of 1977, the
American Federation of Teachers was negotiating contracts at 103 insti-
tutions (202 campuses). In March of 1976, the two largest institutions—
“"Early AFT locals were present at Smith College, Northampton,
Amherst College, Amherst; and Yale College, New Haven.
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The State University of New York and The City University of New York-
dropped their NEA affiliation to become solely represented by AFT.
Recent talks of a merger between the AFT and National Education Associa-
30tion Is only that— talk. No serious merger discussions have taken
place between the leaders of the two associations.
The National Education Association (NEA)
The NEA is the oldest of the three organizations, having been
initially founded as the National Teachers Association in 1857. Its
purpose was to "elevate the character and advance the interests of the
profession of teaching, and. .
.
promote the cause of popular education
31in the United States." In 1870, the National Teachers Association
merged with an organization of public school superintendents and changed
its name to the National Education Association. No longer did the Asso-
ciation represent just teachers—a decision which changed its image and
32
would later be a bone of contention among its members. In contrast to
AFT, NEA resisted the notion of collective bargaining for a long time,
30 For a full discussion of possible merger considerations, see
The Chronicle of Higher Education , July 21, 1975.
3
^Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. VanEyck. Collective Bargaining
Comes to the Campus . Washington, D.C. : American Council on Education,
1973, p. 117. Quoting Walter E. Oberer and Robert E. Doherity, Teachers ,
School Boards and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard
.
Ithaca, New York: State School of Industrial and Labor Relations,
Cornell University, 1967, pp. 22-23.
32Stephen Cole. The Unionization of Teachers, A Case Study of^
the UFT. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969, Chapter I.
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believing that unionism was inconsistent with the professional goals %
33
and status of teachers."
Because of its strong history in the elementary and secondary
sectors of education, the NEA has a growing interest in the teacher
training institutions which ultimately drew in a substantial number of
colleges and universities. Instead of simply becoming part of NEA, these
teachers and administrators formed a separate entity within NEA called
7 the American Association of Higher Education (AAHE) . Eventually, how-
ever, AAHE wanted to focus on the needs of both its professorial and ad-
ministrative membership, whereas NEA wanted to concentrate more heavily
on teachers. AAHE’s negative posture toward collective bargaining pro-
4
vided an additional reason for its final disassociation from NEA in 1968.
Until the mid sixties, NEA refrained from union activity, but
growing pressure from an increasing number of AFT collective bargaining
organizations proved to be too great for NEA to resist. Even its policy
forbidding employee strikes softened as the NEA Locals began dealing
with the harsh realities of public sector bargaining.
By 1969, NEA had organized forty units primarily in the commun-
ity college sector, its strongest base at this point. By June of 1977,
NEA had negotiated contracts at 145 higher education institutions (cov-
ering 207 campuses). AAUP and NEA together have joined to represent one
of their largest faculties— the University of Hawaii which includes
both
J
33Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining Comes to
Campus, p. U9
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the four-year and two-year colleges of that state as well as other major
universities
.
Although the NEA recently moved into negotiating a wide range
of issues for their contracts, the Association, founded on the princi-
ples of a teachers' professional association, built its reputation on a
hard "professional" line. Theodore Martin, Director of NEA's membership
division from 1925 to 1950, described unionism in the following way:
Unionism lowers the ideals of teaching. By emphasizing only the
selfish, though necessary, economic needs of teachers—salary, hours,
tenure, retirement—unionism misses altogether the finer ideals and
rich compensations that do not appear in the salary envelope. 35
To this degree, the NEA reflects the principles of another organization
that at one time appeared to be even less likely to become a bargaining
agent— the American Association of University Professors.
Arne r i can Association of University Professors (AAUP)
In 1915, a group of professors sought to protect "the dignity of
the profession" by forming the American Association of University Profes-
sors. At first, the major effort of the AAUP was to:
. . . win respectability. A bellicose attitude toward trustees,
a militant stand on academic freedom, any of the usual postures of
the trade union, would have alarmed and repelled a great majority
3^ The Chronicle of Higher Education , Volume XIV, Number 14,
May
31, 1977, p. 10~
35 Theodore D. Martin. Building a Teaching Profession.
Middle-
town, New York: The Whitlock Press, 1957, p. 161.
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of American professors. ... The main goals of the Association
appealed to professors as professional men, not as employees.
^
The first major task undertaken by the Association was the for-
mation and report of "Committee A" on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure. The Committee's report concentrated on the notion of academic
freedom for the individual professor so that he/she might pursue a field
of research, teach and be able to serve the public to the best of his/
her ability. The Committee outlined what it felt po be the distinction
between the legal supremacy of governing boards and their moral duty to
abide by these academic principles. The concept of academic freedom,
however, did not come without its limits and obligations:
As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember
that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his
utterances. Hence, he should at all times be accurate, should ex-
ercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions
of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not
an institutional spokesman .
^
Besides the fundamental principles outlined above, the Committee
outlined the following two proposals: first, that if a faculty member
were going to be dismissed or demoted for reasons related to academic
freedom, he/she be given the reasons in writing and that he/she be given
a fair trial on those charges "before a special or permanent judicial
committee chosen by the faculty senate or council or by the faculty at
36
Ilofstadter and Metzger, Development of Academic Freedom, p. 478
^The Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
issued in 1940, AAUP Policy Document and Reports. Washington,
D.C. :
The AAUP, 1973, p. 2.
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large, and the second proposal stated that academic freedom be provided
security and dignity in the academic job through definite rules of ten-
38
ure * Academic freedom was clearly the goal; due process and tenure
were regarded as the necessary means.
AAUP is distinguishable from the AFT and the NEA because it is
the only organization which has always had only post-secondary faculty
in its membership. To this day, its membership requirements state that
one must be either a faculty member or a person certified under the fac-
ulty bargaining unit (added in 1972 after AAUP had endorsed collective
bargaining)
.
Although small in number, the first group of AAUP members in-
cluded the most prestigious faculty of the day. Jn 1913, a small group
of professors from seven different colleges assembled at the Johns
Hopkins Club;, and out of that first meeting, AAUP was born. The member-
ship was limited at first to faculty of full professor rank causing the
organization to grow very slowly. Even though by 1922 there were 183
institutions and 4,046 members who had joined AAUP, there were many
prominent academicians who would not join. Walter Metzger quotes from
an early non-believer:
The matter does not interest me. I am opposed to anything that
savours of organization or the formation of societies of any sort.
The modern habit of organization I regard as a pernicious form of
activity. The present unfavorable conditions of university life
will finally be remedied not by organization but by the refusal of
^Hofstadter and Metzger, Development of Academic Freedom , p. 481
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capable men to enter into it. (W. T. Councilman of the Harvard
Medical School). 39
AAUP was troubled by the agenda conflict of organizational objectives.
On the one hand, the AAUP tried to function as an agency of codifica-
tion, fixing its sights on the larger aspects of academic freedom and
other professional problems. On the other hand, it had to function as
an agency of group pressure, investigating cases and imposing penalties
in response to immediate demands.
The Committee A report, discussed earlier in this chapter, tried
to resolve this conflict in the very beginning. The Statement of Academic
Freedom and Tenure (1915) attempted to outline general principles at the
same time as it proposed two protective measures for its faculty member-
ship. Though the statement was applauded as the best of its time, it did
not serve as the final answer. AAUP to this day plays the dual role of
intercessor for a wronged individual faculty member and, through its com-
mittee structure, the policy maker for institutional faculties.
When AAUP recently entered into collective bargaining, many of
its members were disturbed by a position which they viewed as directly
contradictory to the goals of their professional association. One mem-
ber used the Association’s Bulle tin to state his objection.
In this state of dissent, we will try to briefly show why: (1) our
historic functions will be seriously threatened by adoption of the
council’s proposal; (2) the chances are small that our influence
will be enhanced if we choose the collective bargaining route; and
(3) adherence to our historic role will, even assuming a spread
of
39
Ibid., p. '«78.
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collective bargaining, facilitate the maximum contribution to high-
er education. In brief, the consequence of adopting the Council's
proposal may well be to convert the AAUP into the AUUP— the American
Union of University Professionals—with a substantial change in char-
acter of its membership, its identity, and its image; sharp impair-
ment of its ability to carry out its historic role and an indetermi-
nately severe curtailment of the effectiveness of the Association's
staff and of Committee A. ®
The collective bargaining statement which was eventually adopted
by a majority of the membership sought to incorporate the Association's
goals and principles as well as to outline the policy for a chapter's
representative status. In a sense, it echoes the Association's first
action— the report from Committee A in 1915 which also stressed the use
of academic tenure as a means to an end—namely, academic freedom.
The longstanding programs of the Association are the means to achieve
a number of basic ends at colleges and universities: the enhancement
of academic freedom and tenure; of due process; of sound academic gov-
ernment. Collective bargaining, properly used, is essentially another
means to achieve these ends; and at the same time, to strengthen the
influence of the faculty in the distribution of an institution's econ-
omic resources.^ (See Appendix 3 for full AAUP Statement on Collec-
tive Bargaining.)
In June of 1977, AAUP had, or was negotiating, forty-one contracts
covering forty-nine campuses. Additionally, it had negotiated contracts
jointly with NEA (Hawaii and two other institutions) and with AFT (Eastern
Montana College) .
Virginia Lee Lussier, from the University of Delaware, did an ex-
cellent comparison of the three organizations and their positions on
^Sanford Kadish. AAUP Bulletin, March, 1972, pp. 58-59.
^"The Statement on Collective Bargaining," AAUP Bulletin,
Volume 58, Number 4, December, 1971, p. 423.
57
A 2higher education issues. Table 2 illustrates the differences between
the three organizations in several key areas. The choice of a bargain-
ings agent is critical for a college faculty because the scope and con-
tent of the eventual contract will as likely reflect the union’s objec-
tives as they will the faculty’s. In voting to elect a bargaining agent,
a faculty must decide among some very traditional organizations. The
problem is that each of their traditions is quite separate and unique.
On November 15th and 16th of 1973, faculty members at the
University of Massachusetts voted on whether or not they wanted to be
represented to the legislature of the Commonwealth by a bargaining agent
or, as was then the case, by the administration of the University. By
having to make such a choice, professors were calling into question,
•l
first, their own role within the academic profession; second, the role
of the University administration in that profession; and finally, the
effect of collective bargaining legislation on the individual faculty
member and on the faculty as a group. To fully understand faculty at-
titudes toward collective bargaining and the union movement in the United
States requires at least a brief historical review of those developments.
Such a review constitutes the third section of Chapter II.
Virginia Lee Lussier. "National Faculty Associations in Col-
lective Bargaining: A Comparative Discussion." Washington, D.C.:
Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service, July, 1974,
Special
Report Number 8.
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The Origins of Collective Bargaining
In Higher Education
Collective bargaining has a multitude of meanings to the working
people of the United States. To the AFL-CIO member, it may mean a cost-
of-living increase or a dues increase. To the manager of a General Motors
plant, it may mean that for eleven months out of the year, his plant runs
>
smoothly; but during the period of contract negotiations, his life and
the production level at the plant are chaotic. Collective bargaining,
placed in the context of trade unionism, is a fairly new concept (for
the most part, a nineteenth century phenomenon); but as a general notion
of "collective action to achieve individual and group control," the mean-
ing of "collective bargaining" is as old as group solidarity itself.
Collective bargaining is often regarded as a phenomenon associated
with "blue collar" workers. But in the period of the last tv?o decades,
"white collar" unionism has added important new meaning to collective bar-
gaining. In the past five years, it has assumed significant proportions
among college and university faculty—a group hitherto considered to be
quite unsusceptible to any identification with labor unionism. Faculty
unionism, however, had its origins well before the rapid expansion of
higher education within the past twenty years. One university governing
A3
board began negotiating voluntarily with a union as early as 193o, but
^Harvard University agreed to recognize an employee organization
for certain of its non-academic employees in 1938. Fred J. Lorenz.
"Col-
lective Bargaining in Higher Education," Journal _of_ the Collggg_gnd_Ugi
versltv Personnel Association . Washington, D.C.
:
College and University
Personnel Association, 1971, p- 3?..
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the first major ruling on the matter of collective negotiations by uni-
versity employees came in 1951 when the trustees of Columbia University
brought before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) a case involving
the college's non-academic employees. The NLRB ruled that it did not
have jurisdiction over Columbia University because "the activities in-
volved are non-commercial in nature and intimately connected with the
charitable purposes (researcher's emphasis) of educational activities of
the institution" (Trustees of Columbia University vs. National Labor Re-
lations Board 97, NLRB, 427). This ruling meant that private college em-
ployees had no legal procedure enabling them to be represented unless the
private employer agreed to a voluntary contract which was the case at
Harvard University and several other large universities.
Although many cases were heard by the National Labor Relations
Board during the 1950 's and 1960's, private higher education was not
brought within the jurisdiction of the NLRB until 1970 when the Board,
hearing the case of Cornell University, reversed the position it had
taken in the Columbia University case; and ruled that non-academic em-
ployees in the private sector did have the legal right to collective
bargaining. It was an historic decision.
Charged with providing peaceful and orderly procedures to resolve
labor controversy, we conclude that we can best effectuate the pol-
icies of the Act by asserting jurisdiction over non-profit, private
educational institutions where we find it to be appropriate.
4^183 NLRB, No. 41 at 13, 74 LRRM at 1275.
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The Board concluded, "it is no longer sufficient to say that mere-
ly because employees are in a non-profit sector of the economy, the opera-
tions of their employers do not substantially affect interstate commerce.'
Soon after the Cornell decisions, the NLRB issued the so-called
million dollar rule," stating that all institutions in private higher
education which had an annual gross revenue of more than one million dol-
lars would fall under the Board's jurisdiction.^ 6 But the most radical
step did not come until the following year in 1971, when the right of
collective bargaining was extended to faculty in private higher educa-
tion, coming in a Board ruling on petition from faculty members who had
organized under the United Federation of College Teachers (AFT affiliate)
at Long Island University
.
^
45 183 NLRB, No. 41 at 10, 74 LRRM at 1273.
46
Appendix E, CFR Title 29 - Labor /Chapter 1, NLRB part 103 quoted
by Faculty Power: Collective Bargaining on Campus
,
edited by Terrence N.
Tice and Grace W. Holmes, p. 252, subpart A.
47 The case which determined that post-secondary faculty members
did come under NLRB jurisdiction is an interesting one. Two centers of
Long Island University petitioned for a collective bargaining unit. They
wanted to be represented by the UFCT, but the Board of Trustees of the
University felt that they could use the NLRB Cornell decision (which gave
collective bargaining rights to non-academic employees only) to prohibit
UFCT from organizing. The Trustees claimed that Long Island University
faculty were "supervisors" (and thus had no rights to bargain collective-
ly) since they made decisions on promotions, tenure, and other policy and
personnel matters. The Board, however, ruled otherwise: "... we are
of the view that the policy-making and quasi-supervisory authority which
adheres to full-time faculty status but is exercised by them only as a
group does not make them supervisors within the meaning of Section II of
the Act, or managerial employees who must be separately represented. Ac-
cordingly, we find that full-time university faculty members qualify in
every respect as professional employees under Section II of the Act; and,
therefore, are entitled to all the benefits of collective bargaining if
they so desire." As cited by Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. Van E^ck.
1 e c
t
ive Bar gaining Comes t o the Campus , p . 29.
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The jurisdiction of the NLRB is solely in the private sector;
but the Board's impact is nevertheless also felt in the public sector
of higher education because its cases, rulings and decisions are "judge-
made labor law," and serve as the prototypes for many state labor rela-
tions laws and state board decisions.^ The state laws governing collec-
tive bargaining for state and local employees differ among themselves;
but all reflect in greater or lesser degree, the National Labor Relations
Act. In summary, academic employees in the private sector who are em-
ployed in institutions with annual budgets of more than one million dol-
lars are within the jurisdiction of the NLRB; while their counterparts
in the (non-federal) public sector are subject to the jurisdiction spe-
cified by their own states' legislation.
Federal employees gained improved collective bargaining rights
49
when President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988 in 1962.
Seven years later, Executive Order 11491 was issued by President Richard
M. Nixon establishing the Federal Labor Relations Council. The Council
is responsible for the administration and interpretation of Executive
48
Ibid 6 .
^An interesting historical note: The Pendleton Act (1883) of
New York outlined some of the first guidelines for a civil service
system.
Several major points of the Act show great foresight: (1) it established
an independent commission appointed by the President; (2) the
Act create
open and competitive examinations related to the job to aid in the
selec
tion of employees; (3) a probationary period was established
for employees
after which time they gained a kind of permanency on the
job; (4) Civil
War veterans qualified for certain advantages; (5) a
clause was creat d
to prohibit "payback" to politicians; (6) a merit
system was applied
.
The Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) passed
during President Johnson s
administration outlined in greater detail a merit system.
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Order 11491, and is a parallel in many respects to the National Labor
Relations Board. In contrast to the NLRB, Executive Order 11491 care-
fully limits union bargaining rights on the extant management "preroga-
tives
; and although the order did not give the federal employee rights
to bargain for wages, it did establish detailed grievance procedures.
The first law to affect public employees was passed in 1959 in
the State of Wisconsin; however, it was not until 1^65, in Michigan, that
post-secondary teaching personnel were specifically covered by any law.
Elementary and secondary teachers, who were the vanguard of collective
The Executive Order 11491 as amended, Section 12 states that
management officials of the agency retain the right, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations: (1) to direct employees of the agency;
(2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions
within the agency and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other dis-
ciplinary action against employees; (3) to relieve employees from duties
because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons (emphasis mine)
;
(4) to maintain the efficiency of the government operations entrusted to
them; (5) to determine the methods, means and personnel by which such op-
erations are to be conducted; (6) to take whatever actions may be neces-
sary to carry out the mission of the agency in situations of emergency;
(7) nothing in the agreement shall require an employee to become or to
remain a member of a labor organization or to pay money to the organiza-
tion except pursuant to a voluntary, written authorization by a member
for the payment of dues through payroll deductions. Section 10 of 11491
provides Exclusive Recognition to a labor organization (when that organi-
zation has been selected and approved) . It is important to point out here
that the American labor movement has made this unique contribution to col-
lective bargaining. The union is required to represent all members of the
established unit, even though they may not be members of the union. In
France and Italy, one would normally find two or three unions in one fac-
tory—one being of communist orientation, one of catholic (Christian Demo-
crat) and one of right wing socialist orientation. These unions tend to
employ the "whipsawing" tactics more often; each unit will use the demands
of the other to negotiate further items with management for the contract (s)
Finally, the order is important because it does not concern itself with
wages. These items—management rights, exclusive recognition, the bargain-
ing unit, and wages—will be discussed in greater detail with regards to
the Massachusetts Law(s) and the University of Massachusetts election.
All four issues had an impact on the outcome of the MSP-AAUP election.
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bargaining in education, were first legally covered in Wisconsin as re-
cently as 1961. It should come as no surprise that during the relative-
ly short legal history of collective bargaining within the educational
sector, the states having the most progressive labor legislation also
have had the greatest number of post-secondary institutions involved in
collective bargaining. This study makes use of the survey conducted by
the Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service (March, 1975).^
The great majority of institutions which are now unionized are within the
twenty-five states which have some sort of legislation providing collec-
tive bargaining for public employees. As of June 1977, 150,000 of an ap-
proximate 600,000 faculty in the United States were represented by a col-
lective bargaining agent. Two institutions—The City University of New
York and The University of Hawaii
—
provide illustrative case studies of
^In this survey, legislation existed in twenty-five states per
mitting collective bargaining by some post-secondary employees: Alaska
(1971), California** (1975), Connecticut* (1975), Delaware (1970), Florida
(1974), Hawaii (1973), Iowa (1974), Kansas (1974), Maine* (1975),
Massachusetts (1973), Michigan (1973), Minnesota (1974), Montana (1974),
and Nebraska (1972); replacing the 1965 law: Nevada (1971), New
Hampshire (1975), New Jersey (1974), New York (1974), Oregon (1972),
Pennsylvania (1970), and Wisconsin* (1974). In addition, the states of
Illinois and New Mexico permit bargaining by non-academic personnel in
four-year colleges.
Vocational and Technical only.
'k'k
Two-year only.
***Community College faculty may be looked upon separately under
Employee Relations Act.
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the unionization of faculties in public higher education. 52 There are
also a myriad of other very important cases, some of which will be
The City University of New York has a tempestuous record with
organized labor. The history of the faculty's union affiliations is long
and complicated. It begins in 1963 when the American Federation of Teach-
ers (AFL-CIO) chartered the United Federation of College Teachers (UFCT)
,
Local 1460. By 1957, there were 413 faculty members in that local. Grow-
ing side by side with this organization and representing the majority of
faculty was the Legislative Congress (LC) which had acted as the spokesman
for the CUNY faculty since 1938. In November of 1967, the LC petitioned
the New York Public Relations Board for certification as legal representa-
tive of the CUNY faculty. (In September of 1967, the Public Employee's
Fair Employment Act was passed by the New York State Legislature. Its
common name is the Taylor Law. The law specifically stated that post-
secondary public employees were included, New York Civil Service Law,
SS 200-12, Chapter 392 of the Laws of 1967, amended May 1, 1970.) Almost
immediately the UFT local 1460 filed a similar petition; each wanted to
represent a portion of the university faculty. After several months of
hearings, the New York Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) examiner
ruled that two collective bargaining units were required. Therefore, in
1967, both the UFCT and the LC won the right to represent two parts of
the CUNY faculty—UFCT represented the lecturers and teaching assistants
and the LC tenured and non- tenured but tenure "track" positions. Two years
later (1969)
,
the LC merged with the National Education Association (NEA)
;
and then in 1975, merged with the AFT affiliate, the UFCT, to form a single
academic bargaining unit called the Professional Staff Congress (PSC) , an
NEA-AFT affiliate. The PSC later dropped affiliation with NEA to be total-
ly represented by AFT. For more information, see Bernard Mintz, "The CUNY
Experience," Wisconsin Law Review
,
Volume 1, 1971.
The University of Hawaii collective bargaining situation proved
to be a most valuable case for study because of the project undertaken by
Joel Seidman, Lane Kelley and Alfred Edge in 1972. Their study examined
v the voting preference of various campus faculties within the University of
Hawaii. Their findings included: (1) that the more established professors
with tenure and located on the most prestigious campus (Manoa) voted deci-
sively in the first ballot (October of 1972) for the "no union" choice;
and later in the run-off election (November of 1972) for the most conser-
vative union group, the alliance (a combination of the local unit of AAUP
and the University of Hawaii Faculty Association). It was shown that com-
munity college faculty were more apt to vote for the options which most
closely resembled the trade union model— the College and University Per-
sonnel Association (the NEA affiliate) and the Hawaii Federation of College
Teachers (affiliated with the AFL-CIO). In addition , the Seidman, Kelley
7 and Edge study compared the voting behavior of faculties from
different
academic departments. Within the School of Arts and Sciences,
departmental
67
mentioned in Chapter III as they relate to the University of Massachusetts
53
election.
The Massachusetts Collective Bargaining Laws
The State of Massachusetts implemented a new collective bargain-
ing law. In July of 1974, the General Laws governing public employer
labor relations were amended by adding Chapter 150E to Chapter 1078—Acts
of 1973. Up until that time, public employees in Massachusetts were
allowed to bargain collectively but could not bargain for wages. The new
law changed that.
affiliation was a highly significant variable. Among natural science fac-
ulty, eighteen percent voted the "no union" option, and forty-one percent
preferred the alliance. In the Social Sciences, on the other hand, a near
majority was won for the options with a "trade union" image— forty-six per-
cent for a combined CUPA, HGEA and HFCT. In the Humanities, thirty-five
percent voted for one of the trade union models with thirty-two voting
heavily against all union options, forty-eight "no union," twenty-three
percent alliance, and a combined twenty-four percent for the three trade
union models—CUPA, HGEA and HFCT. The run-off election in November of
1972 proved an HFCT victory; although subsequently after two years of ne-
gotiations by HFCT, the faculty rejected the final contract by a vote of
X 1,073 to 296. Because the contract was rejected, a new election was held
in the fall of 1974. The Hawaii faculty replaced the HFCT with a coali-
tion body made up of CUPA (affiliated with NEA) and the AAUP. For more
information, see Joel Seidman, Lane Kelley and Alfred Edge, "Faculty Bar-
/ gaining Comes to Hawaii," Industrial Relations , Volume 13, Number 1,
February, 1974.
c o
There are several cases involving university employees which
are felt to have had substantial impact upon future decisions. Those al-
ready mentioned are: The Columbia University case (97NLRB424) ; the Cornell
University case (183NLRB41); and The Long Island University case (see
footnote 47). In Chapter III, the Fordham University case (193NLRB23)
is also discussed as are the Wayne State University, University of Miami
and Eastern Michigan cases, which involve questions of the bargaining unit.
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The employer and the exclusive representative shall meet at reason-
able times, including meetings in advance of the employer's budget-
making process and shall negotiate in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, standards of productivity and performance, and any
other terms and conditions of employment; but such obligation shall
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or make a concession. 5 ^
There is more than one change in the 1974 law which has directly
effected the outcome of public sector bargaining in Massachusetts. Both
the definition of certain terms and the range of negotiable items are
two such alterations directly influencing public higher education col-
lective bargaining. One such definition has become an important element
in faculty unit determination. Whereas many other state laws limit their
discussions to "employee vs. employer," the Massachusetts Law carefully
defines a professional employee as follows:
"Professional employee": Any employee engaged in work: (1) predom-
inantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine
mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (2) involving the con-
sistent exercise of discretion and judgement in its performance;
(3) of such character that the output produced or the result accom-
plished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time;
and (4) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science
or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized x
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learn-
ing or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education
or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of rou-
tine mental, manual or physical processes. ^5
54
Acts of 1973, Chapter 1078, Dit of 1973, 150E, Section 6.
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From Chapter 1078, Section 1, a particularly confusing aspect
of the definition is that a "professional" employee has a distinct and
different meaning at the University of Massachuset i.s . Instead of refer
j- j_ng to any person whose work output cannot be measured by hours, it re-
fers to exempt level employees in the administrative staff. for tae pur
pose of this study, the definition contained in the 1973 Massachusetts
Collective Bargaining Law is the one used.
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Without the proper definition of a "professional employee," ser-
ious questions can arise as to whom the bargaining unit can include (and,
therefore, who can vote in a given election). The NLRB controversies
over faculty bargaining units at Fordham, Long Island and Adelphi Univer-
sities are examples of the length to which such confusion can go. A full
explanation of the bargaining unit and relevant cases can be found in
56
Chapter III. What is critical in the definition is the notion that a
faculty member is a worker, not a supervisor; and yet, his work is of
"such a character that the output produced cannot be standardized in re-
lation to a given period of time." The lack of specificity with regards
to productivity measurement causes one major problem. There is no easily
determined gauge of accountability for the professional employee, i.e.,
the faculty member.
"Accountability" has recently become a major issue in public ed-
ucation nationally. The scale by which most public employees are measured
—hours of work—simply does not pertain to faculty in higher education.
The problem is that the college professor does not view accountability in
the same way that the taxpayers do. For the professor, work satisfaction
comes from an entirely different arena; namely, his discipline or field
of research. Professor Harvey Friedman has pointed out that increasingly,
56For a discussion of the differences between "professional"
authority and "managerial" authority within institutions of
higher learn-
ing, see National Labor Relations Board Report D-9709 on
Northeastern
University case. Here, Ralph E. Kennedy draws a clear
distinction between
the administration's bureaucratic authority and the
authority the Vice
President who is a faculty member. Reprint made available
to the Unive
sity of Massachusetts Department Chairmen in the
fall of 1975. .limeo
graphed
.
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the autonomous individual— the doctor with his private practice, the
professor with his course and a group of students— is either choosing
to or is being forced to become part of an ever-growing mega-institution.
The small college becomes the multiversity administered by a board of
trustees and a large selection of "managers". The doctor goes into group
practice; it is more economical. Friedman submits that the professional's
commitment, at least partially, remains more with his colleagues than
with the clients— the physician's commitment is to his fellow practition-
ers and the professor's to his fellow teachers in his academic discipline.
Hie esteem level is measured within these groups, not from professor to
student or from doctor to patient. So, the question raised by the admin-
istrator in the college or hospital about "accountability" to the student
or client becomes clouded because the professional must consider his re-
search and his colleagues as well as his client. Accountability to only
one group might mean a deterioration of service to another involving the
esteem level of the professional as well.
Contrary to the 1967 collective bargaining law, the new law spe-
cified the employer of the University of Massachusetts faculty. "In the
case of employees of the community and state colleges and universities,
the employer shall mean the respective board of trustees or any individual
who is designated to represent it and act in its interest in dealing
with
i,57its employees.
57
Ibid.
,
Section 1.
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A third innovation within Chapter 150E was the "agency shop"
clause which leaves negotiable the duty of all employees covered by the
unit to pay dues to the established collective bargaining agent. The
^clause states that if either party requests an agency shop agreement and
the other party concurs, it forces an election by all unit employees on
the total contract. One possible result of this could be that after
months of negotiation, the contract might be defeated simply because of
the agency shop clause. The risk is high for the bargaining agent; and
so it is not surprising that none of the Massachusetts higher education
contracts (through June of 1977) have included agency shop clauses.
Section 8 of Chapter 150E allows the two parties to negotiate a
grievance procedure which would, in the event of a dispute, be decided by
/ binding arbitration. If the contract does not include a grievance proce-
dure and a grievance occurs over suspension, dismissal, removal, or termi-
nation, then the Labor Relations Commission may order binding arbitration
59
upon the request of either party.
"^Section 12 of Chapter 150E of Chapter 1078 of the General Laws
reads: "The Commonwealth or any other employer shall require as a condi-
tion of employment during the life of a collective bargaining agreement so
providing, the payment on or after the thirtieth day following the begin-
ning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever
is later, of a service fee to the employer organization which, in accord-
ance with the provisions of this chapter, is duly recognized by the employ-
er or designated by the commission as the exclusive bargaining agent for
the unit in which such employee is employed: provided however, that such
service fee shall not be imposed unless the collective bargaining agreement
requiring its payment as a condition of employment has been formally exe-
cuted. pursuant to a vote of a majority of all employees in such bargaining
unit present and voting. Such service fee will be proportionately commen-^
surate with the cost of collective bargaining and contract administration.
^The commission is established under Section 90 of Chapter 23
J of the General Laws of the Commonwealth.
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Finally, Section 9 provides for arbitration to settle a dispute
which arises from the negotiations. In the case of a breakdown, either
or both parties may petition the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration
to determine whether there is an impasse. If this is found to be so,
a mediator is appointed to help determine a resolution to the dispute.
In the event that the mediator does not solve the impasse, a fact-finder
is appointed; and any arbitration agreed upon by both parties becomes
binding. If the two parties had not originally agreed to arbitration,
however, and an impasse continues, the issues are returned for further
negotiation.
These, then, are the major additions to the collective bargaining
law governing public employees in Massachusetts. Faculty who are current-
ly negotiating either their first or second contracts will most assuredly
use the new wage provision in an attempt to gain higher wages. Hie ques-
tion remains: How will the law affect the remaining ununionized campuses?
And most importantly, will a unionized faculty be assured of receiving
higher wages simply because it can bargain for those wages? What will
the state legislature's reaction be to a new series of public employee
contracts? The answers to these questions will continue to be considered
during the next few years by all public employees, especially since the
governor has been attempting to cut down on 'profligate spending by var
ious segments of the Commonwealth, including higher education; and has
been known to leave wage increase questions to the State legislature as
a way of negotiating the possibility of such an increase.
^Established in Chapter 23, Section 7.
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What were the effects of the original law, denying wage negotia-
tion for public employees, on Massachusetts higher education contracts?
To answer this question, a comparison is drawn of two higher education
contracts, both negotiated in 1973—one in Massachusetts and the other
in New York—demonstrating in stark contrast how two different laws in-
fluenced the contracts of two public institutions of higher education.
^
V
One strong cautionary note should be added. Hie City University of New
York is a system of many colleges; therefore, the bargaining agent for
its faculties— the Professional Staff Congress (PSC)—did not outline
specific academic governance procedures for all of its member institu-
tions. Instead, the PSC negotiated general guidelines for its faculties.
The Massachusetts College of Art is one college within a state system.
Therefore, its faculty had (one assumes) a common purpose and set of en-
vironmental factors, making it easier to specify governance procedures
(see Table 3)
.
When higher education was transplanted from Europe to America,
so too was the tradition of the scholar as a man set apart from the work-
a-day world. The European academic had an aura about him which, in the
days of the guilds, meant that he was of an elite group of educated men.
The old world scholars were regarded with a certain amount of awe, and
were part of a profession which literally cloistered them from many of
The Massachusetts agreement is between the Board of
Trustees
of the State colleges and Massachusetts College of Art
Faculty Federation,
American Federation of Teachers, Local 20 j 7, AIL CIO, June 14,
9 .
New York agreement is between the Board of Higher
Education of the City
of New York and Professional Staff Congress.
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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF TWO AGREEMENTS
Massachusetts College of Art
Professional Staff Congress AFL-CIO
Article Article
1 Recognition 1 Recognition and Definition
2 Board: PSC Relationships
Organizational Use of
2 Relationship Between Board
and Federation
7
Faculties 3 Use of College Faculties
30 Faculties and Services 4 Faculty Fringe Benefits
6 Release Time Appendix: Payroll Dues
Check-off
23 Distinguished Professor-
ships Appendix: Board’s Policy
in Appointment
25 Research and Fellowships
Awards Appendix: Promotion and
Tenure
26 Welfare Benefits
Appendix: Non-Discrimination
27 Retirement
Appendix: Definition of Work
28 Travel Allowances Year
29 Waiver of Tuition Fees Article II: No Strike Pledge
4 Check-off and Agency Shop Appendix: Criteria for
9 Appointment and Reappoint- Studio
Personnel
ment 9 Duties of Faculty
10 Schedule of Notification 10 Faculty Grievances
of Appointment and Re-
appointment 12 Statutory Responsibilities
8 Non-discrimination 13 Policy-Making
Authority of
the Board of Trustees
Faculty Evaluation and Ad-14
Annual Leave
8
31 No Strike Pledge vancement
13 Multiple Year Appointments Appendix: Forms for Faculty
for Business Manager and Evaluation, and
Higher Education Office the Professional
12 Certification of Contin-
Data Form
uous Employ 16 Saving Clause
15 Workload 15 Duration and Extent
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Professional Staff Congress
Article
17 Jury Duty
20 Complaint Grievance and
Arbitration Procedures
21 Disciplinary Actions
11 Classification of Titles
5 Information and Data
18 Professional Evaluation
19 Personnel Files
22 Increased Promotional
Opportunities
3 Unit Stability
16 Temporary Disability
on Parental Leave
24 Salary Schedules
32 Legislature Action
33 Duration
Massachusetts College of Art
_
AFL-CIO
Article
14 Compliance of Board Time
Schedules
5 Statement on Academic
Freedom and Responsi-
bility
6 Participation in Decision-
Making
7 Division and Department
Organization
One can see immediately that Articles 6 and 7 make the
Massachusetts model unique. Some authors have predicted that academic
governance is the real issue for many faculties, and they have indicated
in recent studies that faculty are as concerned about a loss of academic
and political power as they are about negotiating competitive salaries
(ACE). If these studies are accurate, and if the economy forces salary
negotiation to a subsistence level, then governance may be the new arena
for contract negotiation. Perhaps unwittingly, the Massachusetts State
College System has forecasted a national trend of governance contracts.
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life's realities. The American college, however, was born into an egal-
itarian society; and because of this immense distinction, had an entire-
ly different set of problems and concerns from the European university.
The aims of early American society and the body of laws which
arose to meet these goals placed the faculties of American higher educa-
tion in a dilemma. The elitest tradition, which had at once protected
*
scholarship and defined its power, now would be placed in the context
of an egalitarian world. Primary to the hypothesis of the study, then,
is an examination of that European tradition, the notions of academe
that arose within that tradition and a parallel examination of the de-
velopment of American higher education concepts.
Equally important was the development of the guild's replacement
in American higher education— the professional association. As is re-
vealed in the results of this study, faculty attitudes toward the vari-
ous faculty interest groups placed a critical role in the results of
the November election. The faculty were concerned not only with which
group would be most effective, but which group was most similar to the
individual. Comments like, "I didn't like the types connected with the
MSP or CCF faculty group," were not uncommon. Identification with the
appropriate representative was a key factor in this election, and was
influenced by a faculty member's predisposition toward collective bar-
gaining.
The collective bargaining movement in higher education
has been
significant. The changes wrought within colleges or
universities have
involved issues of governance, control and accountability.
1 acuities
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facing the choice of whether to unionize or not are obviously influenced
by previous faculty elections and their results. The National Labor
Relations Act, the various state laws and executive orders have influ-
enced institutions of higher learning to a remarkable extent. Of even
greater significance to the election at the University, however, was the
faculty member's attitude toward the entire union movement. Certainly,
he/she could see what effects the CUNY bargaining election had had on
its faculties, but one's predisposition was based on a more fundamental
issue. Does a member of academe need to be represented by an "outside
force" (as one respondent called the bargaining agent)
,
or does the fac-
ulty of the University of Massachusetts have sufficient voice/power to
represent itself to the Legislature? That was the ultimate question upon
which the faculty at the University of Massachusetts were asked to vote.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEW
Introduction :
History of Events Leading Up to the November Election
The decade of the sixties saw fast growth among land grant uni-
versities. The University of Massachusetts was no exception. The size
of its faculty kept pace with that growth, expanding from 360 in 1962
to over 1,400 faculty members by 1972. This faculty growth rate came
with an expensive price tag. It demanded that future student enrollments
keep pace far into the University's future. Standard job security, ten-
ure policies, a depleting faculty turnover rate, inflation, and a fore-
casted economy of recession did not help the budgeting process at the
outset of the 1970 's. Although an unpredicted shortage of student en-
rollments caught many private colleges and universities with insufficient
revenues, the public colleges were being flooded by student applications.
What had not been forecast, however, was a legislative funding cutback
which, in effect, had the same results for the University of Massachusetts
as the reduced enrollments had for the private college. The general
economic recession was perhaps a problem for each university faculty mem-
ber personally; but as a group, they had not experienced the effects of
the recession. In the fall of 1973, that was yet to come.
Long before the 1973 collective bargaining election, the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts faculty had been investigating the possibilities
78
79
of union representation. Although there were a few faculty who had been
members of the American Federation of Teachers, no substantial univer-
committee had been established to study faculty unionization
until early in the academic year, 1971-1972. During that year, two major
events took place. The first was a meeting organized by interested fac-
ulty at the University to inform and educate themselves on matters per-
taining to collective bargaining. Speaking to approximately four hundred
faculty were a panel of experienced persons—Belle Zeller, then president
of the CUNY unit of NEA; Israel Kugler of AFT; and Martin Lapidas of the
AAUP unit at Rutgers University who had been invited to speak at the
University by the faculty senate. Also during 1971, the Faculty Senate
Committee on faculty affairs named a subcommittee to investigate and re-
port upon "public policy, authority, mechanics, regulations and procedures,
advantages and disadvantages, experience of other colleges and universities
within and outside the Commonwealth relating to faculty collective bar-
gaining."^ The committee’s report gave a capsuled version of the history
of collective bargaining within Massachusetts and pointed out some of the
effects of unionization on college faculties. Perhaps the most interest-
ing passage of the report was its summary of the legal powers of the
University of Massachusetts faculty senate, to which the report was
addressed
.
^"Faculty Collective Bargaining: Special Report of the Faculty
Affairs Committee," presented by Chairman Verda Dale at the 171st Meeting
of the Faculty Senate on March 4, 1971. Sen, Doc., 71-028, University
of
Massachusetts/Amherst
.
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Under the University’s autonomy statute, legal authority to
govern the University resides solely in the Board of Trustees and the
administration. The faculty (as well as its senate) and students (rep-
resented by undergraduate and graduate student senates) have no legal
standing. Accordingly, the faculty senate's character is "advisory" in
the sense that neither the trustees nor the administration is legally
bound to respect senate actions.
An alternative to the all-powerful Board authority was the fac-
ulty union which the report outlined in an abbreviated form:
1. A formal structure, supported by a legally enforceable contract
providing for participation with final decisions being made on
a bilateral basis as against the unilateral decisions being
made by the University management currently.
2. A method, based on democratic organization.
3. A voice, with power, to develop and enforce professional stands,
i.e., peer control of these standards.
4. Affiliation with a national organization, an opportunity to col-
lect facts and figures as an aid to resolving cases and conditions.
5. A dues structure adequate to provide for representation, research
and resolution.
No particularly negative results of faculty unionization were discussed
in the Committee's report.
Discussions about collective bargaining continued in the 1
acuity
senate and through informal sessions for the next two
years. A panel of
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experts, including some of the faculty members on the original faculty
senate subcommittee, addressed the faculty senate meeting throughout the
fall of 1972 and the spring of 1973. Both faculty and administrative
viewpoints were heard at these sessions where both pro and con unioniza-
tion opinions were aired. The chance to learn and to speak about higher
education collective bargaining was more than adequate during the year
preceding the November 15-16 election.
The choice which the University faculty was called upon to make
on the November 1973 ballot was simple— the faculty could be represented
by a bargaining agent called MSP-AAUP, or they could continue as they
were and vote "no union." The Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP)
was a group formally affiliated with the National Education Association
(NEA) through a state affiliate, the Massachusetts Teachers Association
(MTA) . The MTA originally became interested in the University of
Massachusetts in the spring of 1972, sending Eduardo Robreno to the
Amherst campus to assess the potential for collective bargaining. Robreno
discovered a small but active group of AFT members and considerable inter-
est in a unionization election. Faculty members of the Amherst AAUP
Chapter had organized a unionization card drive and had succeeded in
getting five percent of the faculty to sign these cards requesting an
election. Based on this information, the MTA sent Cyril Solomons to act
as a full-time coordinator of the Massachusetts Society of Professors.
He was joined in the summer of 1972 by Arnold Schneider, a student with
the University, who became the second staff member. By the spring of
197 3, the MSP had gained strength in numbers as well as in public
image.
Solomons left but Schneider stayed on; and with the help of Eduardo
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Robreno, helped the Massachusetts Society of Professors throughout the
pre-election period.
The University of Massachusetts/Amherst Chapter of the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) became interested in the MSP
activity. The reasons for their interest were varied, and to this date
arguable. MSP provided the backing of a strong state-wide and national
organization. To AAUP, that meant more backing than it could expect to
get from its national office; and in addition, the staff of MSP had con-
siderable experience in Massachusetts collective bargaining. The local
A&UP Chapter was split on the very issue of collective bargaining for
its membership; and so a fraction of AAUP's leadership felt that if they
were to get anywhere with unionization, they had better align themselves
with another group quickly.
MSP ' s. reasons for seeking the alliance were simpler: they needed
the clout which AAUP had with the more established branch of the Univer-
sity faculty. AAUP's reputation could only help the "fresh young turk"
image of the faculty joining the MSP. A decision was made for the two
groups to form one bargaining unit in March of 197 3. The "professional
unity agreement" through which the MSP and AAUP Chapter agreed to oper-
ate can be found in Appendix 4. As soon as the agreement was voted upon,
an executive board consisting of faculty members from both MSP and AAUP
was formed and, thereafter, decided jointly upon the major campaign
issues. Howard Brogan, a professor of English, was made chairman
of
the MSP-AAUP Executive Committee.
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Soon after the formation of the MSP—AAUP, a committee of anti-
union faculty members coalesced calling itself the Committee of Concerned
Faculty (CCF)
. This organization was headed by Robert Wellman, a profes-
sor in the School of Education and author of the recent governance docu-
ment submitted by the faculty representatives to the Board of Trustees
(see Appendix 5) . The purpose of CCF was (in its own words) "to get all
the disadvantages of unionization publicized and discussed by the faculty.
We believe that a faculty that has all the facts relative to unionization
will inevitably reject the current efforts to unionize our campus" (from
a circular published April 2, 1973, issued by the CCF).
During the early spring, the MSP-AAUP organization issued the
necessary signature cards to the University of Massachusetts/Amherst fac-
ulty. Again, the purpose of these signature cards was to demonstrate to
the state labor relations board that there was enough interest by the
eligible voting members of a potential bargaining unit to have an elec-
tion. Once the sufficient number of cards (thirty percent) had been
signed and gathered, a bargaining organization (in this case, the MSP-
AAUP) could petition the state labor relations board for an election.
This was done by MSP-AAUP and the November election date set.
Both MSP-AAUP and CCF visited departments, held open meetings
for the faculty as a whole, and published a number of 'circulars or po-
sition papers on various issues. These papers were first distributed in
the spring (April of 1973) and continued, gaining momentum in September,
October and November, until the eve of the election.
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On Thursday, November 15, 1973 and Friday, November 16, 1973,
1,404 faculty "went to the polls" to cast their ballots. Approximately
ninety-seven percent of the faculty voted. The three percent not voting
included faculty who were on sabbatical, on leave, were sick, or unable
to attend the balloting. The results of the election were as follows:
510 "yes" votes: votes in favor of collective bargaining repre-
sentation by the MSP-AAUP.
challenged votes: votes challenged on several grounds, most
commonly, alleged managerial status (department heads, division
heads, etc.).
—2 "voided" votes.
The "no" votes constituted a majority of all votes cast. Those votes
were sufficient in number to make it unnecessary to resolve the challenged
ballots
.
Between November 16 and April of 1974, when the researcher began
interviewing the faculty for this study, some major events took place.
Because these factors were referred to in the interviews, it seems appro-
priate to discuss them here. One should remember, however, that although
they were pertinent faculty issues, they did not affect the vote, al-
though they may be influential in any future election.
Immediately after the November election, Chancellor Randolph
Bromery sent out a letter to all faculty on the Amherst campus. The
Chancellor applauded the Amherst faculty on the results of the election,
stating that:
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In my view, the election results indicate decisive support for the
present system of faculty governance and the tradition of collegial
relations between the faculty and administration. Considering the
fact that slightly more than thirty-six percent of the faculty voted
in support of a faculty union, I also view the election results as a
mandate for the administration to strengthen its commitment to the
principle of self-government on the campus. (Letter from Randolph
Bromery to the faculty of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
November 19, 1973)
Although many faculty at the University might have agreed with
the Chancellor’s assessment, the general feeling of those interviewed in
April of 1974 was that this letter invited a general shift in sentiment
among "no" voters. These individuals felt that to interpret their "no"
votes as an indication of their acceptance of the present governing pro-
cess was false; rather, they were simply asserting that their vote indi-
cated that they did not want the MSP-AAUP representing them. Many felt
that even withstanding their mistrust of the current administration,
they were selecting the "lesser of two evils" (a quotation from one of
the seventy-six interviews) . To then have their votes summarized by
Bromery as a vote of support for "the tradition of collegial relations
between the faculty and administration" was, they felt, an incorrect sup-
position .
A second and far more important incident occurred five months
after the election. The Faculty Senate and Amherst administration had
been working on a document which would delineate how merit increments
would be dispersed to the faculty. In September of 1973, President
Robert Wood made a recommendation to the Board of Trustees concerning
certain merit guidelines and procedures. He did this without
consulting
Many of the faculty interviewed in April felt thatthe Faculty Senate.
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the President should not have acted without Faculty Senate approval,
and that he should agree to change the merit policy to reflect the Sen-
ate's April 1974 recommendations.
Finally, a third issue weighing on the faculty's minds was tenure
quotas. Many felt that the MSP-AAUP had tended to exaggerate the issue
in its campaign. Some even said that they thought that it was a "trumped
up" issue. During the spring of 1974, each department head had been
asked to do a long-range plan for his/her department, its needs, resources
expenses, and personnel projections. Part of the planning included a
five-year projection of the percentage of tenured faculty members, their
ranks and distribution within the department. Some faculty saw this as
being very close to setting tenure quotas for each department. Since
the administration had denied in the fall that it was trying to set ten-
ure quotas, the faculty felt that they were being "hoodwinked". The ad-
ministration felt that what they were asking for was not, in fact, a
quotas system, but that good planning called for a consideration of the
number of tenured faculty within each department over the next five years
These three issues— the Bromery letter, the merit clause and the tenure
dilemma—were on the faculty's minds four and one-half months after the
election when the seventy-six interviews were being conducted.
An acknowledged limitation of the study is the intrusion of
changed sentiment during the time lapse between the election and the
survey. The time of year, both of the election and the survey,
should
again be noted. Many considered November an advantageous point
in the
year from the administration's standpoint because there
were no crucial
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budgetary or personnel decisions at that time. Spring brought uncertain-
ty for those being considered for tenure, for those up for reappointment,
for those requesting a sabbatical or leave of absence. Also, during the
spring of 1974, the beginnings of the inevitable budget cuts were being
felt and tensions were higher. The administration had announced a pro-
jected ten percent cut in the total University budget, and therefore, no
new faculty positions. At that time, however, there was no projection
of having to cut existing budgeted positions.
The methodology for this study was described in Chapter I. The
researcher’s objective in the one-hour interview was to obtain faculty
attitudes toward unionism in general, toward the specific election held
on the Amherst campus and toward university governance.
Each set of faculty attitudes was cross analyzed with voting
preference and, in some cases, with school or tenure status. The main
concern of the study was to determine whether the greatest influence on
a faculty member’s vote was predisposition (attitudes which had been
nurtured over a long period of time), or the current issues affecting a
faculty member's life at the University of Massac.husetts/Amherst . In
several faculty collective bargaining studies, the authors have concluded
that local issues were the decisive factor in an election. Robert Carr,
in Coll ective Bargaining Comes to the Campus , states that job "dissatis-
faction" is what turns a faculty member towards collective bargaining.
Dissatisfaction with one's job might cover areas such as inadequate sal-
ary, unfair governance systems. . . "old guard, young turk cont licts
(senior vs. junior faculty), or inequitable grievance proceduics. "The
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complex set of factors and influences is seldom identical at any two
2institutions .
"
The hypothesis of the present study suggested that predisposition
of the seventy—six faculty members interviewed was the key factor, pre-
cisely because there appeared to be relatively few local issues of any
great significance. According to the findings. University of Massachusetts/
Amherst faculty were satisfied, on the whole, with their salaries, working
conditions and job security. (This varied slightly, according to the in-
dividual's tenure status.) If these basic factors were areas of dissat-
isfaction, individuals often were more inclined to opt toward collective
action in hopes of improving their status quo.
Each faculty member interviewed was numbered randomly for identi-
fication purposes. In referring to an individual, every attempt has been
made to avoid, positive identification (of a particular individual) by the
reader. The researcher took notes during the interview; but, as has been
previously stated, no taped recording was made.
Interview Resu l ts: Faculty Demographic Data
(Section V of Interview) - Age and Voting Behavior
The age range of the faculty members interviewed can be seen in
Table 4. Because age was correlated to voting preference, the researcher
has grouped the faculty members in four age brackets (see Table _>) .
^Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining, p. o5.
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TABLE 4
ACE RANGE OF SAMPLE
”
RELATIVE
AGE OF ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY
FACULTY FREQUENCY (PERCENT)
Did not ask age. 1 1.3
28.00 2 2.6
29.00 4 5.3
30.00 1 1.3
31.00 4 5.3
32.00 4 5.3
33.00 4 5.3
34.00 5 6.6
35.00 2 2.6
36.00 2 2.6
37.00 4 5.3
38.00 3 3.9
39.00 2 2.6
40.00 2 2.6
41.00 1 1.3
42.00 2 2.6
43.00 1 1.3
44.00 1 1.3
46.00 5 6.6
49.00 3 3.9
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AGE OF
FACULTY
50.00
51.00
52.00
53.00
55.00
56.00
57.00
59.00
60.00
62.00
63.00
TABLE 4 CONT
.
AGE RANGE OF SAMPLE
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
2
3
4
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
RELATIVE
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
2.6
3.9
5.3
3.9
1.3
1.3
2.6
2.6
3.9
1.3
1.3
TOTAL 76 100.0
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TABLE 5
AGE RANGE BY GROUP
ACE
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
RELATIVE
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
0 1 1.3
28 through 35 26 34.2
36 through 44 18 23.7
46 through 53 20 26.3
55 through 63 11 14.5
TOTAL 76
•i
100.0
Table 6 shows, faculty voting preference among the four age brackets.
Column 1 indicates a vote for the MSP-AAUP agent; Column 2 indicates
a vote against the union; Column 3 indicates that there were individuals
in that age bracket who did not vote on November 15 and 16; and the last
column, Column 4, indicates the one person who refrained from telling
the interviewer his voting preference. There is one individual listed
as having age "0 M . The researcher neglected to ask one person his age.
From observing Table 5, one can see that the median age of the
seventy-six faculty members falls between thirty-six and forty-four
years, the majority being under forty-four years old. This is also
true of the entire faculty population at the University, and so indi-
cates that this is a representative population.
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TABLE 6
CROSS TABULATION OF AGE BY VOTING
DID NOT WOULD Row
YES NO VOTE NOT SAY Total
AGE GROUPING 1 0 0 0
0 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 1
3.0% 0% 0% 0% 1.3%
% of Total 1.3% 0% 0% 0%
12a 12 2 0
28 thru 35 years 46. 2%b 46.2% 7.6% 0% 26
36. 4%c 30.0% 100.0% 0% 34 . 2%
15. 8%d 15.8% 2.6% 0%
9 9 0 0
36 thru 44 years 50.0% 50.0% 0% 0% 18
27.3% 22.5% 0% 0% 23.7 %
11.8% 11.8% 0% 0%
7 12 0 1
46 thru 53 years 35.0% 60.0% • 0% 5.0% 20
21.2% 30.0% 0% 100.0% 26.3%
9.2% 15.8% 0% 1.3%
4 7 0 0
36.4% 63.6% 0% 0% 11
55 thru 63 years 12.1% 17.5% 0% 0% 14.5%
5.3% 9.2% 0%
1
0%
Column 33 40 2 1 76
Total 43.4% 52.6% 2.6% 1.3% 100.0%
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages
may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the number of faculty
members. The second figure b in each square is the equivalent percentage
which the sub-sample represents in each row (across). The third figure c in
each square is the percentage which the sub-sample represents in its column
(down) - the fourth figure d represents the percentage of the sub-sample of
the total sample (seventy-six faculty members).
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Table 6 demonstrates an interesting phenomenon in relation to
the Ladd/Lipset faculty collective bargaining study. 3 In the mailed
questionnaire, survey of 1969, which had 60,028 returns, Ladd and Lipset
show a sharp distinction between faculty age and voting preference. Al- '
though their analysis is primarily based on faculty age at different
status institutions (i.e., a range of elite, scholarly universities
through non-scholarly two-year technical schools), one can ascertain
that of faculty under thirty-five, sixty-three percent favor collective
bargaining at a comparable institution to the University of Massachusetts.
Fifty-three percent of those whose ages range from thirty-five to forty-
nine favor collective bargaining, and forty-two percent of faculty over
fifty years of age favor collective bargaining. The University of
Massachusetts sample, one can readily surmise, bears little relation to
the Ladd/Lipset study. In fact, the sample breakdown depicted in Table 6
shows an even distribution in the age categories (twenty-eight to thirty-
five) and (thirty-six to forty-four) between yes and no votes; in the two
older age groups of faculty (forty-six to fifty-three) and (fifty-five to
sixty-three)
,
there is a preference (sixty percent/thirty percent) for
the "no union" choice.
John Livingston has outlined in an article entitled, "Collective
Bargaining and Professionalism in Higher Education," three major reasons
why junior (younger) faculty are more apt to vote pro-union. Livingston's
3
Everett C. Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset. Pr^es^^,_Uni£ns
and American Higher Education. Eerkeley, California:
Carnegie Foun a
tion for the Advancement of Teaching, 1973, pp. 10 11.
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findings are similar to the University of Hawaii study and to the Ladd/
Lipset report. The junior faculty member is less apt to be tenured,
and so has less job security than his older colleagues. His salary is
comparatively lower; and in addition, this faculty member has less in-
dividual negotiating power. The younger faculty member has not reached
a satisfactory status quo position in his/her career (as yet); and, so
therefore, has not reached the higher professorial ranks which enable
the faculty member to have political or professional power within the
faculty governance structure. In other words, from the perspective of
the junior faculty members, they have everything to gain and little to
lose by electing a collective bargaining agent.
The sample for the University of Massachusetts/ Amherst case study
was not stratified for proportionate representation of the sexes within
academic units and among status categories. To do so would have required
a sample size that would have been beyond the capabilities of a single
researcher. However, for general interest, the researcher did correlate
the sex of the faculty member to voting preference (see Tables 7 and 3).
Table 8 illustrates how male and female faculty members voted.
The sample indicates that the female faculty were predominantly against
the union. From her discussion with the female faculty, the researcher
was able to surmise some of the reasons for this voting pattern. Since
the collection of such data was outside the scope of the study, the pro-
cess was without controls; and consequently, the observations are purely
subjective.
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TABLE 7
MALE AND FEMALE FACULTY IN SAMPLE
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
Male 63 82.9
Female 13 17.1
The percentage of female/male faculty in this sample is fairly
representative of the faculty as a whole. It should be noted, however,
that this occurred by chance.
Two of the female faculty indicated that they had serious reser-
vations about faculty collective bargaining based on the history of the
industrial union model. Unions, they believed, would not give adequate
consideration to women as an historically disenfranchised group. Both
of these individuals expressed the same concern for minority faculty.
A maiority of the female faculty interviewed was not tenured
and had lower academic rank than the norm. Because of these two indi-
cators, the female faculty should have had, if they had followed the vot
ing patterns of their male counterparts, a more evenly split vote.
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TABLE 8
MALE AND FEMALE VOTING PREFERENCE
DID NOT WOULD Row
Column
Total
33
43.4 %
40
52 . 6%
2
2 . 6%
1
1 . 3%
76
100 . 0%
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as per-
centages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across).
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
represents in its column (down) - the fourth figure d represents the
percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty
members)
.
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Academic Rank and Voting Behavior
Each individual was asked in which academic rank he/she fell at
the time of the election. In most cases, rank had not changed between
November and the date of the interview. A breakdown of the seventy-six
faculty is depicted in Table 9.
In comparison to the ACE 1972-1973 report, the academic rank of
the sample indicates a slightly higher proportion of faculty in the senior
ranks—59.2 percent—whereas the national average is 50.7 percent. This
national figure is steadily rising with the "aging" of the faculty popula-
tion. (Due to the current job market, fewer young faculty are being hired.
The voting behavior of the associate professor sub-sample (see
Table 10) directly contradicts what Livingston and other researchers have
found to be true for these faculty. The University of Massachusetts sam-
ple, showing a pro-union majority of the associate professors, is unique
among studied populations. The hypothesis being tested here would allow
for such an occurrence because, of course, predisposition allows for an
5
individual phenomenon among any rank of faculty member.
^Alan E. Bayer. Teaching Faculty in Academe: 19 72-1973 .
Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education Research Reports, 1973,
Volume 8, Number 2, p. 17.
5One writer on the subject of faculty collective bargaining had
some definite ideas based on the effect of collective bargaining on ju-
nior faculty status: "(Unions cannot) offer tenured professors greater
job security, since the instances of tenured faculty being fired are al-
most non-existent. . . • The only faculty group a union could really
help are the junior non-tenured members who tend to be exploited both on
salary and working conditions, as well as having little job security.
Unions might well lead to a higher percentage of these junior members be-
ing continued permanently in employment, but at a substantial price- the
watering down of academic standards." (Banks McDowell, "Should University
Faculties Be Unionized?," the Boston Glob e, June 18, 1972, p. 32,
editorial
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TABLE 9
ACADEMIC RANK
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
Professor 23 30.3
Associate
Professor 22 ' 28.9
Assistant
Professor 28 36.9
Instructor 3 3.9
Tenure and School Affiliation
Tenure and school affiliation were considered by the researcher ^
to be critical to her study. In an interview with Everett C. Ladd, Jr.,
co-author of the Carnegie Collective Bargaining Study, she was advised
of the same. Studies by John W. Moore also used these two pieces of
demographic data as significant voting indicators.
Tables 11 through 14 describe faculty tenure status, faculty mem-
ber’s school affiliation, and Table 14 shows a three-way analysis of these
two factors with voting preference. Common assumptons with reference to
these two sets of voting indicators (tenure and non-tenure) are that:
^John W. Moore. "Attitudes Toward Collective Negotiations:
Pennsylvania Community College Faculty," Center for the Study of Higher
Education, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1971; and J. 0. Haehn. 'A
Study of Trade Unionism Among State College Professors," Academic Senate
of the California State Colleges, 19/0, unpublished.
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TABLE 10
ACADEMIC RANK AND VOTING PREFERENCE
DID NOT WOULD Row
YES NO VOTE NOT SAY Total
RANK
8a 15 0 0
Professor 34. 8b% 65.7% 0% 0% 23
24. 2c% 37.5% 0% 0% 30.3%
10. 5d% 19.7% 0% 0%
12 9 0 1
Assoc. Prof. 54.5% 40.9% 0% 4.5% 22
36.4% 22.5% 0% 100.0% 28.9%
15.8% 11.8% 0% 1.3%
10 16 2 0
Asst. Prof. 35.7% 57.1% 7.2% 0% 28
33.3% 40.0% 100.0% 0% 36.9%
13.2% 21.1% 2.6% 0%
3 0 0 0
Instructor 100.0% 0% 0% 0% 3
9.1% 0% 0% 0% 3.9%
3.9% 0% 0% 0%
Column 33 40 2 1 76
Total 43.3% 52.6% 2.6% 1.3% 100.0%
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages
may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the number of faculty
members. The second figure b in each square is the equivalent percentage
which the sub-sample represents in each row (across) . The third figure c
in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample represents in its
column (down) - the fourth figure d represents the percentage of the sub-
sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty members).
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TABLE 11
CROSS ANALYSIS OF TENURE STATUS
WITH VOTING PREFERENCE OF FACULTY SAMPLE
l:
DID NOT WOULD Row
YES NO VOTE NOT SAY Total
TENURE STATUS
20a 27 0 0
Tenured 42 . 7%b 53.3% 0% 0% 47
60. 6%
c
67.5% 0% 0% 63.2%
26
. 3%d 35.5% 0% 0%
13 12 2 1
Non-Tenured 46.4% 42.9% 7.1% 3.6% 28
39.4% 30.0% 100.0% 100.0% 36.8%
17.1% 15.8% 2.6% 1.3%
0 1 0 0
Not On 0% 100.0% 0% 0% 1
Tenure Track 0% 2.5% 0% 0% 1.3%
0% 1.3% 0% 0%
Column 33 40 2 1 76
Total 43.4% 52.6% 2.6% 1.3% 100.0%
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as percentages
may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the number of faculty
members. The second figure b in each square is the equivalent percentage
which the sub-sample represents in each row (across) . The third figure c
in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample represents in its
column (down) - the fourth figure d represents the percentage of the sub-
sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty members)
.
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TABLE 12
THE NUMBER OF SAMPLE FACULTY MEMBERS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
ASSIGNED NUMBER NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
(GIVEN AS FACULTY SAMPLE RELATIVE
IDENTIFICATION) IN EACH SCHOOL FREQUENCY (%)
Food & Nat. Resources 1.00 9 11.8
Business 2.00 4 5.3
Education 3.00 5 6.6
School of Home Ec. 4.00 1 1.3
Humanities 5.00 20 26.3
Social Sciences 6.00 11 14.5
Natural/Phys. Sci. 7.00 13 17.1
Physical Ed. 8.00 3 3.9
Engineering 9.00 7 9.2
Nursing Sciences 10.00 3 3.9
TOTAL 76 100.0
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TABLE 13
VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE
ACCORDING TO SCHOOL/COLLEGE AFFILIATION
DID NOT WOULD Row
YES NO VOTE NOT SAY Total
SCHOOL
6a 3 0 0
Food & Nat. Res. 66. 7%b 33.3% 0% 0% 9
18. 2%c 7.5% 0% 0% 11.8%
7 . 9%d 3.9% 0% 0%
2 2 0 0
Business 50.0% 50.0% 0% 0% 4
6.1% 5.0% 0% 0% 5.3%
2.6% 2.6% 0% 0%
2 2 1 0
Education 40.0% 40.0% 20.0% 0% 5
6.1% 5.0% 50.0% 0% 6.6%
2.6% 2.6% 1.3% 0%
0 1 0 0
Home Economics 0% 100.0% 0% 0% 1
0% 2.5% 0% 0% 1.3%
0% 1.3% 0% 0%
10 9 0 1
Humanities 50.0% 45.0% 0% 5.0% 20
30.3% 22.5% 0% 100.0% 26.3%
13.2% 11.8% 0% 1.3%
5 5 1 0
Social Sciences 45.5% 45.5% 9.0% 0% 11
15.2% 12 . 5% 50.0% 0% 14.5%
6.6% 6.6% 1.3% 0%
oj 10 0 0
Nat./Phys. Sci. 23.1% 76.9% 0% 0% 13
9.1% 25.0% 0% 0% 17 . 1%
3.9% 13.2% 0% 0%
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TABLE 13 CONT.
VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE
ACCORDING TO SCHOOL/COLLEGE AFFILIATION
1/
DID NOT WOULD Row
YES NO VOTE NOT SAY Total
1 2 0 0
Phys. Ed. 33.3% 66.6% 0% 0% 3
3.3% 5.0% 0% 0% 3.9%
1.3% 2.6% 0% 0%
3 4 0 0
Engineering 42.9% 57.1% 0% 0% 7
9.1% 10.0% 0% 0% 9.2%
3.9% 5.3% 0% 0%
1 2 0 0
Nursing 33.3% 66.7% 0% 0% 3
3.0% 5.0% 0% 0% 3.9%
1.3% 2.6% 0% 0%
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as
percentages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents
the number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is
the equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row
(across) . The third figure c in each square is the percentage which
the sub-sample represents in its column (down) - the fourth figure d
represents the percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-
six faculty members)
.
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TABLE 14
VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
ROW
YES NO TOTAL
Food and Natural Resources
STATUS
Tenured 4 2
66.7 % 33.3% 6
66.7% 66.7 % 66.7%
44.4% 22.2%
Non-Tenured 2 1
66.7% 33.3% 3
33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
22.2% 11 . 1%
Column 6 3 9
Total 66.7% 33.3% 100.0%
Business
STATUS
Tenured 1 1
50.0% 50.0% 2
50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
25.0% 25.0%
Non-Tenured 1 1
50.0% 50.0% 2
50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
25.0% 25.0%
Column 2 2 4
Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as per
centages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across)
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the
sub-sample
represents in its column (down). The fourth figure represents the
per-
centage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty
mem
bers)
.
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TABLE 14 CONT.
VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
DID NOT ROW
YES NO VOTE TOTAL
Education
STATUS
Tenured 2a 0 0
100. 0%b 0% 0% 2
100. 0%c 0% 0% 40.0%
40.0%d 0% 0%
Non-Tenured 0 2 1
0% 67.7% 33.3% 3
0% 100.0% 100.0% 60.0%
0% 40.0% 20.0%
Column 2 2 1 5
Total 40.0% 40.0% 20.0% 100.0%
Home Economics
STATUS
Tenured
Column
Total
1
100 . 0%
100 . 0%
100 . 0%
1
100 . 0%
1
100 . 0%
1
100 . 0%
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TABLE 14 CONT.
VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
<
DID NOT WOULD ROW
YES NO VOTE NOT SAY TOTAL
Humanities
STATUS
Tenured 5 7 0
41.7% 58.3% 0% 12
50.0% 77.8% 0% 60 . 0%
25.0% 35.0% 0%
Non-Tenured 5 2 1
62.5% 25.0% 12.5% 8
50.0% 22.2% 100.0% 40.0%
25.0% 10.0% 5.0%
Column 10 9 1 20
Total 50.0% 45.0% 5.0% 100.0%
Social Sciences
STATUS
Tenured
Non-Tenured
Column
Total
3 3 0
50.0% 50.0% 0%
60.0% 60.0% 0%
27.3% 27.3% 0%
2 2 1
40 . 0% 40.0% 20.0%
40.0% 40.0% 100.0%
18.2% 18.2% 9.9 %
5 5 1
45.5% 45.5% 10.0%
6
55.5%
5
45.5%
11
100 . 0%
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TABLE 14 CONT.
VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
<
YES NO
ROW
TOTAL
Natural /Physical Science
STATUS
Tenured 2 7
22.2% 77.8% 9
66.7% 70.0% 69.2%
15.4% 53.8%
Non-Tenured 1 3
25.0% 75.0% 4
33.3% 30 . 0% 30.8%
7.7% 23.1%
Column 3 10 13
Total 23.1% 76.9 % 100.0%
Physical Education
STATUS
Tenured 1 1
50.0% 50.0% 2
100.0% 50.0% 66.7%
33.3% 33.3%
Non-Tenured 0 1
0% 100.0% 1
0% 50.0% 33.3%
0% 33.3%
Col uinn 1 2 3
Total 33.3% 66.7% 100.0%
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TABLE 14 CONT.
VOTING PATTERNS OF STUDY SAMPLE BROKEN DOWN BY
TENURE STATUS WITHIN EACH SCHOOL
<
ROW
YES NO TOTAL
Engineering
STATUS
Tenured 3 4
42.9% 57.1% 7
100 . 0% 100.0% 100.0%
42.9% 57.1%
Column 3 4- 7
Total 42.9% 57.1% 100.0%
Nursing
STATUS
Tenured 0
0%
1
100.0% 1
0% 50.0% 33.3%
0% 33.3%
Non-Tenured* 1
50.0%
100.0%
1
50.0%
50.0%
2
66.7%
33.3% 33.3%
Column
Total
1
33.3%
2
66.7%
3
100.0%
& r
For the purpose ot
eluded here under
this table, the non-tenure track individual
was in
the (2.00) Non-Tenured category.
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1. A faculty member who is tenured is more likely to be satisfied
with his/her own status quo and, therefore, will be less likely
to want to change it by voting for a faculty collective bargain-
ing agent;
2. Parallel to that supposition, that an untenured faculty member
is less sure of his/her job security, and, particularly in the
era of the hard-pressed 1970's, wants a strong agency working
on the faculty's behalf;
3. In addition, the tenured faculty member tends to be older, has
been at the institution for a longer period of time, and has,
therefore, built up certain loyalties to the Institution;
4. The older (tenured) faculty member has served on university-wide
committees, or at least departmental committees, and has seen a
little more of what the administration of the university does
on a day-to-day basis.
This exposure can have the effect of making less clear the line
of demarcation between the administrator and the faculty member. The
individual with some administrative or committee experience may not be
quite as anxious to change the status quo of faculty governance for per-
sonal as well as political reasons.^
7 These assumptions have been voiced by a broad range of authors
studying collective bargaining. The writers mentioned in this chapter
have discussed these same issues in their studies. Kenneth P. Mortimer,
J. Moore, J. Haehn
,
and Robert Carr (co-authors of Collective Bargaining
Comes to Campus), and many of the authors included in the Wisconsin Law
Lew , Volume 1971, Number 1 should be added. Carr summarizes most of
these voting indicators in his analysis of the llayci Study (1169) on
pp. 38-65.
no
Although a slight majority of the tenured faculty sample (fifty-
seven percent) voted against the union, it was not in the expected pro-
portion normally needed to counteract a heavily skewed (pro-union) ju-
nior faculty. The vote of the non-tenured faculty sample was split
evenly, again contradicting national trends.
Departmental Affiliatio n and Voting Behavior
The voting behavior of the total sample generally reflected the
voting population; again, however, the small size of the sample limited
its exact correlation. The sample broke down to 43.4 percent for the
union, 52.6 percent against, 2.6 percent not voting, and 1.3 percent who
would not say. If the department chairpersons and department heads are
excluded from the sample (because their ballots were challenged in the
election), the breakdown is as follows: 40.8 percent yes, 46.0 percent
no, 9.1 percent challenged, 2.6 percent not voting, and 1.3 percent who
would not say. The total population showed 36.3 percent for the union,
51.2 percent against, 12.4 percent challenged votes, and 3 percent not
voting.
Before the election, both the MSP-AAUP and CCF organization pre-
pared lists of faculty members and their predicted voting behavior. Sur-
prisingly, both lists were similar in their predictions, and both were
equally in error regarding some departments. The predictions were based
on national averages taken from studies conducted at other campuses; and
as will be shown, some of these departmental projections were not accur-
ate. Both the MSP-AAUP and CCF predicted anti-union sentiment
among
Ill
faculty in the Food and Natural Resource school. Their predictions were
based undoubtedly on the school's long and prestigious history in the
university the fact that the department's faculty members tended to
<
be older and the majority tenured. The study sub-sample proved the op-
posite. Sample faculty within the School of Food and Natural Resources
voted 66.7 percent for the union and 33.3 percent against it. The sample
interviews reflected a strong feeling of resentment toward the administra-
tion. Ostensible justification for such sentiment is suggested by the
"benign neglect" of this department during the years of expansion. Re-
calling for a moment the history of the University as summarized in
Chapter II, it was apparent that over the past ten to fifteen years the
emphasis of the burgeoning university had been on the liberal arts, not
agriculture. As the institution grew in size, the students were enter-
ing a variety of fields; "Mass Aggie" was being phased out. Although the
School of Food and Natural Resources represented a large portion of the
University budget, the faculty members felt that they had not kept pace
individually with the faculty in other areas of the University. In only
one other school—Education—did the tenured faculty members in the sam-
ple vote so heavily for the union. Of the non-tenured Food and Natural.
Resource faculty, the same proportion (sixty-seven percent) voted for the
union, resulting in the non— tenured vote being fairly consistent with
that of other departments.
The comments made by the faculty members from the School of Food
and Natural Resources were revealing of the pro-union sentiment. One
individual felt terribly disenfranchised, to the point of being hostile
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about the administration's actions toward his department. He stated
that
:
They (the administration) make decisions where I am concerned and
never ask me my opinion. I changed from a twelve-month to a nine-
month contract (the school had been urging this change) and I had
to take a f ive-thousand dollar cut. ... I had no recourse. . . .
They sent me a memo concerning my entire future, and told me I had
three days to sign it—no recourse. ... I am personally against
unions, but they are forcing a union. . . . The College of Agricul-
ture didn't get anything when the University of Massachusetts had an
expansion program. We need more faculty (recently, enrollments in
Food and Natural Resources have increased to a large degree) . The
School of Education gets all the money; but here, in Agriculture, we
don't get any. (No. 55 )
Other faculty from the department were not as vociferous, but expressed
similar resentment toward the administration.
One pre-election prediction was that the School of Business Ad-
ministration would show a majority favoring the no-union vote. The study
sample shows an even split, although the small size of the sample may not
give an accurate breakdown for the entire department.
The School of Education produced some interesting interviews.
/ Table 14 indicates that similar to the Department of Food and Natural
Resources, the two tenured faculty members voted for the union (in this
case, the entire sample of tenured members). Two of the three non-tenured
sample faculty voted against the union; the third non-tenured person
did
not vote at all.
In 1973, the School of Education had the smallest
percentage of
tenured faculty in the University. There were a few
reasons for this de-
velopment. The fast growth of the School during
the past five to six
to 1973-1974 had meant sizeable increases
not only in
years previous
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student enrollment at the graduate and undergraduate levels, but also
in the ranks of the faculty. Because Dean Dwight Allen often wanted to
expand a portion of the School before the University was ready for it,
<
he financed these increases in staff with what was termed "soft money."
Once hired, these faculty were often unable to change over from "soft"
money to regular state "01" account funds (i.e., they were not put on
the regular tenure track). If the faculty had been able to change over
to the tenure system, they (for the most part) had not yet had time to
be evaluated for tenure (six years had not elapsed since they made the
change). Furthermore, when Dean Allen first came to the University in
1968, he fired and/or did not rehire a number of faculty members who were
near to their tenure evaluation, thus depleting even further the percent-
age of tenured faculty within the School.
Many of those who did stay found Allen’s leadership style diffi-
cult to accept. They saw very fast change which, whether they agreed
with it or not, often did not include them. These faculty members, then,
became more and more dissatisfied with the situation; (and although the
A.gr icu 1 ture faculty looked toward the School of education as the depait
ment that had all) these faculty were in that "rich" school but were not
reaping any of the profits.
The School of Home Economics (which at the time of the election
consisted of eighteen faculty members) was handicapped in this study by
the small size of the sample. Only one interview was conducted;
and,
therefore, any analysis of that department based on the individual's
in-
terview would be irresponsible. The interview itself will
be used in the
general discussion of the interview's parts 1-IV later
on in this chapter
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The School of Arts and Sciences was broken down into three areas:
the humanities, the social sciences and the natural and physical sciences.
The various departments within the School were allocated to the three ma-
jor areas according to the general administrative printout sheet. Predic-
tions of voting behavior for the three segments were generally: humani-
ties, pro-union; natural/physical sciences, split; and social sciences,
pro-union. In general, the pro-union predictors believed that the cru-
cial swing would be in the Arts and Sciences.
According to this study's sample, there was no overriding support
for the MSP-AAUP within the arts and sciences, except in the non-tenured
humanities faculty where sixty-two percent voted for the union and twenty-
five percent against.
Within the social sciences faculty sample, the vote was evenly
split between union and non-union forces which was contrary to the pre-
dictions. The departments of economics, sociology, psychology, anthro-
pology, political science, geography, communication studies, and Asian
studies are considered to have faculty members whose average political
base is liberal to liberal-radical. National statistics show that in
1972, sixty-seven percent of those who call themselves "left-liberal"
would reject the statement that collective bargaining has no place on a
college campus, and sixty-nine percent would agree that strikes are a
g
legitimate means of collective action for faculty. In that same study,
(N = 471) fifty-five percent of the faculty in the social sciences and
8Ladd and Lipset, Professors, Unions , p. 26.
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humanities agreed "that the recent growth of unionization of college and
university faculty is beneficial and should be extended." Similarly,
sixty-four percent of the faculty in the social science and humanities
Q
areas characterized themselves as "left" or "liberal". In the 1969
study (N = 60,028), the percentages were even higher—seventy percent in
social sciences agreed with the concept of collective bargaining as well
as sixty-five percent in the humanities (see Appendix B for the 1969 sur-
vey results of all departments)
.
The social science interviews revealed conflicting attitudes
among those faculty members who felt torn between voting for a union "on
principle" and voting against the MSP-AAUP which (they felt) could not
adequately represent their interests. One individual said that if the
union had been an AFL-CT.0 affiliate, he would have voted for a union;
but because the bargaining agent was an affiliate of NEA or MTA, it
lacked clout with the Massachusetts legislature. At the end of the in-
terview, this same faculty member stated that if the election had been
held on that day (April of 1974), he might change his vote.
The natural and physical sciences sample faculty vote indicated
what most people predicted—seventy-seven percent of the faculty voted
against the union, twenty-three percent for the MSP-AAUP. There was
little difference between tenured and non-tenured faculty in terms of
their vote. In comparison to national averages, the University of
Massachusetts faculty in the natural sciences were more opposed to the
^ lbid., p. 39.
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union than their counterparts in other universities. Ladd and Lipset
summarize their findings in the following paragraphs explaining the rea-
sons behind these sets of departmental figures:
As we have indicated elsewhere, the faculty teaching in the liberal
arts. . . tend to be much more liberal than professors in most of
the professional schools, which are linked to the practical worlds
of business, agriculture and government. Within the liberal arts,
there is constant progression from left to right, from the social
sciences through the humanities, with the natural sciences the most
conservative of the group. ... To a considerable degree, the dif-
ferences among fields are not solely related to experience in the
discipline; the fields vary in the kind of students and practitioners
they attract. Thus, the "politically relevant" social sciences, con-
cerned with social problems, have recruited from the more liberal
segment of undergraduates; whereas at the other extreme, professional
fields that relate directly to the business world—such as engineer-
ing, business administration and colleges of agriculture—draw upon
the more conservative students. . . .
The same sharp variations by discipline that we have found in other
areas of professional and political opinion can be seen in response
to unionism. Social scientists give more backing to collective bar-
gaining than any other group of faculty. They are followed closely
by the humanists. Next come the natural scientists, with professors
in the business-related applied fields decidedly the most hostile to
professional unionism. 10
The faculty interviews in the School of Physical Education pre
sented a statistical problem. Although only three interviews were needed
for the sub-sample (two tenured and one non-tenured) , six faculty members
were interviewed. Because four of these six individuals held instructor
titles, it was assumed that these four individuals were not tenured. A
peculiarity of the Physical Education Department, however, is that its
faculty often did not have an advanced degree; and, therefore,
had been
awarded tenure at the bottom rank, thus creating an
imbalance of tenured
lOfbid., pp. 38-40.
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faculty in the lower ranks. ^ Because the question of tenure status was
not asked until the end of the interview, the researcher was forced to
interview more individuals than were necessary. Two of the three sample
<
faculty members in the School of Physical Education voted against the
union, one voted for the MSP-AAUP. The two tenured votes were split:
the non-tenured faculty member voted against the union.
The sub-sample of Engineering faculty should have contained five
tenured, two non-tenured faculty members. However, a similar identifica-
tion problem occurred in the gathering of faculty interviews here as
happened in the School of Physical Education. Two assistant professors
thought not to be tenured were tenured, both having been at the University
for less than five years. Of those interviewed, fifty-seven percent voted
against MSP-AAUP and forty-three percent for the union.
As explained in Table 14, one of the Nursing faculty accounted
for under "non-tenured faculty" was not on the tenure track, but was be-
ing paid by outside grant funds. In this particular table, the individual
has been counted in the non-tenured category, simplifying the graph con-
siderably. Again, the vote was fairly evenly split. The sample accur-
ately reflects the low percentage of tenured faculty members in the School
of Nursing: thirty-five percent of the departmental faculty are tenured
as compared to the University-wide figure of sixty-two percent.
recent survey (1974-1975) completed by AAUP shows what per-
centage of university and college faculty are tenured within each
rank.
The University of Massachusetts/ Amherst proved to have a high
percentage
of tenured instructors. (From "Tenured Faculty Members at
United states
Colleges and Universities," AAUP Survey, Economic Status of
the Professor,
The Chronicle of Highe r Educa tion, July 21, 1975, p. 11-
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Number of Years at the University and Voting Behavlo r
The number of years which a faculty member has spent at a uni-
versity is thought to be a significant factor, reflecting many of the
same attitudinal considerations as a faculty member’s tenure status,
i.e., longevity at one institution. The exception to this rule lies in
the number of faculty members in the study sample who reported that they
were brought to the University fully tenured. These faculty then had
the status and stature of the tenure rank, but had not been at the in-
stitution for any considerable amount of time. They could not be ex-
pected to be as committed to the university.
A majority of those faculty members (sixty-four percent) with ex-
tensive service to the University (twenty-three to thirty-seven years)
did vote against the union as might be expected however
,
those with
eleven to twenty years of service chose to support the union by a two to
one margin. Another surprising factor was the majority (fifty-four per-
cent of the sample faculty who had been with the University a relatively
short period of time (one to ten years) but who voted against the union.
Some of these faculty members were tenured but the majority were not.
Most of these faculty members were in the School of Arts and Sciences.
Once more, a demographic prediction of faculty voting behavior; namely,
number of years at the University proved to be wrong.
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TABLE 15
THE NUMBER OF YEARS WHICH SAMPLE FACULTY
HAVE SPENT AT UMASS/ AMHERST
NUMBER OF YEARS SPENT THE NUMBER OF FACULTY
AT UMASS IN YEARS CATEGORY
PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL SAMPLE
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
11 . 00 .
13.00
14.00
15.00
16.00
19.00
20.00
23.00
25.00
26.00
27.00
28.00
34.00
36.00
TOTAL
3.9
9.2
7.9
9.2
14.5
6.6
10.5
2.6
3.9
5.3
1.3
1.3
3.9
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
2.6
5.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
100.0
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TABLE 16
A CROSS ANALYSIS OF FACULTY, GROUPED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER
OF YEARS THEY HAVE SPENT AT THIS UNIVERSITY,
C
WITH THEIR VOTING BEHAVIOR
DID NOT WOULD Row
YES NO VOTE NOT SAY Total
NUMBER OF YEARS
SPENT AT UM/A
23a 30 2 1
1-10 years Al.lZb 53.6% 3.6% 1.8% 56
69. 7%
c
75.0% 100.0% 100.0% 73.7%
30. 3%d 39.5% 2 . 6%' 1.3%
6 3 0 0
11-20 years 66.7% 33.3% 0% 0% 9
18.2% 7.5% 0% 0% 11.8%
7.9% 3.9% 0% 0%
4 7 0 0
23-36 years 36.4% 63.6% 0% 0% 11
.
12.1% 17.5% 0% 0% 14.5%
5.3% 9.2% 0% 0%
Column 33 40 2 1 76
Total 43.4% 52.6% 2.6% 1.3% 100.0%
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as per-
centages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across).
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
represents in its column (down) . The fourth figure d represents the per-
centage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty members).
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TABLE 17
A DIVISION OF ONE SUB-GROUP FROM TABLE 16
(FACULTY WHO HAVE SPENT BETWEEN 1 & 10 YEARS AT UM/A)
COMPARED TO FACULTY VOTING BEHAVIOR
YEARS HERE YES NO DID NOT
VOTE
WOULD
NOT SAY
ROW
TOTAL
1-5 14 a 18 2 1
40. 0%b 51.4% 5.7 % 2.9% 35
42.4%c 45.0% 100.0% 100.0% 46.1%
18 .4%d 23.7% 2.6% 1.3%
6-10 9 12 0 0
42.9% 57.1% 0% 0% 21
27.3% 30
. 0% 0% 0% 27.6%
11.8% 15.8% 0% 0%
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as per-
centages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across)
.
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
represents in its column (down). The fourth figure d represents the
percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six members)
.
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TABLE 18
FACULTY MEMBERSHIP IN A "PROFESSIONAL" ORGANIZATION:
PAST AND PRESENT MEMBERSHIPS
NUMBER ASSIGNED NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF
TO CATEGORY FACULTY IN THAT TOTAL FACULTY
ON THE LEFT ASSOCIATION SAMPLE
No Memberships 1.00 54 71.1
AAUP 2.00 14 18.4
MSP-AAUP 3.00 2 2.6
AFT/Union 4.00 4 5.3
AAUP and AFT 2/4.00 1 1.3
MSP and AFT 3/4.00 1 1.3
TOTAL 76 100.0
123
TABLE 19
A CROSS ANALYSIS OF FACULTY MEMBERSHIPS IN A
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION WITH THEIR VOTING BEHAVIOR
ORGANIZATION YES NO DID NOT WOULD
VOTE NOT SAY
ROW
TOTAL
No Memberships 24 a 27 2 1
44.4%b 50.0% 3.7% 1.9% 54
72
. 7%c 67.5% 100.0% 100.0% 71.1%
31 . 6%d 35.5% 2.6% 1.3%
AAUP 4 10 0 0
28.6% 71.4% 0% 0% 14
12.1% 25.0% 0% 0% 18.4%
5.3% 13.2% 0% 0%
MSP-AAUP 2 0 0 0
100.0% 0% 0% 0% 2
6.1% 0% 0% 0% 2.6%
2.6% 0% 0% 0%
AFT/ Union 2 2 0 0
50.0% 50.0% 0% 0% 4
6.1% 5.0% 0% 0% 5.3%
2.6% 2.6% 0% 0%
AAUP and AFT 0 1 0 0
0% 100.0% 0% 0% 1
0% 2.5% 0% 0% 1.3%
0% 1.3% 0% 0%
MSP-AAUP and AFT 1 0 0 0
100.0% 0% 0% 0% 1
3.0% 0% 0% 0% 1.3%
1.3% 0% 0% 0%
Column
Total
33
43.4%
40
52.6%
2
2.6%
1
1.3%
76
100.0%
The chart is set up so that both actual
numbers as well as per
wawsst ---=3 sL.
rxir.ssrrx s-U.
represents in its column (down). The fourth
figure d represents the per-
centage of the sub-sample of the total sample
(seventy-six membe s)
.
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Membership Affiliation and Voting Behavior
According to the study completed by Ladd and l.ipset in 1969, a
large majority of professors (sixty percent) at "elite” Institutions did
not belong to any unions or professional associations. The authors ex-
plained that this was due to the fact that faculty at these colleges and
universities have:
1. the most individual prestige and bargaining power,
2. the (faculty's) fears over such issues as academic freedom are
low because threats are minimal. 12
The Ladd/Lipset study also revealed that at lower tier institutions
—
community and junior colleges—association membership was very high with
only eighteen percent of the faculty unaffiliated with any association.
Of those faculty who did Join professional associations or unions
in the major institutions, three-quarters were in the American Associa-
tion of University Professors. These AAUP members, however, did not
favor unionism because, as the authors pointed out, they identified
themselves with a meritocratic profession—one In which they sought rec-
ognition for their individual (vs. collective) position within the insti-
tution. We are reminded by Ladd and Lipset that their data was gathered
In 1969, long before the AAUP became involved in the union movement.
The figures may have changed.
The University of Massachusetts/ Amherst sample (depicted in
Table 18) substantially reflects the national survey. Seventy-one percent
^Tbid., p. 41.
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answered negatively to the question, "Are you a member of a professional
organization and if so, which one?" The majority (sixty-four percent)
of those who held membership in some organization was affiliated with
the AAUP.
Table 19 shows the voting behavior of faculty according to their
membership status. The one category which (at first) may seem contra-
dictory is the AAUP vote. Remembering that the bargaining agent at the
University of Massachusetts/Anherst represented AAUP; it is surprising
to find a large majority (seventy-one percent) of the sample AAUP mem-
bers voting against the MSP-AAUP. One AAUP member explained his reason
for voting against the coalition during his interview. Apparently, dur-
ing one of the AAUP-Amherst Chapter meetings, a merger of the two organ-
izations was discussed; but according to this individual, a majority
were against such a merger. A vote was not taken. Later, the execu-
tive committee of the local chapter met and voted to join with the
Massachusetts Society of Professors, alienating many of the chapter mem-
bers. "They abused the responsibility of their office," the informant
proclaimed
.
Four faculty members mentioned that they had worked with the
Committee of Concerned Faculty at one point or anotner during the cam-
paign; but they did not answer the professional membership question in
the affirmative. The CCF did have a looser definition of membership
than did the MSP-AAUF, and, therefore, may not have seemed to its back-
ers to answer the description of "professional organization."
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Administrative Position of Faculty
Member and Voting Behavior
Tn answer to the question, "Do any of the following pertain to
you: Department Head? Department Chairperson? Cluster Chairperson?
Program Director?"; eighty-two percent of the faculty answered that no,
they had no such designation. Five percent said that they were depart-
ment chairpersons (some said they were "acting" or half-time department
chairpersons; these were counted as full department chairpersons).
Close to four percent answered that they were department heads, and nine
percent responded "yes" to program director. This last title was the
most difficult to distinguish as some faculty would answer "yes" ini-
tially if they were in charge of any sub-section of their department.
For instance, a faculty member who had been asked by the department
chairperson to oversee the graduate students within that department an-
swered "yes". Even after clearing up this confusion with the informants,
seven still insisted that they were program directors. In terms of the
total University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty population, this would
be much too large a percentage of the total; and, therefore, the "pro-
gram director" title was not counted as part of the challenged vote
category.
There were three reasons for asking faculty to identify any ad-
ministrative position which they held. First, 174 votes were challenged
because of faculty's administrative status. Second, the issue of the
bargaining unit (to be discussed in more detail later on in this chap-
ter) involves not only the faculty who can vote in an election but
upon
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the agent's election— those who can be represented by a single agent.
The third reason stems from the hypothesis that a department head is
more apt to vote against a union because of his administrative func-
13
tion. Both the department chairperson and department head carry ad-
ministrative responsibilities for faculty and students, and often these
individuals teach as well. Having been exposed to the administrative
bureaucracy, its assets and its liabilities, it is felt that the prob-
lems inherent in a large organization are more clearly recognized by a
department chairperson or head; and the lines of demarcation between ad-
ministration and faculty members are less clear. Clearly, the sample
vote indicates just that. The department head sample vote went three
to zero against the union, and the department chairperson vote was evenly
split
.
Self-Proclaimed Voting Behavior
Table 22 shows the results of the statement, "It would be helpful
to this analysis if you would tell me whether you voted for or against
the MSP-AAUP coalition. It will be kept in confidence, as will the en-
tire interview." There was one individual who would not disclose how
he/she had voted. The reason was clearly understandable as the vote,
the person said, would have indicated how a block of individuals had
voted; and this person did not want to disclose those other
votes as well
13a department head at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst
is appointed by the provost usually for an unspecified
amount of time;
whereas a department chairperson is elected by the
department faculty
members for a specific period of time. The department
chairperson, how-
ever, can be re-elected; so the difference becomes,
at times, indie
gu ishable
.
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TABLE 20
ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION OF FACULTY MEMBER
ADMINISTRATIVE NUMBER ASSIGNED
POSITION TO CATEGORY
NUMBER OF FACULTY
WITH TYPES OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE TITLE
PERCENT OF
TOTAL SAMPLE
None
Department
Chairperson
1.00
2.00
62 81.6
4 5.3
Department
Head
3.00 3 3.9
Program
. 4 . 00 7
Director
9.2
TOTAL 76 100 . 0%
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TABLE 21
A CROSS ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION
OF FACULTY MEMBER AND VOTING PREFERENCE
DID NOT WOULD Row
The chart is set up so that both actual numbers as well as per-
centages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across)
.
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
represents in its column (down) . The fourth figure d represents the
percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty
members)
.
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TABLE 22
VOTING:
SELF-PROCLAIMED STATUS OF FACULTY MEMBER
NUMBER ASSIGNED
TO VOTING
CATEGORY
NUMBER OF
FACULTY IN
EACH CATEGORY
PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL
SAMPLE
Yes 1.00 33 A3.
A
No 2.00 40 32.6
Did Not Vote 3.00 2 2.6
Would Not Say p- oo 1 1.3
TOTAL 76 100.0%
The final three questions in Section V of the interview are illus-
trated in Tables 23 through 27. The reason for these questions was to
see if personal affiliation with a University-wide function (such as
membership on a University-wide committee or the Faculty Senate) would
affect a faculty member's vote. The third question involving membership
on a departmental committee or, specifically, the departmental personnel
committee was asked for a similar analysis. Involvement with one of
these committees or with the Faculty Senate was thought to inlluence the
way a faculty member perceived the university, and therefore the way he/
she would vote.
131
TABLE 23
MEMBERSHIP ON FACULTY SENATE
NUMBER ASSIGNED
TO CATEGORY OF
MEMBERSHIP
NUMBER OF FACULTY
IN MEMBERSHIP
CATEGORY
PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL SAMPLE
Oa 1 1.3
Yes 1.00 18 23.7
No 2.00 49 64.5
Yes, In Part 3.00 8 10.5
TOTAL 76 100.0
indicates that one individual was not asked the question
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TABLE 24
A CROSS ANALYSIS OF FACULTY SENATE MEMBERSHIP
WITH VOTING BEHAVIOR
DID NOT WOULD Row
The chart is set up so that both actual members as well as per-
centages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across).
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
represents in its column (down). The fourth figure d represents the
percentage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six faculty
members)
.
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TABLE 25
FACULTY MEMBERSHIP ON A DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE
VALUE
ABSOLUTE RELATIVE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY PERCENT
Yes 1.00
No
t
2.00
Yes, Personnel 3.00
41
11
24
53.9
14.5
31.6
TOTAL 76 100.0
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TABLE 26
A CROSS ANALYSIS OF FACULTY MEMBERSHIP ON
DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE WITH VOTING BEHAVIOR
MEMBER YES NO DID NOT
VOTE
WOULD
NOT SAY
ROW
TOTAL
Yes 20 a 20 1 0
48.8%b 48.8% 2.4% 0% 41
60. 6%c 50.0% 50.0% 0% 53.9%
26
. 3%d 26.3% 1.3% 0%
No 5 5 1 0
45.5% 45.5% 9.1% 0% 11
15.2% 12.5% 50.0% 0% 14.5%
6.6% 6.6% 1.3% 0%
Yes, Personnel 8 15 0 1
33.3% 62.5% 0% 4.2% 24
24.2 % 37.5% 0% • 100.0% 31.6%
10.5% 19.7% 0% 1.3%
Column 33 40 • 2 1 76
Total 43.4% 52.6% 2.6% 1.3% 100.0%
The chart is set up so that both actual members as well as per-
centages may be read. The top figure a in each square represents the
number of faculty members. The second figure b in each square is the
equivalent percentage which the sub-sample represents in each row (across'
The third figure c in each square is the percentage which the sub-sample
represents in its column (down) . The fourth figur e d represents the per-
centage of the sub-sample of the total sample (seventy-six members)
.
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TABLE 27
FACULTY MEMBERSHIP ON UNIVERSITY
-WIDE
t
COMMITTEE
VALUE ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
RELATIVE
FREQUENCY PERCENT
Oa 1 1.3
Yes 1.00 35 46.1
No 2.00 39 51.3
Yes, In Part 3.00 1 1.3
TOTAL 76 100.0
Indicates one individual who was not asked the question.
The results of the question regarding membership in the Faculty
Senate indicated that membership in that body produced a more positive
stance toward the union side. A discussion of the faculty's attitudes
toward the University of Massachusetts/Amherst Faculty Senate will be
handled in Section II of the interview, and will substantiate this re-
sult. (Bayer's study conducted in 1969 indicated that faculty who gave
lower effectiveness ratings on the Faculty Senate were more apt to be
.14
pro-union
.
)
1Z>
Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining^ p. 44.
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Whether faculty had served on several departmental committees
or not made little difference in their voting behavior. However, those
sample faculty members who had served on a departmental personnel com—
/ {
mittee voted against the union by a margin of two to one.
Faculty Attitudes Toward Unionism
(Section I of Interview)
Questions 1 and 2 :
Definitions of Collective Bargaining
The purpose of Section I of the interview was to ascertain each
faculty member's personal attitude toward the concept of collective bar-
gaining and unionism in general. Although the faculty member had been
told in the introductory letter that the interview would be about the
University of Massachusetts November election, no discussion of that
election preceded the first question.
—Question 1 : When the term "collective bargaining" is used, what
comes to your mind?
—Question 2 ; Is there a distinction in your mind between collective
bargaining for blue collar and white collar workers? If yss, what
are those distinctions?
The faculty's responses to these two questions revealed far more
than a simple definition of collective bargaining. (See Chapter I, page
9 for a definition of collective bargaining.)
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As the number of interviews progressed, it became clear that the
placement of these first two questions was critical. Because they were
asked first, they elicited fresh responses from the faculty reducing the
/ f
likelihood that the definition they chose would be colored by their own
discussion of their vote. As the interview progressed and issues of
governance, student rights and particularly issues of tenure and depart-
mental authority were discussed, the faculty member began compensating
his/her language for what might have appeared to be a one-sided view-
point expressed in Questions 1 and 2. The predisposition of each faculty
member, however, had already been ascertained.
The responses to Questions 1 and 2 produced assorted definitions
of collective bargaining and unionism. A fairly standard answer was:
"an organized group of position holders within a system" (Number 2, anti-
union). Having given a fairly routine definition type answer, however,
the faculty member often would go on to explain how he/she felt about
collective bargaining. "Collective bargaining is a matter of the fac-
ulty as a group, collective action vs. the individual. It is frighten-
ing to contemplate an outside bureaucracy coming between us and the ad-
ministration" (Number 3, anti-union). "The differences between the blue
and white collar worker are narrowing as the development of unions is
tied to economic phenomena rather than educational. The faculty needs
a mechanism by which it can say to the administration, 'these are deci-
sions you can't make alone'" (Number 4, pro-union voter).
"Someone speaking for me rather than having the opportunity to
fight my own battles. . . • The blue collar worker is not quite as
138
equipped to deal with injustices because of his (lack of) education"
(Number 19, anti-union voter).
Unions are concerned with needs of workers, not with a product.
. . . Professionals should be concerned with a product. I didn't vote
for the union because I've seen what happens to professional people
when they become 'unionized'. The American Nursing Association is noth-
ing but a union. I violently react to that. We are concerned with the
care of people. The fact is that we have let ourselves become a union"
(Number 18, anti-union voter).
"Delegating your own wishes and worth to a group or person who
is then responsible to you to represent you. You turn yourself into a
mean or average rather than an individual" (Number 38, pro-union voter).
One individual had a very personal reaction: "My father was the owner
of a bituminous coal mine. I was considered a 'scab' in high school."
To the question, "Are there differences between blue and white collar
workers?" The same person responded, "Yes, definitely! I choose to
spend my time the way I want to. A blue collar worker is on an hourly
wage basis. A professor does nothing you can regulate by hours" (Num-
ber 40, anti-union voter).
"Where people in a work setting with an agreed upon agenda of
items negotiate for these issues and it becomes legally binding. In
white collar collective bargaining, we emphasize ownership. . . blue
collar workers would discuss worker satisfaction (Number 12, pro-union
voter)
.
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One person believed that his response summarized it all. In
answer to Question 2, Are there differences between blue and white col-
lar workers," came the response, "Yes. A professional has a code of
ethics" (Number 30, anti-union voter).
Question 3 : Faculty Involvement in Collective Bargaining:
"Should faculty at a university or college be involved in col-
lective bargaining" introduced what was really at issue in the interview
—
the possibility of collective bargaining in higher education. In gener-
al, the faculty's responses were affirmative. Two-thirds answered yes
to this question, but often added a qualifying phrase such as, "but not
on this campus," or "I tend to think yes, although I voted no in this
election" (Number 19). The "no" voters would tend to answer the ques-
tion in the following vein: "that's bothered me; it depends on what is
being bargained for" (Number 47); or "I don't know, I haven't felt that
way but I'm beginning to—as the administration gets bigger and bigger,
and grows away from the faculty" (Number 30).
The concern of another "no" voter was again the type of issues
within the contract: "the real need of faculty is job security. If
this and governance could be worked into a contract, then yes, I feel
we might have a union" (Number 63). A "yes" voter said, "we'll have
it here within three years; we'll have to in order to keep control
(Number 50). A second "yes" voter responded, "yes, for a limited rea-
son— the growing administration— its power and size. I don't like unions
but the faculty needs a larger voice than it has. We
shouldn't need
such a large administration here" (Number 23). Although
close to
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two-thirds of the faculty members in the study sample voted "no", their
responses to this question concerning the possibility of faculty collec-
tive bargaining paralleled comparable studies. Most agreed that there
could well be collective bargaining on a college campus.
—Question 4 : Contract Items:
Question 4 queried faculty members on possible contract items
within a collegiate collective bargaining agreement. "Should collective
bargaining in higher education include any or all of the following:
Economic issues, working conditions, job security, governance?" The
greatest difference among faculty responses was between those who men-
tioned governance and those who did not.^ Responses mentioning faculty
salaries, tenure, teaching load, or general personnel issues outweighed
two to one the individuals answering that they would include governance
items in a collective bargaining contract. Yet, Sections II and III of
the interview (below) provide evidence that governance was considered
an important issue for faculty at the University of Massachusetts in
April of 1974. A majority of faculty, however, did not feel that a
union could or should be involved with faculty governance. The way in
15
At the time of the election, no Massachusetts public employee
could bargain for wages. The law empowering them to do so was not passed
until ten days after the election on November 26, 1973, and was not
en-
acted until the following summer. Many of the faculty interviewed
did
not know that they could not bargain for wages at the time of the
elec-
tion. Those who were aware of the possible passage of such a
law at the
time of the election said that it did not really matter to
them, since
salary was not an issue.
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which a few faculty members responded offers some explanation of their
own mixed feelings on the subject.
One of my objections to collective bargaining is that the union was
interested in governance when they should not have been. It would
make faculty participation in governance a mockery. Governance
would be handled by union negotiators, not by faculty—a horror!
(Number 31)
In response to Question 4, another faculty member answered: "I don't
even want to consider the eventuality (of a contract). Professional
people should not have dictated standards or salaries. That's for trade
union people" (Number 46).
Although faculty governance is not normally considered part of
a collective bargaining agreement, most of the contracts negotiated be-
tween the Massachusetts state colleges and their Board of Trustees (be-
fore the November 26, 1973 Collective Bargaining Law was passed) con-
tained whole sections outlining governance systems and procedures.
These contracts have been the focus of a heated dialogue on the merits
and problems of including faculty governance in a legally binding agree-
16
ment. According to the study sample, the use of collective bargaining
to establish governance structures remains questionable in the minds of
the University of Massachusetts/Amherst faculty.
^ ror an interesting dialogue of opposing views on the
Massachusetts contracts, see Donald E. Walters. Collective Bargaining.
Helping to Restore Collegiality , " in The Chronicle of Higher Education,
November 26, 1973, p. 24j and "Letter to the Editor, from William J.
Crane, December 17, 1973, The Chronicle of Higher Education .
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—Question 5 : The Strike:
Should faculty in public higher education be able to strike?
The strike is a universal right of union members in the private sector.
Its effectiveness stems from both the threat of its use by employees as
well as its actual use. The National Labor Relations Board recognizes
that when "collective bargaining does not produce an agreement, the two
sides may turn to traditional modes of labor-management warfare, such
as the strike and the lockout.
Historically, however, the picture for public employees has been
quite different. This sector of the work force had been denied collec-
tive bargaining completely until Executive Order 10988 was Issued for
federal employees in the early 1960's. Since that time, not only has
Executive Order 11491 been issued, but twenty-five states have adopted
legislation (see Chapter II, footnote 51 for a list of states which
cover college employees specifically). A few of these states even al-
1
8
low for certain segments of the public work force to strike.
Massachusetts, however, does not; nor do the majority of other states.
19
Yet, many illegal strikes have occurred in the public sector. One of
the most recent involved the New Jersey State College system where three
17 Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining , pp. 9-10.
l8Hawaii Rev. Stat. 89-12 (Supp. 1970): Pennsylvania Stat. AFT
43 1101.1003 (Supp. 1971). A Vermont statute prohibits strikes by lo-
cal government employees If, by striking, they will endanger
health,
welfare or safety of the public. Merton C. Bernstein. Alternatives
to the Strike," AAUP Bulletin , Volume 58, Number 4, December,
1972,
pp. 408-410.
19 Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining , p. 21
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thousand faculty struck in eight state colleges. The faculty wanted a
cost-of-living increase; but because of a nine hundred million dollar
state deficit, they were denied the raise. Their strike lasted ten
days, resulting in no pay increase. The faculty were not fined nor
jailed for their illegal activities; nevertheless, they did have to
20
make up the school days missed.
The American Association of University Professors has spent con-
siderable energies determining the Association’s policy toward the fac-
ulty strike. At first denouncing the strike, AAUP later revised its
position
:
It does not follow from these considerations of self-restraint (some
examples had preceded depicting instances of effective and ineffec-
tive uses of the strike) that professors should be under any legal
disability to withhold their services, except when such restrictions
are imposed equally on the other citizens. -*
Dallas Sands argued that the strike has negligible value within
public higher education because of the "non-profit" nature of college
education. Rather than supporting either side of the strike issue.
Sands has presented the opinion that new collective bargaining laws will
20An interesting piece of faculty history is recalled by
Hofstadter concerning faculty at William and Mary in the 1750 s. The
faculty put up a spirited resistance to lay control, insisting that be-
yond the making of statutes, the Visitors had enjoyed no rightful powers
over the college since 1729 except in cases in which violation of the
statutes was alleged. Since the faculty could appeal to the Bishop of
London against the decisions of the Visitors, they were not without re-
course, and they won a number of concessions." Richard Hofstadter,
Academic Freedom , p . 134
.
^"Faculty Participation in Strikes," AAUP Bulletin , Volume 54,
Summer, 1968, p. 157.
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need to be designed for the collegiate institution. In the following
rationale, he describes the difference between the public and private
sector strike. The public employer, Sands explains, does not have the
/ (
profit loss to contend with as the private employer does; so that the im-
pact of the public employees' strike, though felt by the taxpayer, does
not have as great an impact upon the administrative body of the public.
The strike operates as an economic sanction in industry to compel the
employer to make concessions in order to restore production and avoid
further loss of profits. In the case of an enterprise not operated
for profit, that kind of sanction cannot be expected to operate with
its usual force. Of course, no labor dispute is ever purely an econ-
omic contest. Both sides to an industrial labor dispute generally
cultivate the support of public opinion based on considerations of
justice, nationalism, ethics, institutional loyalties, and so on.
But the absence of the economic factor from its position of key im-
portance is a significant difference in the educational bargaining
relationship .22
Furthermore, Sands suggests that sympathy for the striking public employee
wanes fast; and without strike benefits or the employer's incentive to
move quickly, a public strike can be long and costly to the employee.
Continuation of a faculty strike beyond a relatively brief period is
apt to be counterproductive because its economic impact on the strik-
ers increases as the strike continues while the public relations im-
pact on the institution would have been felt most acutely at first.
22
A recent article in The New York Times points to "The^ Public.
Disdain of Public Employees," in Lee Dembart’s "Week in Review/'
."Poli-
ticians find the same sentiment and are turning it to their
political a
vantage. In Massachusetts last week. State employees struck
for three
days; but when the State held firm and threatened stiff fines,
they wen
back to work with nothing to show for it." Sund_ay_New_ York
Times, June
27, 1976, p. 3.
23
C.
Education ,
"
Dallas Sands. "The Role of Collective Bargaining
in Higher
Wisconsin Law Review, Volume 1971, Number 1, pp. 163-164.
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In other words, whether the strike is legal or illegal, Sands
doubts that a strike by faculty members can effectively deny to the col-
lege administration a vital service which cannot, for a time, be foregone.
/ f
It appears that society does, in fact, tolerate interruptions, tem-
porary or extended, of the learning process for reasons which are no
more substantial than faculty demands. Brief interruptions to cele-
brate athletic victories are not uncommon. Longer interruptions may
be imposed for compulsive military service. . . . Thus, the "essen-
tial" nature of the educational process is insufficient to support a
doctrinaire repudiation of the right to strike. 24
In a study conducted with the Pennsylvania State College faculty,
individuals were asked whether or not they would resort to a strike, and
whether or not a strike might be used by a college faculty. Their re-
sponses were then correlated to the faculty member's selection of a bar-
gaining agent. Only the "no representative" voters rejected the strike
completely. The APSCUF-PAHE* and AAUP voters felt that although a strike
is "generally undesirable and should be averted in most instances,
1 there
might be occasion when a strike was the only recourse. AFT voters were
even less hesitant to use the strike and, in fact, few respondents felt
that the strike was an "unprofessional activity (a response most often
given by the "no representative" voters) . Mortimer and Lozier summarized
their findings, stating that: "If Pennsylvania State College faculty at-
titudes are indicative of the broader populace of the higher education
faculty, it may be that the strike is no longer regarded as an
*The Association of Pennsylvania State College and
University
Faculties in Affiliation with the Pennsylvania Association
for Higher
Education and associated with the National Education Association,
NEA
^ Ibid
. ,
p . 162
.
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unprofessional activity, or at least a sufficient reason to reject union-
25ism.
Certainly, there are alternatives to the strike. Arbitration,
/ f
both binding and non-binding, fact finding and mediation are used in
many states. There are even some non-traditional approaches, one of
which was called the "non-stoppage" strike, and was described in the
AAUP Bulletin.
Under my proposal, a public employee union would be free to declare
a non-stoppage strike after all bargaining procedures failed to pro-
duce a settlement. Employees would be obliged to continue to work
full-time but would forego a portion of their take-home pay. I sug-
gest that, initially, ten percent would suffice. This money would
be paid by the public employer directly into a special fund. . . .
In addition to paying the equivalent of regular wages, the employer
would also put into the fund an extra amount equal to what the em-
ployees have given up. This latter sum would constitute a loss to
the employer. The union would have the option periodically to in-
crease the amount of the foregone wages to employer payments, per-
haps by increments of ten percent every two weeks. The public em-
ployer would have the option to require the union to switch to a
graduated strike. If the employer did this, the employees would
continue to lose the same rate of pay; but the employer would fore-
go services rather than pay out the additional funds. ^6
The article describing the non-stoppage strike was written in
1971; and since the non-stoppage strike clause has not been negotiated
into any public employer-employee contracts, one would have to say that
the suggestion fell on "deaf ears."
^G. Gregory Lozier and Kenneth P. Mortimer. Anatomy of a Col
lective Bargaining Election in Pennsylvania s State—Owned Colleges.
Center for” the Study of Higher Education, The Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, February, 1974, p. 60.
^Merton Bernstein. "The Non-Stoppage Strike," AAUP Bulletin,
Volume 58, Number 4, December, 1972, p. 409.
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Question 5 of the interview querLed whether faculty, In general,
should be able to Htrlke. The faculty responded overwhelmingly that
vos, «i sti ike should be used ll all alternatives had been exhausted.
Many expressed the opinion that collective bargaining would bring a
greater chance of a strike; others felt it was highly unlikely that the
faculty would over strike. One person replied, "l don’t see us ns hav-
ing that much unified dissatisfaction" (Number 76). Four people answered
that they personally would never strike but that a certain "element" of
the faculty at the University of Massachusetts might. No correlation
existed between those voting affirmatively or negatively on collective
bargaining in the November election and those supporting or opposing the
legitimacy of a faculty strike. The following quotations illustrate
various faculty attitudes. One person expressed strong sentiments con-
cerning the duty which a faculty member has as a public employee; and, as
such, he felt that faculty sho.lld not be allowed to strike (Number 60).
Another responded quite simply: "in collective bargaining, the only
effective way to bargain is with the threat of a strike (Number 59).
One union voter remarked that "it would be a pretty sad situation it the
faculty struck. 1 am against it. Of course, the percentage of chances
for it (a strike) Increase with a union. . ." (Number 57). Most said
that they would regret a strike; although the great majority left that
It was a bargainer's right, provided he was willing to live with the
costs. One faculty member who had been quite open up until this point
said, with a twinkle in his eye, "Now, I'd never say that I'd do any-
thing illegal!" (Number 5).
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In conclusion, from the faculty's responses, it is clear that
if collective bargaining were to become a reality for faculty at the
University of Massachusetts, the administration would be foolish to
think that when rights and privileges are at stake, faculty would re-
sist a strike for any reason.
—Question 6 : Family Membership in a Union:
"Have you or has any member of your family ever been a member
of a union?" Studies on "professionalism" often mention family back-
ground as a significant factor in enabling the prediction of faculty
27
attitudes toward unionism. These studies hold the premise that a fac-
ulty member, one or more of whose family members had been a union member,
would be far more likely to vote for a union than would someone who had
had no previous close association with a union. This trend is also sug-
gested by the- findings of one study which indicate that a faculty member,
himself having once been a union member, would be more likely to favor
28
union representation on his campus. In their response to Question 6,
^Cole, author of The Unionization of Teachers , examined the
leaders of the teacher's union movement in New York City. He found that
"many of its leaders had been brought up in the pro-union socialist en-
vironment of New York's predominantly Jewish lower east side. . . much
of the militant leadership in the local came from the ranks of the
Socialist Party. . . those without socialist backgrounds generally came
from families with a strong union tradition.” S. Cole, The Unionization
of Teachers
,
p. 12.
28
J. 0. Haehn. "A Study of Trade Unionism Among State College
Professors." Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of California, Berkeley,
1969. Haehn found that supporters of unionism were more typically
from
a family which included clerical and skilled workers. In addition,
those
professors with previous union experience were more likely to support
faculty unionization than those without previous union experience.
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sixteen of the seventy-six faculty members answered that they personally
had been or were at the present time members of a union. Nineteen re-
sponded that they had relatives who had been members of a union, and
five of those nineteen answered "yes" to both a personal and family mem-
bership. Thirty-six had no affiliation with a union. Table 28 demon-
s ^ ra ^ es correlation between union membership and voting behavior.
The reason for asking Question 6 was to test the validity of
the theory that people who had had personal experience with a union
would more readily vote for a union. The statistics showed that no such
statement could be made for the University of Massachusetts/ Amherst sam-
ple. Although there were no conclusive results from Table 28, some in-
sights can be drawn from the faculty's responses. A majority of the
"no" voters who had had a close relative (mother, father or sibling) in
a union answered that, to some extent, they saw their current profession
as antithetical to a union. The faculty member valued the University as
a peer-governed institution which, even when challenged by administrative
machinations, was far better than his memory of the adversarial union.
One individual illustrated the point quite graphically:
One of the reasons why I feel so against a union here is because
when I was a boy, I belonged to a teamsters union in a canning fac-
tory. I saw some extremely vulgar events which I now associate with
unions. We worked hard— twelve hours a day—and a large portion of
our pay went toward union dues. When I walked out of the faculty
to become a teaching associate, I walked out of that part of my life
(Number 15, anti-union).
The same individual went on to say that the union did some good
in the factory, and that he wouldn't be afraid of a union at the Univer
sity of Massachusetts. Nevertheless, he did question whether, after its
first five years, a union would not become corrupted.
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TABLE 28
A CROSS ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL AND/OR
FAMILY MEMBERSHIP IN A UNION WITH VOTING BEHAVIOR
/ f
NUMBER OF
FACULTY VOTED YES VOTED NO
(1) Personal Membership 16 5 10
(2) Family Membership 19 8 10
(3) Both Personal and Family
Membership 5 3 1
(4) No Previous Affiliation
With Union 36 17 19
TOTAL 76 33 40
•DID NOT WOULD NOT
- VOTE SAY
(1) 1
(2) 1
(3) 1
(4)
TOTAL 2 1
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Another individual who had voted against the union discussed
Question 6 at great length: "The blue collar image is relegated to a
position of meniality. Services are bought and sold which is certainly
not a way to handle any kind of skills—chattel—that ' s the way they are
treated" (Number 66). When asked if he or a relative had been a member
of a union, he answered, "no". Later on in the interview, however, he
responded affirmatively to membership in a professional organization
—
the musicians' union. The individual obviously did not feel that his
membership in a musicians' union in any way qualified him as a union
worker, again drawing a strong distinction between the professional's
"organization" and the worker's "union".
A faculty member who had started a union on another college cam-
pus felt quite strongly that there was no need for one at the University
of Massachusetts.
v.
There's no need for a faculty union here. ... We have an immense
amount of voice. ... I worked in a college where we didn't, and
there I helped form a union. Our salaries here are supported by a
great number of people who make much less (the taxpayers) . If we
were scrutinized, we'd lose in that respect (Number 69).
One of the informants had an anti-union background but now was
in support of a union at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst . He
felt that there were major issues in this election, and thus the reason
for his own personal shift in beliefs. He stated that the university
and his school were being run by "tyrannical bureaucrats”; and that he
saw a union as the only way to counteract these forces. He admitted
that he had had a very bad opinion of most unions when he had grown up.
He was raised in an area "where unions were all around him, even though
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he had had no family member in a union. "However," he said, "as a mem-
ber of the School of Education, I feel that this administration has giv-
en the green light to the School of Education administration to treat
faculty the way they want to" (Number 74). He felt that the school's
personnel committee was "manipulated" from above. The individual had
been at the University of Massachusetts for a number of years, and had
experienced the changes brought about by the Allen administration. These
changes had not been positive experiences for him, and, in a sense, he
wanted to punish the University of Massachusetts administration for al-
lowing these transgressions of faculty control. His attitudes toward
unionism, had he not had pressing issues concerning the school, would
have probably caused him to vote "no". However, once those issues be-
came critical enough to him, any such predisposition was suppressed.
—Question 7 : The Bargaining Unit:
Who would you include in a bargaining unit? Question 7 was
usually prefaced by an explanation of the term "bargaining unit. Be-
cause many faculty members had not become familiar with it during the
course of the election, there was a basic feeling of disinterest in the
subject of inclusion/exclusion in a bargaining unit. Only a few who
had been directly involved in the campaigns knew how important the def-
inition of membership in a unit could be. The categories depicted in
Table 29 were derived directly from the faculty's answers to Question 7.
Each faculty member's answer was phrased a little differently,
but generally, the responses fell into one of the
categories in Table 29
Only a few of the faculty members had strong opinions
on the subject.
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TABLE 29
FACULTY RESPONSES TO QUESTION 7
"WHO WOULD YOU INCLUDE IN A BARGAINING UNIT?"
TYPE OF RESPONSE NUMBER OF FACULTY
Everyone, excluding administration but
including
:
Librarians
Department Chairpersons
Department Heads
Teaching Assistants
All faculty members, Department Chairpersons,
and Department Heads
All faculty and Department Chairpersons
All faculty (excluding chairpersons and heads)
15
11
25
11
Anyone who meets criteria of AAUP membership 2
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One of the things that militates against a union here is that the
administration has managed to co-opt many faculty into being mana-
gers. I'd like to see a sharp distinction between management and
faculty. I would not include department chairpeople at first.
Later, yes, when they were really willing to represent faculty
(Number 41, pro-union).
All of the (sample) department chairpersons or heads felt that
their level should be included in the unit. One person was quite ada-
mant about the status of the department head: "I hold faculty status
as a department head. There is no issue as long as I hold academic rank.
I am a faculty member" (Number 46, anti-union). If that argument were
followed through, however, the trustees would be the only people on the
management side, since all of the academic policy-makers have faculty
rank in a department or school, including President Robert Wood.
A "yes" voter replied: "Any administrative officer appointed by
the central administration should not be in the unit. All others are
okay. This issue was not discussed by MSP-AUP . That's why they lost
(Number 74).
That the bargaining unit was not an issue in the election is not
the important point. The unit will be a critical issue of any future
election. One consideration which none of the informants mentioned was
the inclusion of the Boston campus and/or Worcester campus faculty. The
November election had not included either of these two campuses, not had
the issue of their inclusion surfaced during the election. The
study
sample, therefore, would have had no reason to mention a
system-wide
bargaining unit. That option, however, became a serious issue
tor the
university, as demonstrated by the lengthy hearings on
that subject during
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November and December of 1975, and January and February of 1976, the re-
sults of which can be seen in Appendix 7.
Recent history has shown that the system-wide unit is more pow-
erful in determining wage increases and other faculty demands. Hawaii,
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Maryland, New
Jersey, Washington, New York, Delaware, Vermont, Nebraska, Connecticut,
Alaska, Massachusetts, and Maine all have multi-campus institutions which
have organized into single bargaining units within the past five to six
years. There are forty-two system-wide units covering 247 campuses out
29
of the total of 544 campuses which have collective bargaining. It is
likely that this trend will continue as state and city budgets become
more hard-pressed, and as faculty members have to compete with other seg-
ments of the public sector for limited financial resources.
The bargaining unit is a subject about which there is a prolif-
eration of opinion. Connecticut and Hawaii are the only two states which
legally define the faculty bargaining units while other states simply
„ t .30
stipulate which public sector groups are allowed to bargain.
The NLRB has taken an "ad hoc" approach to each collegiate deci-
sion. One of their recent cases has some relevance to the University or
Massachusetts. In October of 1974, the NLRB reached a decision concern-
ing the University of Miami (146 NLRB 1148). For the first time, the
29
They are listed in the May 31, 1977 update of The
Chronicle of.
Hi gher Education , Volume XIV, Number 14, p. 10.
30Maine law, which took effect July 1, 1976, stipulates
univer-
sity-wide bargaining rather than campus by campus.
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NLRB excluded medical school professors from a faculty collective bar-
gaining election. The Board s three—member panel cited the physical
separation of the medical school (in Miami's case, it was on the same
campus but still distant from other university facilities, the lower
student-teacher ratio, the medical school's year-round operation and
twelve-month faculty contracts, and its higher faculty salaries. Cer-
tainly all of the aforementioned particulars hold true for the Worcester
11
medical campus of the University of Massachusetts.
Also, in the Miami case, the NLRB excluded deans and part-time
faculty from the faculty bargaining unit, but included associate and
assistant deans who teach, department chairpersons, all full-time facul-
ty, and researchers. Although a private institution and, therefore, sub-
ject to the National Labor Relations Act and not a state labor law, the
case may become a precedent; and, with all of its relevant features,
should be noted.
The definition of the bargaining unit is most crucial before a
university's first election. Not until the unit is decided upon by
either a state labor relations board (or its equivalent) or the NLRB
32
can the rest of the election proceedings take place. In its definition
21
The Massachusetts State Labor Relations Commission found
the Worcester campus to be a separate unit, October, 1976.
32
Nor does an election necessarily take place. If, when the
labor organization is attempting to get its initial thirty percent sup-
port cards in order to hold an election, it gets more than fifty percent
of the employee's signatures of support, the labor union may go to the
employer directly and request to be certified without an election. At
this point, other labor organizations may file a petition with the
labor
board as well. If this occurs, an election between contending
organiza
tions is held. Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining, p. 69.
157
of a bargaining unit, the NLRB has stated that a unit is defined accord-
ing to those persons who have "similarity of duties, skills, wages, work
ing conditions, past bargaining history or patterns in the industry in-
volved, the appropriateness of a unit in relation to the organization
of the company, and finally, where there is a question of professional
status or craft cohesion, the employees' wishes."33
Carr and Van Eyck have pointed out six major issues involved in
unit negotiations, three of which are pertinent to this study:
1. Multiple campus issue;
2. Faculty fragmentation issue;
3. The department chairperson issue.
The multiple campus (multi-campus) issue which was mentioned
earlier is critical to higher educational institutions as a whole, not
just their faculties. The City University of New York (CUNY) provides
an excellent example of the complex bargaining unit. (The State Univer
sity of New York is another similar case.) A brief history of the col-
lective bargaining events at CUNY can be found in Chapter II, footnote
52. The discussion below will concentrate on the advantages and disad-
vantages of a multi-campus unit for both the faculty represented and
the administration of such a system.
CUNY is governed by a single governing board, a set of univer-
sity-wide administrators and an integrated budget. For these reasons,
and the obvious political reasons (of size and, therefore, bargaining
33
Ibid., p. 73.
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power), it would seem to have been advantageous to the CUNY faculties
to be represented by only one unit; yet many of the faculty within the
CUNY system believed that they might benefit more from separate units
because their institutions had unique characteristics. City College and
Hunter College were two such institutions where historically different
types of students and faculty had been attracted, thus setting them
apart by their prestige and autonomy of budgeting and curriculum design.
However, the combined faculties of the different campuses soon recognized
that a single multi-campus unit would profit all of them to a far great-
er extent than each could expect to gain from a separate unit. They have
been proven correct at least in the area of compensation, as current sal-
ary schedules have shown. A comparison of CUNY faculty salaries in 1968-
1969 to salaries in 1974-1975 shows that the average compensation at
Manhattan Community College rose from the eighty-second percentile in
1968 to the ninety-fifth percentile in 1975. At present, the CUNY system
3A
average ranks highest in the country. More recent problems with the
entire New York City budget have caused a desperate situation for the
CUNY system, students and faculty. The faculty union, however, has been
a strong voice between city and university discussions.
Item 2, the faculty fragmentation issue, has proven to be par-
ticularly interesting and relevant to the University of Massachusetts.
Although a three-campus university, one of its campuses—Worcester—is
a medical school; and as such, is thought to be a distinct
entity from
34 See Th e Chronicle of Higher Education , June 9, 1975,
pp. 8 9
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the other two campuses. The University of Miami case has already pro-
vided the illustration of how a medical school faculty was treated. In
1971, Fordhara University and the AAUP brought a petition before the NLRB
/ (
requesting two separate bargaining units—one to represent law faculty,
the other a regular unit of Fordham University faculty. The Board
found in favor of AAUP and two units were established. 35
In direct conflict to the NLRB decisions at Fordham and at the
University of Miami, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC)
denied AAUP's request seeking a separate unit for the medical faculty at
Wayne State University. Here, then, is an example of the public sector's
viewpoint. The MERC examiner found that "it would unduly fragmentize a
teaching faculty unit if individual schools or colleges were permitted
to have separate representation, especially where one of the parties was
36
seeking the broader unit." It may be that the Michigan decision had
more to do with the institution being public than with the actual de-
scription of the particular unit. A larger bargaining unit can negoti-
ate with greater clout for its share of the legislature’s budget; one
bargaining unit also avoids the "whip-sawing" technique often resorted
to by two or three smaller units. MERC undoubtedly saw the case as a
precedent and so, sought to simplify its own and the state s future.
35Terrence Tice and Grace W. Holmes, Editors. Faculty Power:
Collective Bar gaining on Campus . Ann Arbor, Michigan: The Institute
for Continuing Legal Education, 1972, pp. 255-272.
36 Carr and Van Eyck, Collective Bargainin g., p. 99.
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Finally, the department chairperson issue is one which finds
the NLRB highly inconsistent. In defining a department chairperson,
the question arises, "Is the department chairperson a 'supervisor’ or
not?" If the chairperson is, then he/she is ruled out of a bargaining
unit and onto the administration's side; or In bargaining terminology,
the chairperson becomes "management".
At Long Island University, two agents were competing for fac-
ulty representation in 1971. The American Federation of Teachers was
the only contender at the C. W. Post Center and wanted department chair-
persons excluded from the unit. At the Brooklyn Center, AAIJP and AFT
(two rivals) wanted chairpersons included; and in this instance, the
university concurred. Even with both sides requesting inclusion of de-
partment chairpersons (as was the case at Brooklyn)
,
NLRB ruled that
they be excluded in both cases because they had authorities and respon-
sibilities similar to that of a supervisor.
In the same year, the NLRB contradicted this first decision in
another Fordham University case and included department chairpersons in
the unit. One month later, the NLRB ruled on a University of Detroit
bargaining unit petition, again including department chairpersons. The
history of NLRB demonstrates case after case of distinct and varying
decisions on the inclusion/exclusion issue of department chairpersons.
The one critical issue in the eyes of the Board seems to be whether
chairpersons "effectively recommend" faculty personnel decisions. The
problem with this criterion is that a chairperson's authority could be
directly dependent upon the control and philosophy of the current
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administration. The fluctuation of NLRB decisions should serve as a
warning to any university which believes the issue is simply resolved.
In contrast to the private sector, the state labor relations
boards have been more consistent in their decisions; and up until 1971,
they ruled that department chairpersons should be included in a bargain-
37ing unit. Michigan's Board proved to be an exception, however; and
at both Eastern Michigan and Wayne State Universities, the Labor Commis-
sion excluded department chairpersons because "the chairman exercises
more than mere group responsibility for the affairs of his department .
"
3^
Carr and Van Eyck pointed out in their analysis of this decision that
no distinction was made between the "ability" to make recommendations
on personnel matters to the deans and the "effectiveness" of the chair-
persons' recommendations once made. The authors note that perhaps the
labor boards and councils are not familiar enough with the nature of
collegiate institutions to make beneficial decisions for either the fac-
ulty or the institution. The notion of peer review and shared gover-
nance is unique to higher education, and could be confusing to a labor
board which is familiar only with industrial management questions.
David Wollett has summarized this plight in an article published
in the Wisconsin Law Review , 1971: "Excellence In faculty performance
individual efforts that go beyond norms or deviate from standard prac-
tice—may, in a system of collective negotiations, be discouraged or
37
Ibid.
,
p. 108.
-*®Ibid.
,
p. 109.
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repressed In order to gain uniformity in performance and equality in re-
wards." Collective bargaining agents tend to favor policies that treat
all employees alike. For this reason, collective bargaining in higher
education is particularly problematical because there are so many dif-
ferent types of employees in one unit. Whether a larger unit can speak
for those differences and equitably represent them is at best problemat-
ic. He concludes the article by saying: "The question is whether and
how collective negotiations can function in higher education without
erosion of the values for which higher education presumably stands."
Perhaps this should be the prime inquiry.
Kenneth Mortimer, in the Pennsylvania State College study, queried
faculty attitudes on the scope of the bargaining unit. Those who disa-
greed with the definition determined by the state labor relations board
wanted a less inclusive rather than more inclusive unit. The majority
(61.5 percent) agreed with the definition of "all full-time teaching
faculty members, department chairpersons, part-time teaching faculty, and
librarians without faculty status." Their fear was quite obviously that:
The creation of large bargaining units across campuses in state
university systems (in which every type of institution from two-
year agricultural schools to major universities are included in the
same units) and among teaching and non-teaching professionals with-
in institutions would lead to a homogenization of both faculty and
other professional personnel in higher education institutions .^0
aq
David Wollett . "The Status and Trends of Collective Negotia-
tions for Faculty in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review , Volume
1971, Number 1, pp. 18-32.
/|0
Kenneth P. Mortimer and G. Gregory Lozier. "Collective Bar-
gaining: Implications for Governance." University Park, Pennsylvania.
Center for the Study of Higher Education, 1972.
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The new University of Massachusetts bargaining unit includes a
wide variety of teaching faculty and staff at the Boston and Amherst
campuses. (see Appendix 7 for definition of unit). The question which
remains is, has the Massachusetts Commission served the University well
(and its faculty) by including such a broad unit? The new contract and
time will tell.
Professionalism
The questions incorporated in Section I of the interview raise
a major area of consideration—the notion of professionalism.^ The
41
It has often been said that the professional is one who pro-
fesses. There are more components to this complex individual than this
one ability, however; there are aspects which set him apart by his edu-
cation, motivation, autonomy, "professional" standards, and code of con-
duct. What is a professional? The following definition of a professional
is taken from- Professional Education by Edgar H. Schein: "The profession-
al has been identified as having several traits: (1) the professional has
a strong motivation or calling; (2) he possesses a specialized body of
knowledge acquired during a prolonged period of education and training;
(3) he is apt to have a service orientation—using his expertise on be-
half of a client. Professionals form professional associations which
define criteria of admission, educational standards, licensing, or other
formal entry examinations; career lines within the profession; and areas
of jurisdiction for the profession. The ultimate criterion of profession-
alization, according to most sociologists, is the achievement of "autonomy"
which implies (1) knowing better what is good for the client than anyone
else. .
. (2) subjecting one’s decisions only to the review of colleagues;
and (3) setting all one's standards pertaining to jurisdiction of the pro-
fession and entry into it through peer-group associations. These charac-
teristics give rise to professional 'communities' implying a common sense
of identity, self-regulation, lifetime membership, shared values, a com-
mon language, clear social boundaries, and strong socialization or new
members." The professor within this context has an identity of his/her
ovm as a teacher; the professor has a mission (teaching), "but he has
neither professional training as a teacher nor a well defined client
(p. 12). The professor's training has been in a specific discipline; his
client (the student) is often not dealt with on individual terms (one de-
signs a course to teach a group of students something), but rather as
part of a society to which the professor must impart his knowledge. At
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word professionalism", or some derivation of it, came up consistently
in faculty responses to Questions 2, 3, 5, and 7, where the faculty mem-
ber’s self-stated identity as a professional was reiterated throughout
the interview.
Although the conflict of "professional vs. employee" is not new,
the process of unionization did cause the concept to rise anew for fac-
ulty. As more than one faculty member put it, "the administration forced
us into the role of employee" (Number 29). That being the case, many
felt that a union would be the only way to effectively have a voice in
order to counteract the sense of powerlessness which the notion of "em-
ployee" evokes. Ronald C. Brown summarizes the sentiments of what many
of the faculty said:
By established custom, professors are independent persons who seek
a type of self-government which can maintain their ideals of aca-
demic freedom, professional autonomy, and professional status. To
many professors, the thought of a faculty union poses a threat to
these ideals because they believe a union, with its industrial re-
lations concepts, would encroach on their professional status.
^
Before the AAUP finally decided to open up the option of collec-
tive bargaining to its members, it also voiced similar distress signals:
times, Schein says society becomes the client. Edgar H. Schein. Prof es
sional Education: Some New Directions , 10th in a series of Carnegie Com-
mission Higher Education profiles. Berkeley, California: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1972, pp. 9-12.
^Ronald C. Brown. "Professors and Unions: The Faculty Senate,
An Effective Alternative to Collective Bargaining in Higher Education,"
William and Mary Law Review, Volume 12, Winter, 1970, p. 331.
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The American Association of University Professors is deeply committed
to the proposition that faculty members in higher education are of-
ficers of their colleges and universities. They are not merely em-
ployees. They have direct objectives to their students, their col-
leagues and their disciplines .43
The role of "professor" is quite different from the role of the
elementary and secondary level teacher. This latter group of individuals
is not as concerned with their disciplines or the research aspect of the
college professor’s job. Indeed, one definition of the professor clear-
ly distinguishes him from a "mere" teacher.
The professor innovates, stimulates and deals with abstract relation-
ships; the teacher, by contrast, conserves and transmits. . . .
Hence, the instruction that falls legitimately under the hand of the
university man is necessarily subsidiary and incidental to the work
of inquiry.
Hence, it does not have to become a conflict for the university
professor that K-12 teachers are unionized; since the two educators have
far less in common than one might guess from a superficial glance. As
Alan Wolfe so succinctly stated, "there is something positive about the
word "professional", especially compared with one of its opposites— the
, it 45
word amateur .
43
From the "Statement on Faculty Participation in Strikes," AAUP
Bulletin
,
Summer, 1568, p. 157.
Jessie Bernard. "Teachers and Professors: Subject Matter
Areas , " in The Professors: Work and Lifestyles Among Academicians ,
Charles H. Anderson and John D. Murray, editors. Cambridge, Massachusetts
Schirkman Publishing Company, Inc., pp. 30-32.
45
Alan Wolfe. "The Professional Mystique," in An End To Polit-
ical Science: The Caucus Papers , by Marvin Surkin and Alan
Wolfe. New
York: Basic Books, 1970, p. 290.
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Wolfe sees the notion of professionalism as that which sets
apart the elite from the proletariat. Even before the trend toward fac-
ulty collective bargaining began, Wolfe noted that:
Academics have become more and more concerned that a proper defini-
tion of a professional role be developed. ... In other words,
this attempt to define professional conduct is a political act,
among other reasons, because it is really an attempt to define po-
litical conduct.
A personal and political sense of control--the ability to affect
one s environment is very much the sense of the following passage pub-
lished in the AAUP Bulletin:
In speaking of the ideals of the university professor with respect
to his work, we are brought inevitably to the general concept of pro-
fessionalism. I tremble at introducing the word. It invites the
worst kind of logomachy, especially since professionalism is so often
invoked as a weapon—as a way of attracting prestige and superiority
when used about one's own work; and a way of‘ telling someone else
that he shouldn't do something we don't want him to do when used
about his. . . . Professionalism represents a particular set of be-
liefs (and) ideas. .
.
(which center). .
.
principally upon three
conceptions— that of specialized expertise, of autonomy and of ser-
vice. . . . Autonomy is exercising that competence which is an im-
portant ideal of professionalism. The professional himself must have
final responsibility, though with advice and consultation among col-
leagues, to determine how his work is to be done.^ 7
Here one begins to sense the faculty member's need for individ-
ualism, for his own sense of autonomy, within the university system.
There was the individual who was afraid of the union because he did not
46
Ibid., p. 292.
47 Sanford Kadish. "The Strike and the Professoriate," AAUP
Bulletin, Volume 54, Summer, 1968, p. 161.
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want someone speaking for me, rather than having the opportunity to
fight my own battles" (Number 19). One faculty member saw the notion
of individuality as the difference between blue and white collar workers
(his response to Question 2): "Historically, in my mind, there are dif-
ferences.
. . . White collar workers have considered themselves as be-
ing able to have individual negotiations as opposed to collective needs"
(Number 24).
Central to this concept of professionalism is the faculty member's
individual autonomy. This autonomy is derived from the belief that
a faculty member s technical knowledge, skills and experience as
they relate to his academic discipline should permit him to deter-
mine for himself the conditions under which he will work, and the
problems with which he will deal. 48
Lozier has hit upon one of the major conflicts in a university
system of governance— the individual vs. the collective, or autonomy of
the individual vs. the political autonomy of a group. This tension
arose in several of the faculty interviews. The faculty member (Number
42) who stressed peer review and a system of shared governance so vehe-
mently was really saying that she wanted to retain a collective (in the
sense of collegial) form of government; yet she felt that a union would
take away her individual bargaining rights with the administration.
She was concerned, too, about the amount of time faculty had to spend
on committees and on administrative work in order to have a "shared"
system of governance. Other faculty members felt that their system of
48
g . Gregory Lozier. "Changing Attitudes Toward the Use of
Strikes in Higher Education," The Journal of CUP
A
,
Volume 25, Number
2, April, 1974, p. 41.
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shared governance was failing; that the administration had increasingly
more power; and hence, the faculty peer review system and Faculty Senate
lacked the clout to override administrative decisions. The faculty had
lost their political power as a collective, and yet were afraid of los-
ing their autonomy as a peer group to union officials.
The faculty's failure may have had more to do with the size of
the institution than any overt irresponsibility of the faculty or in-
versely any machination of the administration. Burton Clark, in a chap-
ter entitled "Interpretations of Academic Professionalism," has noted
that
:
As campuses increase in size, complexity and internal specialization,
there is less chance that the faculty will be able to operate effec-
tively as a total faculty in college affairs. . . . The profession-
al-in-the organization presents everywhere this special kind of prob-
lem. He gains authority, compared to most employees, by virtue of
his special knowledge and skills; he loses authority compared to a
man working on his own, by virtue of the fact that organizations lo-
cate much authority in administrative positions .
^
The bureaucracy of the Amherst campus administration was not, in
the final analysis, what brought about a union; however, in 1977, the
bureaucracy of the entire university system was most influential. A fac
ulty's collective need to save their university from an outside force
^
which might lower their individual or collective status is more likely
to be the reason for unionization. The concern for one's professional-
ism, if attacked sufficiently, will not dwindle, but will increase. A
^Burton R. Clark. "Interpretations of Academic Professional-
ism," in The Emerging University and Industrial America , edited and in-
troduced by Hugh Hawkins. Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath and Company,
1970, pp. 92-93.
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real threat to the autonomy or professionalism of the faculty member
will not produce a retreat into the research and teaching of one’s dis-
c ^P^-i-ne * Rather, the threat will be translated into a quick seizer of
power by the faculty as a group. To get that power, faculty will do
their best to form a union which can retrieve that sense of profession-
alism they feel they have lost.
Organizations of professional employees—both those which call them-
selves unions and those which do not—will increasingly take their
rhetoric from the. .
. professional model (as exemplified by doctors
and lawyers), their goals and status aspirations from the academic
model, and their tactics from the union model. In brief, they will
do their best to look and sound like professional societies; but,
if necessary, will act more like unions.
An interesting aspect of the pre-election period was the atti-
tude and strategy used by the University administration. Outward appear-
ances would have suggested that their* s was a "laissez faire" strategy.
Some believed that in actuality, the administration used the entire con-
flict of professionalism to its advantage in a well-executed plan. (See
Appendix 8 for a discussion of the Michigan State University election.)
One example of this strategy can be seen in a letter sent from former
Chancellor Oswald Tippo to all faculty on November twelfth, three days
before the election. His letter urged a negative vote and outlined sev-
eral of his own thoughts on the upcoming vote. The message was aimed at
the professional status image of each individual faculty member and of
the campus as a whole. In this capacity, the letter was extremely ef-
fective. Tippo called for the. . .
50Joseph Garbarino. ,rProfessional Negotiations in Education,"
Industrial Relations, Volume 7, 1968, p. 274.
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community of scholars. . . and faculty (to) devote their primary
attention to the ancient functions of teaching and seeking the
truth. ... We are all decision-makers, and we are all officers
of the University. I reject the proposed adversary relationship
between faculty and administrators, for the industrial model of
management vs. employees is inappropriate for an academic community
which aspires to excellence. 51-
In his predictions, Tippo had indeed forecasted some unfortunate
trends for a faculty which adopted unionism; however, many felt that
these trends would come because there was no collective bargaining.
Tippo predicted that collective bargaining would cause "power and deci-
sion-making (to) increasingly move to Boston." Tippo believed that the
union would force decision-making into the city, away from campus.
However, an article in the August 6, 1975 The Amherst Record out-
lined the already growing discontent of the Amherst campus faculty with
President Wood's office. The "Hay Report," a study done by Hay Asso-
ciates for Wood's staff, had called for increased centralization of the
three campuses. The faculty, and particularly the MSP members of the
Amherst faculty, were not overjoyed with the results of the thirty-
52
thousand dollar study. In addition, the University of Massachusetts
budget for fiscal year 1975-1976 indicated increasing problems between
President Wood, the legislature and the Governor. Many faculty members
felt that this budgeting process needed some help from a strong union;
"^The Letter was published by the CCF and was also printed in
The Amherst Record on November 14, 1973, "to the editor, signed by
Oswald Tippo, Professor of Botany.
^ 2
Andrew Marx. "Discontent With Wood Growing Among Faculty,"
The Amherst Record , August 6, 1975, pp. 1 and 4.
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and that pressure would need to be applied both in the President's
office and in the Statehouse.
In Tippo's letter, the closing sentence calls upon the faculty
at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst to remember their elite
status, a theme Chancellor Randolph Bromery would repeat a day later.
"For these and many other considerations, I ask (for cooperation from)
all faculty colleagues who share with me the dream that one day a great
state university will arise at Amherst. ..."
Another example of the administration's strategy can be seen in
the letter from Chancellor Randolph Bromery to the faculty sent a few
3
days before the election (November 12, 1975) (see Appendix 9). Again,
this letter attempted to persuade the faculty of the elite place held
by the Amherst campus in the community of universities. This, in effect,
played upon the faculty member's sense of professionalism and autonomy
within his own university. History has demonstrated that unionism has
proliferated in the junior colleges and in the "emerging" four-year state
colleges. . .
which are so organized that essential autonomy which is the critical
component of the professor's job interests is threatened or appears
. to be threatened. This is why the problem is not seriously raised
in the universities of the first rank, where professorial autonomy
and control are imbedded in the structure of government; no amount
of ideology will convince most of these professors that they are
employees for their essential purposes. 53
The letter from Chancellor Bromery appealed to that professional
sense of the professor as a member of one of the elite universities
^Jack Barbash. "Academicians as Bargainers with the University,
Issues in Industrial Society , Volume 3, Numbers 22-28, 1970, p.
27.
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where the traditions of scholarship and peer-evaluation are valued."
Had the letter been sent further in advance of the election, the MSP-
AAUP could have used it effectively against the administration by call-
ing them elitists
,
and appealing to those faculty who professed ideo-
logically to be pro—union. As it was, the letter came at just the cor-
rect moment (from the administration’s viewpoint) because all it did
was raise the issue in the minds of the undecided.
Both Tippo and Bromery, as well as the University of Massachusetts
administration, knew quite accurately what the real issues were; and
they used them extremely effectively: the faculty member is an individ-
ual, academic professional, part of a system where collegeality and one's
discipline is critical to the life blood of the institution. Because
there was no issue of enough concern to the faculty in November of 1973,
the MSP-AAUP could not muster what should be a union’s major strength
—
the need for collective action (a different form of collegeality perhaps)
to present either an alternative solution to the problem or at least to
combat the present administration.
Faculty Attitudes Toward the Current
University of Massachusetts Situation
(Section II of Interview)
The second section of the interview attempted to find out wheth-
er the faculty member was generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the
university as an employer; and if dissatisfied, the nature of the dis
After an open-ended first question on election issues,satisfaction.
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the interviewer raised questions regarding compensation, satisfaction
with working conditions, personal acceptance of promotion and tenure
policies, and then general satisfaction with personnel policies. If
any of these "bread and butter" issues had been of tantamount concern
to a majority of faculty, a union group would have had a much easier
uime establishing its campaign strategy. The reason for this is that
unions, historically, have done well by their constituents in the areas
of compensat ion
,
working conditions, and job security.
Correlation of Local Issues to
Faculty Voting Behavior
Question 1 • What did you perceive to be the major issues affect-
ing the election on November 15th and 16th? Could you state
which issues were the most important to you?
The answers to Question 1 have been categorized in Table 30.
The MSP-AAUP and the CCF organizations, as well as most faculty at the
University of Massachusetts, predicted that the lack of issues during
the Amherst election would be the main reason why the union would lose
the election. It might be interesting to point out, however, that fol-
lowing close on the heals of a faculty member’s "no-issues" response
was usually a comment about the polarization factor between the faculty
and administration. Most respondants felt that this polarization had
not reached a critical enough point for them to choose a union over the
Faculty Senate. Others felt that the point of antagonism had been
reached, and that a union was the only way for the raculty to have its
share of the power. One "yes" voter reflected that. . .
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TABLE 30
TYPE OF RESPONSES TO MAIN ELECTION ISSUES
NUMBER OF
RESPONSES (In Categories) FACULTY MEMBERS
There were no issues.
Polarization between administration and faculty. 14
Whether outside "force" (i.e., a union) should
speak for us.
^2
Tenure quotas, or the fear of losing the tenure
process. 10
Whether faculty governance works at this
university. 9
Need to be able to deal more effectively with
legislature. 4
Fear of losing my individualism. 2
Parking. 2
Would give faculty more say/departmental autonomy. 2
p Dwight Allen (anti-School administration) . 2
Salary. 1
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the feeling which the faculty has gotten over the past few years is
that they've been sold down the river. There's been pressure from
the administration and from the students on the administration, but
(f not from the faculty for anything. All these should be together.
The trouble is there's no one looking out for our interests (Number
29).
(Another "yes" voter replied)
:
I voted for the union because I feel that the faculty doesn't have
the opportunity to participate in University governance. The admin-
istration is making all the decisions without consulting faculty or
students. The administration should be here to do the clerical stuff.
Faculty and students should make the decisions. I can't even see
my Dean! (Number 9)
The third most significant issue was the one of outside inter-
vention by a union. Many faculty responded to the question by stating
their concern over an "outside force" speaking for the faculty. Here,
also is echoed the personal autonomy question: "If a union were ac-
cepted, we would have lost direct impact and our own bargaining which
already exists. It would have been a Boston matter between the union
and the President's Office. An outside force would be frightening, just
frightening" (Number 3)
.
One individual saw many of the questions and issues raised by
the MSP-AAUP as problems which might well exist in the future. Large-
ly, the issue was one of principle—whether faculty should be represented
by an outside union or (whether the faculty) was happy with the present
system. The union pointed to future problems rather than to the
past
or present" (Number 45)
.
The issue of tenure was discussed both as a personal
problem
as well as a projected one for the faculty as a whole. If an
individual
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was not tenured, he would be more likely to answer that tenure was an
issue. The answer which most resembles the general response was that
of Number 64 :
Tenure quotas. Can a vote for the union help the situation? I
don’t know, perhaps. I don't think that the union would have allowed
contracts for non-tenured people. I’m glad the union lost, but I
am also pleased that the election was so close. ... I wouldn't
mind if one hundred percent were tenured in my department as long as
I had some sav in who would be tenured.
The person epitomized the feeling, which the majority of faculty
gave, that the union was not a natural outgrowth of the present faculty's
direction. This person spoke of the union "allowing" contracts for non-
tenured people. But presumably, the union would consist of faculty rep-
resentatives who would have the authority to make such a decision. Re-
sponses to this first question demonstrated that most faculty (even yes
voters) think of a union as a foreign body. They consistently chose
words like "them" and "it".
The issue of faculty governance was felt by some to be the most
important issue in the election. Rather than taking up the discussion
of faculty participation in academic governance here, the researcher
discusses governance as a whole when Section V of the interview is re
viewed in Chapter III.
Four particularly well-informed faculty members pointed to the
legislature as being the pivotal force in a union movement. Kenneth
P. Mortimer's study provided strong evidence that "the movement
toward
the collectivization of faculty through collective bargaining
has been,
in part, a result of the centralization of decision-making
authority in
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state boards of higher education, state governments and state legisla-
tures .
"
The study which he and Lozier conducted on the Pennsylvania
faculty found that although a small fraction of the "no representative"
vote (itself a minority vote) did not agree, "the vast majority of the
faculty.
. . supported collective bargaining as a means to promote their
interests in the legislature and administrative chambers of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania."^
The four faculty at the University of Massachusetts who answered
that the power of the legislature eventually would be the faculty’s rea-
son for electing a bargaining agent did not make their statements light-
ly. Each one seemed to have thought through the union question extreme-
ly carefully. Each one voted for the union. Only one had worked di-
rectly for MSP-AAUP; two had tenure; two had not yet been evaluated. As
one respondent explained:
The question is to what extent Wood and the Chancellor are strong
enough to counter the moves of the legislature. The allocation of
funds is the key, of course. The Chancellor's Office always seems
to take the position— "let’s do the best we can: wait and see."
But as the money gets tighter, the problem for the University gets
greater. You can’t hire new faculty; you try to limit promotions
and raises; merit gets affected; and at the same time, you accept
more students; classes get larger; and a fewer number of topics can
be offered. All of this leads to an atmosphere of anti-experimen-
tation. It’s an expensive way to save money in the long run. Fac-
ulty salaries suffer, but students eventually pay. I just don't
feel that Wood and the Chancellor fight hard enough. This year,
our department got cut back on Teaching Assistantships ; next year,
who knows what it will be (Number 65)
.
^Mortimer and Lozier, "Anatomy," p. 7 of conclusion.
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Another fortune teller predicted: "Next year, there will be no
cost-of-living increase because the legislature will figure that groups
can bargain for increase in salary if they want it" (Number 50)
.
(Not
only was there no cost-of-living increase in 1974, but merit was elimi-
nated also.) What could happen if the University's fiscal budgets were
reduced on a yearly basis is that even the President and the Chancellor
might begin to consider the merits of having a strong union force be-
hind them as opposed to an ineffectual Faculty Senate.
Correlation of Satisfaction
With Jobs With Voting Behavior
Questions 2, 3, 4, and 5 all concerned faculty "bread and butter"
issues: salary, working conditions, promotion, and tenure.
—Question 2 : Is salary an issue to you? Are you satisfied with
your current salary?
—Question 3: Are working conditions an issue for you?
—Question 4 : Do you feel that you have been fairly treated in
terms of promotion and tenure at the University of Massachusetts?
—Question 5 : Do you think that the personnel policies are fairly
implemented at this university? Are they effective?
Question 2 was asked chiefly because, having studied
several
AAUP salary schedules, the author needed to
clarify that salary was not
For most faculty, it was not. A few
members
an issue for the faculty.
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of the School of Agriculture and one in Nursing felt that relative to
other faculty in the University, their salaries were not equitable. The
vast majority, however, felt that they were adequately compensated.
Three even felt that they were overpaid, but stated that they were not
complaining
.
Most faculty felt that working conditions (Question 3) did not
constitute an issue for them, nor for other faculty. Again, two faculty
members from the School of Food and Natural Resources felt that their
classes were too large, and that they could use some new office furni-
ture (Number 55). "I haven’t even had a new file cabinet since I came"
(over thirty years ago) . Eight to ten faculty mentioned that the merit
policy was an issue for them. The policy on merit increment for the
fiscal year 1974 had just been decided (see introduction to Chapter III),
and undoubtedly had heightened the faculty's sensitivity to it. One in-
dividual was aware of previously negotiated union contracts where the
merit system had been disbanded. He felt that the MSP-AAUP might have
attempted the same had it been elected. At this point, the interviewer
would proceed to Question 5 in order to find out whether it was the ac-
tual merit policy or the administration of that policy which was of con-
cern to the informants. For the most part, it was the implementation
of the policy which bothered the faculty.
On the fourth question, most tenured people answered that they
had been fairly treated. Some mentioned other faculty members who had
not been as equitably treated as they had been. They were often speak-
ing of a departmental colleague or, in a few instances, the faculty
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mentioned the Jarvesoo case" which was decided in her favor one week
before the election. 55
To a great degree, the responses of the individuals on Questions
4 and 5 depended upon their school affiliation. The Schools of Food and
Natural Resources and Nursing again seemed to have murkier policies; and
therefore, their memoers felt that individual faculty members were not
as fairly handled as they should be. A member of the School of Food and
Natural Resources responded: "No, you sort of say to hell with it after
a while. It takes four to five years to find out how to get through the
system. The University of Massachusetts is the best in the state, but
extremely disorganized" (Number 70). Two members of the School of Edu-
cation also felt that the personnel policies were not equitably imple-
mented .
The humanities and social sciences departments had apparently
clearly delineated personnel policies because their faculty members felt
that the departmental committees were as fair as possible. Part of the
acceptance by faculty of the personnel policies obviously related to
the Dean's fairly consistent approval of departmental recommendations.
Only one faculty member (Number 11) in these two schools mentioned the
level above the department, stating that during the spring of 1974, his
department's personnel committee had recommended six people for tenure,
and only three had been granted tenure. He implied that it was more a
The Jarvesoo case involved a nepotism ruling which had caused
Dr. Jarvesoo to be fired twenty-three days before she would have quali-
fied for retirement benefits after eleven years of employment at the
University of Massachusetts.
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sign of the times than a poor decision by the Dean. Clearly, the fac-
ulty responding to these questions were not concerned over the basic
job security issues. Those who did express personal concern constituted
a slight minority.
Both the M->P-AAUI’ and the CCF prepared full and thorough news—
letteis stating their positions on the various issues pertaining to the
faculty at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst. Often closely dated
newsletters from each of the two groups answered each other's accusa-
tions pointing out inadequacies in the other's arguments. The two groups
dealt with the issues fairly and in a responsible manner.
Obviously, many issues were raised between April of 1973 and
November of 1973 (the heaviest period of campaigning). To list them
all would be repetitive; however, those issues which were discussed the
most often were: tenure quotas, the Morris and Wellman documents and
general governance policies, increased power vis a vis, the Amherst ad-
ministration and the President's Office, grievance procedures, and bud-
get formulation (including campus autonomy). The faculty responses to
Section II, Question 1 reflected these issues to some degree, although
the majority felt that these issues were not critical enough to change
the present system.
Salary
Although salary was not a concern to the University of Massachusetts
faculty members, it has been a large issue to faculties across the coun-
try. An unpublished study entitled "An Impartial Review of Collecti\e
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Bargaining at Michigan State University documented the current effects
of collective bargaining on salary at that time (March 9, 1971)
1. At Central Michigan University, there was a 12.5 percent salary
increase including fringe benefits, 7.1 percent of which was
straight salary increase. However, the report adds, the admin-
istration had budgeted an eight percent increase anyway.
2. At CUNY, substantial increases have occurred during the past
four years.
3. At Rutgers University, a nine percent increase, and again, a
quotation is added from Dr. Martin of Rutgers saying, "I tend
to think the amount would have been much the same" (without a
union)
.
4. Southeastern Massachusetts University responded to the inquiry
by saying yes, substantial increases had been gained through
collective bargaining. Five percent annual merit increases had
been given (which is less than the University of Massachusetts
average increase up until 1973)
.
56
"An Impartial Review of Collective Bargaining by University
Faculties," prepared by the Michigan State University Faculty Affairs
Committee, March 9, 1971, pp. 8-10. To the question, Has there been
an appreciable increase in faculty salaries since collective bargaining
was initiated? If so, was it necessary to reduce staff and/or programs?'
1
The following University representatives gave responses: Central Michigan
University—Professor Brite and Dr. Ping; C.U.N.Y.—Mr. Kantor and Dr.
Mintz; Rutgers—Dr. Martin and Dr. Peskin; Southeastern Massachusetts—
Dr. John and Dr. Orze; St. Johns—Professor McCarrick and Dr. Swartzman.
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5. At St. John's University, the increase was substantial: twenty-
one percent across the board in a two-year period (twelve per-
cent in 1970-1971, and nine percent in 1971-1972).
In the same document, the faculty group interviewed a labor re-
lations professor at Michigan State, Dr. Charles Killingsworth
. His
comments are certainly relevant to any study which attempts to compare
faculty salaries before and after collective bargaining.
It is extremely difficult to get any figure that clearly shows mone-
tary gains as an effect of unionization. Many good statisticians
have tried to do this and have yet to arrive at a figure that is
generally accepted. Your question to me, and in your survey, makes
the assumption that it is possible to determine the effect of union-
ization. That assumption is false because it assumes that all that
has happened in any case is the initiation of collective bargaining
procedures. It isn't a good question. How can you separate the
effects of collective bargaining from the effects of a general in-
flationary period, for example?57
David Wollett has quoted Mr. Justice Jackson who made the point
twenty-five years ago that collective bargaining tends to favor policies
that treat all employees alike. Wollett 's article agrees with the gen-
eral homogenization premise:
The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with
suspicion on such individual advantages. Of course, where there
is great variation in circumstances of employment or capacity of
employees, it is possible for the collective bargaining to pre
scribe only minimum rates or maximum hours or expressly to leave
certain areas open to individual bargaining. . . but the majority
rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individual
57 Ibid., p. 29.
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advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contri-
bution to the collective result. 58
Lad and Lipset, in their study, say that "unionization inevit-
ably fosters policies that seek to eliminate salary differentials among
those in a given job category, other than those linked to seniority."^ 9
They examine several different colleges where the merit incre-
ments have been deleted and/or made more. uniform. At CUNY, for instance,
there was no money allocated for merit in 1971; and the union received
much criticism from its faculty for that occurrence. The next year,
the teaching faculty received a 3.5 percent general increase and 1.5
percent available for "differential increments." The key distinction
S
was that the power of decision-making for such individual raises had
shifted from the administration tc peer review. "This eliminates the
power of administrators to implement the so-called "star system," the
emphasizing of "quality" or prestige distinctions among faculty.
The authors proceed to describe a situation which had occurred before
unionization took place (1966) at one of the CUNY colleges where the fac-
ulty, as a whole, had been voted an eight percent salary increase. Un-
fortunately, the local college president had the authority to allocate
five percent of the eight percent, the result being that one faculty
58
J. I. Case, Company, V. NLRB, 321 vs. 332, 338-339 (1944), as
cited by David H. Wollett. "The Status and Trends of Collective Nego
tiations for Faculty in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review, Volume
1971, Number 1, pp. 18-19.
59Ladd and Lipset, Professors, Unions , p. 69.
60Ibid., p. 71.
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member received a thirty-two percent increase while a few faculty got
no more than three percent increases. In California, local AFT and NEA
units have opposed individual merit increases (as compared to across the
board) in the California University and State College System.
A 1971 study done on the Michigan Community College System con-
cluded that: . . salaries were more homogenous before collective
bargaining within colleges, disciplines, degree and experience levels,
and for all colleges in the study. There was a greatei difference be-
tween high and low salaries after collective bargaining . "^
At another institution,' a differentiated salary structure was
negotiated in instead of out of a contract. "At Oakland University in
Michigan and elsewhere, faculty representatives have attempted to nego-
tiate a superstar clause which would permit paying highly distinguished
62
faculty off scale.” Generally speaking, it seems apparent that the
faculty can negotiate into their contract the types of salary structures
6 3
that the majority of that faculty wants.
61Christine E. G. H. Gram. "Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Faculty Salary Structures in Michigan Community Colleges.” Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Michigan, 1971, pp. 91-92.
62Kenneth M. Smythe, Tracy H. Ferguson and Karl J. Jacobs. "In-
stitutional Differences: Questions and Answers,” in Facu1 1y Powe
r
.
Coll ective Bargaining on Campus , edited by Terrence Tice and Grace Holmes
p. 76.
6 3One contract negotiated in December of 1974 stipulated unique
compensation. It was reported that "as part of the compensation pro-
vided in a newly negotiated contract, each faculty member of
Tranklin
Pierce College here (in Rindge, New Hampshire) is entitled to cut
one
cord of wood on college land for personal use.” Perhdps
the time. of
year and the setting had something to do with that piece
of negotiation,
TVio Chronicle of Higher Education , Volume IX, December 2, 1374 , p. b.
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Working conditions are usually a part of a collective bargaining
agreement; but for faculty collective bargaining contracts, they range
from a description of office space, to class size, to a description of
the academic calendar. Working conditions were not predicted to be a
concern to faculty; and neither the CCF nor the MSP-AAUP highlighted
this issue in their campaigns. The Amherst campus faculty have adequate
work space: classroom hour load is less than most other public post
secondary institutions and teacher/student ratio, though steadily in-
creasing, is not out of the ordinary. Responses to Question 3 indicated
that, in fact, working conditions were not an issue.
Tenure
The subject of tenure was of great concern to the faculty, al-
though it was. not seen as a direct issue in the November election. Sat-
isfaction with personnel policies was fairly consistent, as was evidenced
by the faculty's responses to Questions 4 and 5; although when they men-
tioned tenure, it was usually to point out inconsistencies between the
tenure policy and the implementation of that policy.
For the most part, untenured faculty members were worried about
future decisions with regard to their own job security. Only a few ten-
ured faculty articulated an awareness of the national (and local) trends
6/
*For an excellent series of articles on working conditions in
the college and university sector (for non-academic employees) , see
four articles by James P. Begin, The Journal of the College and Univer-
/ sity Personnel Associa tion , December, 1970; March, 1971; May, 1971, and
September, 1971.
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away from sure fire tenure. Those individuals who expressed concern
over the University of Massachusetts tenure policy felt that the prob-
lem lay not at the departmental level, but with the Dean. One individ-
ual who had just gone through his tenure review period expressed his re-
sentment of that process to the interviewer: "I went through an awful
tenure problem. I wish that faculty were evaluated as faculty and not
as pawns. They (the administration) want faculty who will put the ad-
ministration in a good light" (Number 23, affirmative voter). Others
mentioned that although they had been told that faculty were judged pri-
marily on teaching ability, they knew that research played a primary
role in tenure evaluation.
One faculty member realistically looked forward to his own ten-
ure review period: "So far, tenure is fair; when I came here four years
ago, there were no quotas; there are now and there will be when I am
evaluated. It's not the administration's fault; it's the changing times"
(Number A3, a negative voter).
One person summarized these sentiments for his colleagues: "I
was never convinced that tenure was an issue in the election, yet fac-
ulty were afraid that they would lose their departmental authority.
The latent issue was fear that things would be changed by a union" (Num-
ber 12, an affirmative voter).
A survey on tenure policies conducted by the American Council
on Education compared tenure policies and the percentage of faculty ac-
tually granted tenure at major universities and colleges in 1972 and
1974. One of the most startling statistics is the change in the
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percentage figure for the number of institutions granting tenure to one
hundred percent of all those who were formally considered for it in 1972
vs. 1974 (see Table 31).
In public universities, the shift from 1972 to 1974 was a marked
one. In 1972, 14.8 percent of the institutions surveyed granted tenure
to one hundred percent of its faculty; whereas in 1974, only 3.6 percent
of those universities granted tenure to all faculty. Instead, the pub-
lic universities shifted to a policy of granting tenure in only fifty-
one to sixty percent of the cases. The results of these fairly lenient
policies (1971-1972) can be seen in Table 32 where the percentage of
tenured faculty had increased from forty-one to sixty percent of full-
time faculty being tenured to fifty-one to seventy percent tenured fac-
ulty in 1974.
At the University of Massachusetts/Amherst , approximately sixty-
two percent of the faculty were tenured in 1973-1974 following the na-
tional trend for public institutions.
In the great majority of instances, tenure has been written into
collective bargaining agreements and has retained its name and substance.
According to the 1976 Chronicle Handbook on Faculty Collective
Bargaining, eighty-five percent of all colleges and universities hasten-
ure systems, a figure which has remained constant in recent
years. There
are, of course, exceptions. Union College in Schenectady,
New York tried
a svstem of renewable contracts for faculty over two
years ago. In addi
tion, experimental colleges such as Evergreen State in
Washington, Hamp
shire College in Massachusetts, and Johnston College
in California nave
renewable contracts instead of a tenure system. Howard
B. Means an
Thilip W. Sernas, Editors. A_CJironicle or. Higher Educ.
atiog^gdb_^..
Thr ill ry Col lective Bargaining . Washington, D.C. :
Editorial .roject
for Education, 1976.
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TABLE 31
TENURE COMPARISON
1971-72
Public
Universities
100 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure 14.8%
81-99 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure 29.7%
.-61-80 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure 15.7%
1973-74
Public
Universities
100 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure 3.6%
81-99 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure 27.8%
61-80 percent of faculty
considered and granted
tenure 30.6%
Private
Universities
9.7%
25.8%
22 . 6%
Private
Universities
2 . 2%
22.9%
30.8%
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TABLE 32
TENURE COMPARISON
1972
Percentage of
Full-Time Faculty
With Tenure
Public
Universities
Private
Universit ies
41-50% - 28.9% 32.3%
51-60% 25.0% 38.7%
61-70% 15.6% 19 . 4%
71-80% 5.5% 0.0%
/
1974
Percentage of
Full-Time Faculty
With Tenure
Public
Universities
Private
Universities
41-50% 12.0% 16.7%
51-60% 39.4% 53.3%
61-70% 30.2% 24.2%
71-80% 9.4% 5.7%
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In Hawaii, the low priority given to a tenure policy in the original
AFT contract led to a rejection of that contract by a majority of the
unit members. They chose a NEA-AAUP affiliate to represent faculty at
the University of Hawaii. 66
While the argument has been previously raised that the concept of
collective bargaining - and tenure may be incompatible, the experi-
ence to date has resulted in no significant erosion of the tenure
systems. Of course, the tenure systems in public institutions,
which are dictated by statute, will see little change as a result
of collective bargaining as long as tenure legislation remains in-
tact. Even in private institutions, our research reveals that to
date, only two tenure systems have disappeared as a result of col-
lective bargaining. o7
In 1973, the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education
completed a major study of twenty-six hundred institutions of higher ed-
ucation. The Commission, representing the Association of American Col-
leges and the AAUP examined faculty attitudes toward tenure and the
percentage of faculty tenured at those institutions. Keast and Macy,
co-chairmen of the Commission, commented:
ft ft
°Philip Sernas reported faculty at the University of Hawaii voted
down the proposed collective bargaining agreement 1,301 to 279. "The
pact would have given the university’s administration the option of ap-
pointing faculty members on a renewable five year basis." The untenured
probationary period could have been extended indefinitely with the con-
sent of the administration. The contract would not have totally abol-
ished tenure. The article says that faculty, presently covered by ten-
ure, would retain it. Rejection of the contract did cause another elec-
tion where an NEA-AAUP agent won. Philip W. Sernas. "Hawaii Faculty
Turns Down Union Contract," The Chronicle of Higher Education , December
3, 1973, p. 1.
67 Tracy H. Ferguson and William L. Bergan. "Grievance-Arbitra-
tion Procedures and Contract Administration," in Unionization on the Col-
lege Campus, reprinted from Journal of College and University Law ,
through the joint cooperation of the National Association of College and
University Attorneys and the Academic Collective Bargaining Information
Service, Summer, 1574, p. 385.
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acuity unionization is increasing rapidly, and it would be naiveto suppose that faculties will long accept the uncertainties of
regular contract review without seeking the protection of collectivebargaining. The drive for job security will surely lead to virtual
tenure, based on seniority or some like principle, or to some system
similar to civil service. b °
The Commission made forty-seven recommendations. In brief, they
were: that the basic traditions of tenure be strengthened within every
college and univeisity; that improved methods for evaluating teaching
performance be studied; that there be an openness to student input; and
that non-tenured faculty have input into evaluation procedures.
The most surprising aspect of the study comes in Recommendations
19 and 20 (Number 19)
.
The Commission recommends that in formulating its faculty staffing
plan, each institution develop policies under which an appropriate
number of tenure positions, when they become. vacant
,
are available
for allocation to any unit when they may be needed, or for tempor-
ary suspension, or for elimination (Number 20). The Commission
recommends that each institution develop policies relating to the
proportion of tenured and non-tenured faculty that will be compat-
ible with the composition of its present staff, its resources and
projected enrollment, and its future objectives. In the Commission's
nearly unanimous judgement, it will probably be dangerous for most
institutions if tenured faculty constitute more than one-half to
two-thirds of the total full-time faculty during the decade ahead .
^
The statement certainly appears to be advocating a tenure quota
system, yet in the October 29, 1973 issue of The Chronicle , there is a
front page headline, "AAUP Council Votes to Oppose Tenure Quotas." The
68William R. Keast and John W. Macy, Jr. Faculty Tenure: A
Report and Recommendations by the Commission on Academic Tenure in High-
er Education. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973,
p. 17.
69 Ibid.
,
pp. 48-51.
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article goes on to summarize the statement adopted by Committee A on
Academic Freedom and Tenure by saying, "For a university to adopt limits
on the percentage of faculty members that can be given tenure. . . is
to depart from a basic feature of the system of tenure and thus to weak-
en the protections of academic freedom." It would seem that the two
opinions, both authorized by AAUP, are in conflict. It is no wonder
that the issue of tenure quotas was so confused at the University of
Massachusetts/Amherst in the fall of 1973 and in the spring of 1974 when
the interviews' were conducted. The University of Massachusetts/ Amherst
administration had done exactly what the Commission had suggested in
the recommendations above by asking department chairpeople and heads to
make five-year departmental projections, including tenure openings. The
University of Massachusetts faculty, however, responded to these planning
reports wTith "ah-ha: tenure quotas." But since no tenure percentage
had been stipulated, the administration counteracted that institutional
planning did not mean tenure quotas. The confusion may not rest with
the Amherst campus alone.
The Commission made strong statements against state-wide or "mul-
ti-versity" policies concerning individual campus tenure. Although it
saw a need for multi-campus system planning, the Commission obviously
was troubled by the evidence of growing bureaucracies and decisions
made on a system-wide basis.
One of the final recommendations strikes right at the heart of
collective bargaining (Number 44).
The Commission recommends that collective bargaining in colleges
and universities not extend to academic freedom and tenure and
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related faculty personnel matters, and that grievances involving
issues of freedom and tenure be referred to academic procedures
outside the collective bargaining process. 7 ®
Perhaps their warning came too late because many faculties, both
air. the University of Massachusetts and at other institutions, have stated
that they see tenure as one part of a collective bargaining agreement.
Quoting from the Mortimer and Lozier study, "The Pennsylvania State Col-
lege faculty were essentially of one mind in their opinion that every-
thing from salaries to curriculum to tenure and promotions should be
negotiated in an agreement for their colleges."71
William McHugh, in an article following the Commission’s actual
report, points quite accurately to the complicated nature of grievance
and tenure policies. Often these policies can be and are changed on an
annual basis by faculty senates and boards of trustees. With a collec-
tive bargaining contract, "it may not be unilaterally changed by the
72
governing board during the contract term." What McHugh is saying is
that many problems with tenure policies or with an individual tenure case
can be solved in an informal setting rather than confronting a set of
legal statutes. Nevertheless, any faculty which is used to the relative
70 Ibid
. ,
p. 90.
71 Lozier and Mortimer, Anatomy , p. 73.
7
^William F. McHugh. "Faculty Unionism and Tenure," in Keast
and Macy, Faculty Tenur e, p. 207.
7 \abor boards in New Jersey and Michigan recently issued deci-
sions limiting the subjects on which (public) colleges must negotiate
with faculty unions. In essence, both boards stated that colleges
could
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job security which tenure commands will not readily give it up; nor will
a standard union seniority system be taken up by faculty in its stead.
Faculty Perception of University Governance
(Section III of the Interview)
Having discussed the faculty member's basic attitudes toward
unionism and toward election issues, the interview now turned toward
t
the more general subject of academic governance. Section III of the in-
terview queried faculty on their perceptions of the Faculty Senate,
shared governance, faculty power within the decision-making process, and
finally, whether they thought that a union might effect the "quality of
education" at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst . As in the pre-
ceding parts, references will be made to various works directly pertain-
ing to the issues involved in academic governance.
Academic governance may be one of the most studied and least
understood subjects in higher education. Somehow, the real workings of
a faculty senate never become public enough to do the student of gover-
nance much good. As Harold Hodgkinson put it, governance is hard to
not be compelled to negotiate over issues of governance. "There is no
reason whv the system of collegiality and collective negotiations may
not function harmoniously," said the New Jersey Labor Board, whose case
involved issues at Rutgers University such as budget, affirmative ac
tion, the academic calendar, quotas on tenure, number of faculty
posi-
tions, studies of faculty productivity, and faculty representation
on
committees. None of these issues were required by law to be
negotiaten
by Rutgers with its AAUP faculty union. Philip W. Sernas.
Two Courts
Limit Topics That Must Be Bargained," The_Chronjxle of Higher Education,
February 17, 1976, p. 8.
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study, for some of the same reasons that sexual behavior is hard to study.
In our culture, both are considered private acts, not to be performed in
public."74
u^
-
e
--
tlons 1 and 2 : Areas of Faculty Influence in Academic Gover-
nance.
Question 1: In what areas should faculty have influence in univer-
sity governance?
I
Question 2: Should faculty have final say over these matters or
should they make recommendations to the Chancellor, President
and/or Board of Trustees?
The first two questions sometimes were asked together and often lead di-
rectly into a discussion of the Faculty Senate (Question 3)
.
The respondents felt that the three most important areas of fac-
ulty governance were curriculum, personnel policies and teaching loads.
They varied, however, on the extent to which the faculty's authority
would be final. A majority (fifty-five percent) of those answering
"personnel policies" to Question 1 responded that faculty should have
complete and final control over personnel decisions, though the admin-
istration should be able to "review" those decisions. The minority
opinion was that although faculty should have major influence on per-
sonnel decisions (and they hoped that the administration would accept
74
Harold L. Hodgkinson. "College Governance: The Amazing
Thing Is That It Works At All," Report 11, Eric Clearinghouse on Higher
Education, July, 1971, p. 1.
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the faculty s recommendations), the Chancellor should have the final
veto power.
The faculty did not specify whether curricular matters should
be under its final authority or should take the form of a recommendation
to the Chancellor. It was the interviewer’s understanding that faculty
wished curriculum matters to be totally within the realm of its purview
as they are now. Presently, the Chancellor acts as the spokesman to
the President who then presents any new programs before the Board of
Trustees. It seems that in the curriculum area, the faculty did not
feel that their authority had been overstepped as they did in the area
of personnel.
One faculty member (Number 61) commented, "the faculty should
demand to know more; the administration is the only one to know the to-
tal personnel. process . ” Again, returning to the Keast and Macy report
on faculty tenure, a recommendation is made "that each institution de-
velop and systematically use a plan for communicating its personnel pol-
icies to its faculty and give special attention to new appointees. The
terms of conditions of service should be clearly spelled out.^ Cer-
tainly, part of communication effectiveness relates to the ever increas-
ing size of an institution and its burgeoning bureacracy.
Several faculty expressed their sense of frustration and alien-
ation from the university because of a fast growing mega-campus.
^Keast and Macy, Faculty Tenur e, p. 57.
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Recommendations arc absurd; this university is a very big business.
It is run in the guise of a democracy, but it is not one. The
university should not have a zillion appeal boards. The number of
powerless committees is overwhelming (Number 21, affirmative voter).
A negative voter said that:
It depends on the size of the university; it's unrealistic to ex-
pect that faculty will participate in governance in such a large
university; only that they can participate to the extent that we
can participate in the United States government. At Amherst Col-
lege (he says), they are small enough to participate; all they need
is a president and a treasurer (Number 14)
.
Whether the increasing size of a university is particularly
problematical or not, it may become the number one reason for collec-
tive bargaining.
Four individuals suggested that the faculty should select the
administrators, thereby making the administration report to the faculty.
One person mentioned that he would rather see the faculty review admin-
istrative decisions than the current opposite system.
A hypothetical, departmental personnel system was described by
one faculty respondent which included a collective decision-making
scheme on all merit, hiring, promotion, and tenure procedures. The en-
tire department would be evaluated in the personnel process so that
each of the individual department members would be considered according
to what he/she contributed to the total expertise needed within that
department. Thus, if one member was a good teacher, liked it, and did
not want to spend too much time doing research, he could trade off his
teaching capabilities with another department member who preferred to
do research. The department would always remain balanced, but each
fac
ulty member could have more flexibility within his/her area of
strength
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The evaluation of faculty members would, of course, be based on a de-
partmental system as well. The researcher was interested in this model
but queried whether a faculty member would become too narrowly special-
ized within such a system.
One lone faculty member would have preferred to see the univer-
sity administration have more power. "Faculty power is preserving the
status quo," he said (Number 35). He represented a minority opinion,
needless to say. Some viewpoints, though, clearly reflected a hesitancy
to give faculty ultimate power over university governance.
The faculty as a group should have more authority than the adminis-
tration or students; but the administration can have an overview
of the situation which the faculty can't. Faculty can be just as
repressive as administrators. . . the faculty has kept out innova-
tive programs (Number 11)
.
In response to Question 1 also came a request by one person for
more faculty input in the area of departmental budget allocations. All
other faculty who mentioned the budget implied that their concern was
the. total Amherst campus budget.
One realist summarized his colleagues' request for more fiscal
control. "The faculty wants to have a hand in expenditures, but not in
the raising of funds. I would like a benevolent dictator provost. I
don't want to do administrative work; I want time for my research
(Number 69)
.
Faculty control over areas of university business ranged from
total authority over all matters to complete abdication. For
instance,
one faculty member said that she felt faculty should have "no
authority
in terms of student admissions and financial aid"
(Number 17); while
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another felt that faculty should have complete review of all student
services.
Collective bargaining will affect university governance. The
question remains, how? The possibilities have been outlined as:
The complete replacement of traditional procedures by the bargain-
ing process; the emerging of a dual but co-existing form of gover-
nance as indicated by (a) the incorporation and protection of tra-
ditional procedures within the contract; or (b) the development of
separate systems of faculty participation (one for negotiable econ-
omic and personnel matters, the other for educational policy issues
which may or may not be negotiable); or finally, (c) the improvement
of senate operations in competition with bargaining to the point
that the bargaining agent is undermined . ^6
In a sense, then, the real question lies in whether or not col-
lege faculty have perceived their system of academic governance to be
fair before they vote for a collective bargaining agent. If sufficient
power is lacking, then a faculty might use the negotiations to improve
its lot in the college or university. The Massachusetts State Colleges
are a good example of this phenomenon. Before bargaining came to Boston
State and Worcester State Colleges, for example, faculty had what amounted
to a very powerless faculty senate arrangement. The collective bargain-
ing contracts outlined not only college-wide faculty governance mechan-
isms, but stated provisions outlining departmental procedures as well.
Each of these first two contracts have been re-negotiated and improved
upon since they were first written; but, nevertheless, set a precedent
for the other Massachusetts State College contracts, making the
7
6
James P. Begin. "Faculty Governance and Collective Bargain-
ing: An Early Appraisal," Special Report H-5. A paper produced
by
the Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service, May
s, 1974,
pp. 1-2.
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Massachusetts State College System negotiations unique in an era of in-
dustrial model bargaining.
Binding Arbitration
Traditionally, a conflict in academic governance is handled in
one of two ways: the faculty has a review process and/cr the adminis-
tration decides the issue. Many faculty contracts have shown the inclu-
/
sion of a binding third party arbitration rather than a total process
of peer review.
A key difference emerges between procedures in contracts negotiated
by affiliates of national associations and other grievance procedures.
Peer review is virtually always a part of non-contract and non-affil-
iated contract procedures, although binding arbitration seldom is.
In the contracts with affiliated (AAUP, AFT or NEA) faculty units,
binding arbitration is most often included while peer review is not. 77
Some universities, such as CUNY, have included binding arbitra-
tion for some parts of their contract but left peer review for person-
nel, tenure and promotion decisions. Arbitration is involved only when
there needs to be a decision regarding whether or not the negotiated
agreement bylaws have been violated. When "academic judgement" is in-
78 A
volved
,
a committee of three tenured faculty reviews the case. As na-
tional organizations become more and more familiar with higher education,
more of these compromises will find their way into the legal agreements.
7
7
David W. Leslie and Ronald P. Satryb. "Management of Conflict:
Collective Bargaining and the Proposed Research Directions," in che
Journal of CUPA , Volume 25, Number 2, April 1974, p. 20.
^"The Agreement Between the Board of Higher Education of the
City of New York and Professional Staff Congress/CUNY,' October 1,
1973,
pp. 23-24. This agreement expired August 31, 1975.
202
Peer Review Process
Some faculty do not feel that the peer review process is neces-
sarily always democratic. Wollett points out in his article from the
Wisconsin Law Review that. . . "the process of 'peer' evaluation is
sometimes viewed by the large number of junior faculty members as a de-
vice by which the elders maintain control at the department level."79
In the majority of cases, the University of Massachusetts junior facul-
ty would have disagreed with this statement. Most felt that at the de-
partmental level, governance and personnel policies worked as equitably
as possible.
One of the best known authors on the subject of faculty collec-
tive bargaining is Joseph Garbarino. In an article entitled "Creeping
Unionism and the Faculty Labor Market," he spoke of the effect of col-
lective bargaining on peer review.
One suspects. . . that in those key institutions in which the untidy,
unsystematic process of peer evaluation has worked with demonstrated
success, the introduction of procedures that can be defended before
an arbitration or perhaps a judge will incur a real cost in quality.
Several people have made dire predictions concerning the effects
of collective bargaining on university governance. One such individual
was later to become the chairperson of the MSP-AAUP Executive Committee.
Howard Brogan forecasted that "uniformity and the centralization required
7
^Wollett, "Status and Trends," pp. 8-9.
80Joseph Garbarino. "Creeping Unionism and the Faculty Labor
Market , " Carnegie Commission in Higher Education—a draft, p. 23.
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for campus-wide bargaining and contract administration will further af-
fect university governance by reducing departmental and school auton-
,,81
omy. This obviously was written long before he became involved with
the MSP on the University of Massachusetts campus.
Some have suggested an interim solution to the aimlessness of a
faculty senate or the ruthlessness of a bargaining agent. More than one
University of Massachusetts faculty member pointed to the "Wellman Report"
/
(Senate Document T73-098), as it is commonly called, as an attempt by
the faculty and the University to reach an equanimical governance agree-
ment, at least for the time being (see Appendix 5). On April 4, 1973,
the Board of Trustees voted to accept this document, thereby establish-
ing the powers of the board, the president, the campus administrators,
and the campus governing bodies in university governance (which, on the
Amherst campus, would be the Faculty Senate and Student Senate). In-
cluded as part of the report is a statement affirming the Trustees' en-
dorsement of the 1966 statement on "The Government of Colleges and Uni-
versities" adopted by the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP)
,
the American Council on Education, the Association of Governing
Boards of Universities and Colleges, and the 1970 "Statement on Student
Participation in College and University Government."
The document was applauded by many faculty and administrators,
and pointed to by the same as an indication that the Board was willing
8
^Howard Brogan. "Faculty Power: Pretense and Reality in
Aca
domic Government," Journal of Higher Ed ucation, Volume 40,
Number 1,
January, 1969, pp. 26-27.
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to adopt a tripartite system. Others felt that because it left so much
in the realm of the Faculty Senate, it would be a powerless document.
—Question 3 : The Faculty Senate
In your opinion, does the present system of faculty governance
provide for faculty voice ovet these matters adequately?
Responses to Question 3 often were natural continuations of the
discussions preceding this specific query concerning the structure of
academic governance. Faculty would expand upon their answers to the
authority/influence questions (Numbers 1 and 2) in a longer discussion
of the Faculty Senate.
Of those responding to the question, sixty-four percent said no,
the Faculty Senate does not adequately provide for faculty voice over
these matters. This majority clearly negated what Chancellor Bromery
stated in his post election letter. With two exceptions, all of the
faculty who voted affirmatively in the November election. . . felt that
the Faculty Senate was an ineffective body. The sixty-four percentage
figure indicates that there was a large number of "no" voters as well
who felt that the Faculty Senate was powerless.
Some of the respondents answered in general terms that they did
not think that the Faculty Senate had enough clout; others were more
specific. "People who represent our school do not report back to the
department" (Number 5, affirmative). Another: "The Faculty Senate is
an advisory body to the Board. I'm not sure it can be any more than
that—legally" (Number 67, negative). "We don't even have the control
that students do over their own budget" (Number 71, affirmative). I
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served on the Senate for four years. It is a rather powerless body—
a lot of noise. Power rests where the money is" (Number 10, affirma-
tive). Another member responded, "I was a member for six years, but
I m afraid I wasn't overly impressed" (Number 28, negative voter).
A few were very positive about the Faculty Senate: "Yes, it
gives them a voice; everyone I know who is a member takes it quite ser-
iously (Number 33, negative voter). A second positive Faculty Senate
viewer felt that the idea of a Faculty Senate was good, and that it had
great potential; but then hesitated adding that "faculty senators
should do a better job" (Number 56, negative).
One faculty senator explained his opinion of it: "I'm a bad
person to be asked that question. I've sort of been a Faculty Senate
member. I went to the first three meetings, but I was upset by the
pettiness, the pure greed. I was astonished by the behavior. It was
the on-campus equivalent of Nixon's tax returns" (Number 37, affirma-
tive). A similar opinion came from a fellow member: "I was ashamed
for the students to come and see how we behave! The majority of fac-
ulty senators are irregular in attendance and have a negative effect"
(Number 69, negative).
The Faculty Senate is an old model of governance. Hofstadter
writes of its prototype in the medieval universities: "In internal mat-
ters, the universities had the prerogative of self-government. They were
autonomous corporations, conceived in the spirit of the gilds; their mem—
. t
bers elected their own officials and set the rules for the teaching craft.
82Hofstadter, Academic Freedom , p. 6.
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It was not until the founding of AAUP in 1915 that the coalales-
cence of faculty members in American higher education really began.
Little did many of its founders imagine that in 1972, the Committee
would draft a statement leading to the pursuit of collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining, in offering a rational and equitable means
of distributing resources and of providing recourse for an aggrieved
individual can buttress and complement the sound principles and prac-
tices of higher education which the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors has long^ supported. . . . From its vantage point
as the paramount national organization in formulating and implement-
ing the principles that govern relationships of academic life, the
Association has the unique potential, indeed the responsibility, to
achieve through its chapters a mode of collective bargaining consis-
tent with the best features of higher education. ^3
What would be the effects of collective bargaining on a faculty senate
model specifically? James Begin has studied some of the major collective
bargaining agreements in an attempt to assess those results. In general,
he states: "There is no evidence to support a conclusion that collective
bargaining has led to a significant dismantling of the traditional in-
stitution-wide or system-wide governance procedures such as senates or
n 84faculty councils."
Begin quotes President Boyd of Central Michigan State as saying
that one result of collective bargaining on the Central Michigan State
Faculty Senate has been that "the Senate has stopped talking about
gov-
,,85
ernance and started governing.
83AAUP "Statement on Collective Bargaining," October 1972, pp.
52-53 of "Redbook". (See Appendix 3)
8 /4 Begin, "Faculty Governance," p. 2.
85 Ibid
. ,
p . 3
.
207
At Rutgers, where AAUP is the bargaining agent, academic gover-
nance has not been altered significantly by the contract. The relation-
ship of the bargaining unit to the Rutgers Faculty Senate is a fairly
informal one and one that permits a good deal of "back and forth" with-
out necessitating specific procedures spelling out how one body approaches
the other. Begin gives an example of this flexibility:
Changes in the tenure system and the development of a faculty aca-
demic study/leave plan originated in the bargaining forum, and then
were submitted to the Senate for its recommendations. Neither of
these items appeared in the contract, though bargaining agent input
was important in stimulating and shaping the policy changes. 8 ^
A more formalized situation appears at St. John's University
where a special senate committee has been formed to coordinate the ac-
tivities of the bargaining agent and the Faculty Senate. In this same
study, Begin found what he believed was another result of collective
bargaining, a decrease in interaction between administrations and sen-
ates. The author hesitated to give specific reasons for this occurrence
because it is difficult to pinpoint the exact nature of these relation-
ships before an agreement was negotiated. Nevertheless, Begin found
that an open sharing of information had diminished. "In some instances,
where the issues deliberated in the Senate were in the part primarily
those presented to it by the administration, the senates (had) started
to act rather than react, often without consulting the administration
.,87
prior to acting.
8
^Ibid., p. 6.
87 lbid.
,
p. 8.
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One very interesting study, completed in February of 1975, demon-
strated that collective bargaining had radically changed both the atti-
/ tudes toward and practices of academic governance within six community
colleges adopting collective bargaining. 88
Michael Falcone questioned faculty and administrators concern-
ing their opinions about governance before the collective bargaining
agreement had been reached and then again after the signing of the con-
tract to see the effects of collective bargaining on campus governance.
(The responses of faculty and administrators were not separated.) The
data from the survey has been summarized as follows: thirty-three per-
cent of the respondents indicated that faculty and administrators shared
equally in decision-making before collective bargaining, sixty-three per-
cent said that the sharing occurred only after collective bargaining had
come to the community colleges. Regarding the policy on academic free-
dom, forty-two percent of the respondents believed that their institution
had some form of an established policy prior to collective bargaining,
while thirty-four reported that a formal policy did not exist. Approx-
imately sixty-one percent reported that after collective bargaining, a
formal written policy had been written, while twenty percent reported
that none had been negotiated. Prior to collective bargaining, sixty-
six percent indicated that their institutions had formal tenure policies;
eighty-eight percent reported that after the introduction of collective
bargaining, a formal written policy on tenure had been established. Only
fifty percent believed that collective bargaining had more clearly defined
the respective roles and responsibilities of faculty and administrators.
Eighty- three percent of the community coliege respondents said that col-
lective bargaining had changed faculty-administration relationships, in-
cluding sixty-four percent who felt that this change was toward an adver-
sary relationship. Falcone summarizes that section by stating that "ad-
versary relationships rru.iv be inherent in the industrial type bargaining
process which is still prevalent in higher education. One would hope
that professionals in higher education will develop methods of bargain-
ing more consistent with the principles of shared governance, collegial
relationships, and common goals" (p. 4). Mr. Falcone did not ask faculty
and administrators to comment on the relative amount of shared governance,
collegial relationships, and common goals before the entrance of c.ollec-
, tive bargaining at those six community colleges. Fifty-three percent be-
lieved that the union movement had enhanced the status of faculty; fifty-
six percent indicated that without collective bargaining, iacult\ would
have little or no voice in decision—making. Falcone concludes, The fac-
ulty Senate, once touted as a major mechanism of self-government, does
not, in most cases, operate from as strong a power base as the faculty
union. The faculty union is gaining recognition as a legal entity cap-
able of making an enforceable contract and effectively guarding faculty,
rights even in times of economic recession" (p. 4). To the extent that
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The power structure within a university faculty itself has be-
come the subject of some debate. Burton Clark has suggested that the
majority of academic administrative matters (in large universities) are
handled by the faculty oligarchs who function as quasi-administrators
of the faculty. These faculty members serve because of their scholarly
prestige, but mostly because they have made academic governance their
business. He explains that the majority of faculty members have acqui-
• / N *
esced to these oligarchs. The theme of oligarchic control has also
been picked up by Thomas McConnell and Kenneth Mortimer in their study
of the University of California at Berkeley and Fresno State. "An ex-
ample of a more easily documentable relationship between political and
academic governance lies in the oligarchic control of organizations. . .
oligarchic behavior is a highly probable, though not inevitable, feature
89
of organizational life." (The oligarch fits Clark’s description.)
McConnell, however, would rather see this kind of faculty imbalance than
what he believes would occur with the advent of collective bargaining.
"Individuals wi.ll lose freedom of action if they are represented by an
faculty have participated more fully in personnel and educational deci-
sions, one might conclude that the concept of shared authority has been
advanced by collective bargaining." The problem with trying to corre-
late the results of this study with a major university or four-year col-
lege is that, for the most part, faculty members in community colleges
have not usually had as strong a model for academic governance as in the
senior institutions. Michael A. Falcone. "Collective Bargaining: Its
Effects on Campus Governance," Academic Collective Bargaining Informa-
tion Service, Washington, D.C., February 1975, Report Number 6.
89
T. R. McConnell and Kenneth P. Mortimer. The Faculty in
Universi ty Governance . Berkeley, California: Center for Research and
Development in Higher Education, 1971, p. 23.
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exclusive bargaining agent, and faculties will lose power corporately
when an external organization serves as the collective bargaining
90
agent." McConnell believes that collective bargaining would "doom
the system" of shared governance.
The problem may lie in what the governance of the collegiate
institution entails. Over ten years ago, Brogan painted a realistic
view of what it could be.
/
Naturally, if the faculty does not get to discuss vital issues, the
members (of the Faculty Senate) become bored with their participa-
tion. Administrators are always complaining about the bad atten-
dance at meetings and the little faculty participation in them.
They use these inadequacies as evidence of the disinterest of the
% faculty in running the institution.
The result is that the real power ends up by default back with
the administration. 92
In this reality of a corporate power hierarchy governing colleges
and universities, the assortment of faculty councils and senates
becomes part of an academic charade, embroiling faculty for the
9®T. R. McConnell. The Redistribution of Power in Higher Edu-
cation. Berkeley, California: Center for Research and Development in
Higher Education, 1971, pp. 41-42.
•^Brogan, "Faculty Power," p. 27.
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0n July 28, 1970, the University of Massachusetts/Amherst
chapter of the AAUP sent a letter and memorandum to its colleagues de-
scribing the effects of the Massachusetts collective bargaining law on
what had been proposed to the faculty in 1969—a "unicameral student--
Faculty Senate." The document is particularly interesting for its
dis
cussion of the relative power of a faculty senate within the present
legal structure of the university. "Background Memorandum on
Recent
Issues Concerning University Governance and Faculty Representation.
Prepared by the Committee on Representation, AAUP, University
of
Massachusetts, Amherst, July, 1970. (Mimeographed)
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most part in endless dispute and debate, with final decisions made
by the administrative-trustee combination. 93
Another predictor of gloom and doom was the former president
of the University of Michigan, Harron Hatcher. His opinion of what
(
real negotiations" are like between university staffs and union lead-
ers is clear.
What began as presumptive bargaining in good faith results all too
often in outright economic warfare, calling upon tribal rituals,
an archaic script for the actors, irrational round-the-clock ses-
sions to reach a settlement to meet an artificial deadline, and
collective bludgeoning, in a heated-up mood of strife, with the
slogan of get all you can and everybody else be damned.
The bombastic comments are nevertheless shaded by the fact that
collective bargaining is taking place, has involved faculty governance,
and probably will increasingly do so as several things transpire. The
scarcity of resources is quickly forcing faculty and administrators to
focus in on the issue of power: who allocates what to whom . This con-
sideration may increasingly bring academic governance into the collec-
tive bargaining arena. The sample faculty interviews demonstrated no
overwhelming sense of collegiality between the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst faculty and its administrators. Therefore, one must question
whether collective bargaining would destroy any great bilateral or even
tripartite models. The ultimate strength of the University vis a vis
93Israel Kugler and Ralph S. Brown. "Collective Bargaining for
the Faculty," Liberal Education , Volume LVI , March, 1970, p. 82.
^Address by Harron Hatcher, September 22, 1966 (unpublished) as
quoted by Ronald C. Brown, "Professors and Unions: The Faculty Senate:
An Effective Alternative to Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, _
William and Mary Law Review , Volume 12, Number 2, Winter 1970, p.
271.
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the Commonwealth of Massachusetts may be the pivotal risk which facul-
ties, administrators and unions must test.
The national situation in higher education boils down to a power
crisis . It is not that institutions of higher- education have had a great
deal of power in the past and are losing it. It is that people (parents,
students and taxpayers) are questioning the value of a college degree.
The pressure on legislators to fund our public universities (to the ex-
tent' that they were in the 1950's and 1960 's) is quickly diminishing.
The university cannot use the old expansion arguments, or even arguments
95
of subsistence since higher education itself is being challenged.
In one of the articles included in Tice's collection, Allan Smith
has assessed faculty power and academic freedom from a personal stand-
point. Academic freedom involves:
1. The power to choose one's colleagues;
2. The ability to declare one's own work assignments; and
3. The power to determine the content and function of the courses
one teaches.
"Ultimately," Smith says, "the decision as to whether faculty should or-
ganize will be determined by an assessment of the gains and losses in
,,96
faculty power.
95an article in the New York Times outlined the decreasing
impor-
tance which the middle and working classes are placing on the
college de-
cree Why? One, it is not getting them jobs; two, the degree
is not re
lated to the kinds of jobs which do take training. In addition,
the de
dine in relative income shows that "the rate of return on the
college
investment has fallen significantly," by Gene Maeroff,
"Study of College
Degree Finds Its Value Declining," New York JTimes,
August 14, 1975, p. .
96Allan Smith.
Grace Holmes, editors,
"Should Faculties Organize," in Terrence Tice and
Facul ty Power , pp. 119-120.
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Platt and Parsons look at faculty power in a different light. 97
They distinguish between power and influence and ascribe the faculty's
role as depending more on influence than power. The faculty has, in a
sense, functional authority more than formal authority (which is as-
signed to the adminis trator—trustee bailiwick) because each faculty mem-
ber within the body of faculty can have individual relationships on
which he can build collective victories. If this functional authority
or influence is effective, faculty power can be strong. If it is not,
however, the individual faculty member has no recourse—his lack of for-
mal and stated authority places complete control in administrative hands.
E. D. Duryea and Robert Fisk, in an article entitled "Impact of
Unionism on Governance" have credited college and university administra-
tions for the advent of collective bargaining.
Ineffective or repressive administrations have stimulated unionism
as a counter-force to authoritarian presidents or governing boards.
. . the need for serious retrenchment by most state governments
has reinforced intrusions which threaten the continued viability
of governance based on shared authority. 9 ^
A lack of power by one group (whether it be faculty, administra-
tion or students) in a tripartite system of shared governance means an
imbalance, and thus a mockery of "shared" authority. If, in fact, the
97 Gerald Platt and Talcott Parsons. "Decision-Making in the
Academic System: Influence and Power Exchange in Continuing Education,"
in The State of the University: Authority and Change, edited by Kruytbosch
and~Messinger . Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970.
98
E. D. Duryea and Robert S. Fisk. "Impact of Unionism on Gov-
ernance," in The Expanded Campus, edited by Dyckman W. Vermilye. San
Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1971, pp. 107-109.
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faculty has no power (or has misused that power), the option of collec-
tive bargaining will surface.
—Question 4 : Student Participation in Collective Bargaining
V
"Do you think students should be involved in collective bargain-
ing?" The issue of student power is a very real one, and at the time of
the election was beginning to build strong momentum. At the Massachusetts
State Colleges of Fitchburg, -North Adams and Salem, students already
were represented at the bargaining table. The October 29, 1973 issue
of The Chronicle of Higher Education ran a story entitled, "Three
Massachusetts Colleges Allow Students to Sit In on Faculty Bargaining."
The article by Philip Sernas gave the University of Massachusetts faculty
cause for concern since at all three of the colleges, Eduardo Robreno
had agreed— in fact urged— the participation of students in collective
bargaining. The Committee on Concerned Faculty reprinted the story and
sent it to all University of Massachusetts faculty on November fifth ex-
pressing its doubts about such an arrangement. The article demonstrated,
the CCF newsletter said, "... how students can become mere pawns in
union negotiations" and "how these 'professional negotiations can go
awry and tip the bargaining balance in favor of the administration
(November 5, 1973, CCF Newsletter).
The Amherst campus faculty was not the only group concerned
about the prospect of students acting as negotiators for their own
rights
During the CUNY negotiations, the Student Senate tried to gain a
role as
observer and was rebuffed by the faculty. The New York Board
of Higher
Education supported the student's request, thus convincing the
CUNY
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faculty that student representation would only work against them. In
an often quoted passage, Belle Zeller, the President of the Professional
Congress, said all the students have to do is holler and the ad-
ministration Quivers. We are fighting to preserve the power of the fac-
ulty. . .
Zeller's comments v/ere partially a response to an article released
by the University Student Press Service on CUNY in January of 1971 by
George McCough (a student)
:
A high ratio of tenured faculty will, in the long run, mean higher
tuition and fees and a stagnant curriculum. Since neither of these
can be regarded as being convergent with student interests, uncon-
ditional student support of faculty in tenure disputes is at least
counter-productive and clearly contradictory . 100
Alan Shark, who was Chairman of the CUNY Student Senate in 1972-
1973, also argued against reduced teaching loads and higher salaries
with which the Board was in agreement. In as early as 1971, the National
Student Association came out with a fairly negative stance toward faculty
collective bargaining terms because the Association felt that students
might lose the little power they have.
The 1969 Carnegie study (part of the Ladd/Lipset study) showed
that faculty were particularly apprehensive about student participation
in decisions such as faculty appointments, promotions, salary increases.
9^A. h. Raskin. "Unionism and the Content of Education: What
are the Bounds?," New York Times , January 8, 1973, quoted in Ladd
and
Lxpset, Professors Unions, p. 90.
l°0George McCough. A Letter to the Editor, Congress News,
August
23, 1971.
216
and tenure grants. Only 5.8 percent of the faculty respondents believed
that students should have "control" or "voting power" on committees
where faculty personnel decisions were being made.
In a paper written by Neil S. Bucklew, Vice Provost of Central
Michigan University, the author presented a convincing rationale on why
students will be involved in bargaining within a short period. Mr.
Bucklew traced the beginnings of the student movement to the 1920’s and
• -
1930 ’s when the first student "unions" were started. He pointed out
that these student unions were not bargaining units but the facilities
funded and operated by students involving extracurricular activities
such as housing, meal service, athletic programs, bookstores, etc. Fol-
lowing the establishment of these came a more formal student government
association in the 1940's and 1950's. Again, the majority of issues to
come before the student governments were extracurricular. By the 1960 's,
the formal structure of student government was beginning to give way to
special interest groups whose primary aim was basically the same as stu-
dent governments but whose method resembled more of the "whipsawing"
techniques of bargaining. The late 1960 's demonstrated to college fac-
ulties and administrators just how critically effective the student
movement could be.
Bucklew points to three possible student governance models with-
in the collective bargaining structure. First, a claim by students for
an "exclusive representation" role with the resulting right or power to
appoint student members to governmental committees; second, a disband-
ing of splinter groups and the creation of an omnibus council or struc-
ture; and third, as Bucklew calls it, the independence pattern
or the
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"extra-university" model where students would form a corporation or a
union and negotiate with the university as the employer.
/
A landmark case involving students who were both employees and
"third party" candidates was the Teaching Assistants Association (T.A.A.) ^
vs. the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1969.
The Wisconsin law did not cover teaching assistants (TA's), but
the University of Wisconsin decided to recognize the Association as the
exclusive bargaining agent for these students/teachers . The scope of
t
bargaining which was identical to that allowed for classified state em-
ployees covered only certain specified conditions of employment, and was
limited by a statutory "management rights" provision. The TA’s, however,
V7anted salary negotiation and educational planning included in their
contract. After a long period of negotiations, a strike—and much con-
fusion over the law—the TAA finally neogtiated a contract with the
University of Wisconsin. Some of the critical contractual issues were:
the inconclusiveness of the state law making the situation extremely dif-
ficult for both the TAA and the University; the lack of a mechanism for
expediting joint decision-making; the question of who was the employer
(for TA’s it could have been the University, the state or even the TA's
department faculty members); and finally, the problem of educational
planning (an offshoot of joint decision-making). Presumably, many of
these same issues would arise under a regular student bargaining union
situation. The result was a contract filled with compromise from both
sides covering conditions of employment and a "limited duty to
bargain.
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Any disputes concerning the scope of the contract were to be submitted
to binding arbitration. 1 ^ 1
Alan Shark, a one-time student in the City University of New
York, is the director of the Research Project on Students and Collective
Bargaining. In a paper entitled, "Current Status of College Students
in Academic Collective Bargaining," Mr. Shark outlines some of the ef-
fects which faculty collective bargaining has had on students. Their
• /
fears. Shark contends, are well-founded.
I
Students fear the loss of rights gained by much struggle over the
past fifteen years. . . they fear that increases in salaries and
fringe benefits negotiated by the faculty unions will, at least
partly, come out of students' pockets in the form of higher tuition
. . . and (finally) students fear that strikes will interrupt their
education. ^-02
To protect their rights, students have lobbied for legislation,
undertaken court action, been student observers on a team, and have
tried to be included in negotiations as an independent third party. In
Montana, April of 1975, a law was passed—the first in the nation—to
give statutory recognition to the right of students to participate in
the bargaining process. Shark quotes from the law:
lOlArlen Christenson. "Collective Bargaining in a University.
The University of Wisconsin and the Teaching Assistants Association,
pp. 210-228; "The University of Wisconsin, Madison Campus TAA
Dispute
of 1969-1970: A Case Study by Nathan P. Feinsinger and Eleanore J.
Poe;
both in the Wisconsi n Law Review , Volume 1971, Number 1, PP •
229-274.
Shark. "Current Status of College Students in Academic
Collective Bargaining." Published by The Academic Collective
Bargaining
Information Service, Washington, D.C., pp. 2-3.
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The student government of an institution of higher education may
designate an agent or representative to meet and confer with the
Board of Regents and the faculty bargaining agent prior to negotia-
tions with the professional educational employers to observe those
negotiations and participate in caucuses as part of the public em-
ployers’ bargaining team; and to meet and confer with the Board of
Regents regarding the terms of agreement prior to the execution of
a written contract between the Regents and the professional educa-
tional employees.
The Associated Oregon Student Lobby recently achieved an even
more substantial role. In early June of 1975, the Oregon legislature
passed a bill granting students an independent third party role at the
bargaining table.
In Maine, a bill has been passed which gives students the right
to caucus with the Board of Higher Education prior to negotiations, and
gives them the right to sit at the bargaining table.
Students in California, Wisconsin and Washington are working
hard on legislation that would grant them observer status. In California,
they are seeking the right to see all written documents pertaining to
any future collective bargaining agreement with the additional right
to produce an "impact report" before the contract was signed.
In 1971, fifteen students representing six of the seven city col-
leges of Chicago filed suit in Cook County to end the five-week (AFT)
faculty strike . The judge ordered public negotiations and the strike
-*-0^Ibid
.
,
p . 4
.
10Z,
In 1975, faculty members in the AFT unit (involving six of
the seven campuses of the City Colleges of Chicago) reached an agreement
with the community college system, ending a nine-year period of strife
in which there were six major faculty walkouts.
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was quickly ended. Students have also had an impact on strikes at the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey colleges.
Shark predicts that the outcome of student participation in
unionism may depend on such experiments as the Student Organizing Pro-
ject at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst, founded in the spring
of 1974 . The project has been the vehicle for research on the legal
effects of collective bargaining to students, and is working toward es-
/
tablishing a credit union for students. At Fitchburg State College,
students were allowed to participate in all discussions of negotiation.
After the collective bargaining agreement had been signed by the faculty
and the Board of Trustees, the students conducted a referendum on ail
of the parts pertaining to student decision-making. Even Eduardo Robreno,
the NEA representative for college negotiations in Massachusetts, was
quoted as calling the Fitchburg agreement "a truly representative gov-
ernance mechanism" on campus. The results of the Montana and Oregon
legislation and the Massachusetts State College tripartite governance
contracts have had a large effect on the way faculty view student parti-
cipation in collective bargaining.
In April of 1974, little collective bargaining activity, aside
from the Massachusetts State Colleges, sought to include students in
any phase of the faculty union movement. Many of the seventy-six sample
faculty expressed concern, however, that students might attempt to become
involved once a union was elected and negotiations were begun. Forty-
eight percent responded negatively to Question 4, saying that they
did
not want students involved in collective bargaining.
Thirty-five percent
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said that they felt students should have a voice and some chance for
input into areas which conerned them— the student/ teacher ratio, work
loads and faculty teaching evaluation—but no formal role. Nine facul-
ty members (eleven percent) felt that students should be able to parti-
cipate in collective bargaining through student representation. Two in-
dividuals felt that students should form their own union.
Some of the "no" vote respondents voiced similar reactions to
• /
those of Belle Zeller, CUNY. Basically, they felt that the faculty were
beginning to coordinate themselves through collective action and saw
student involvement as diluting their strength. One person answered the
question, "No, if students knew that much, they'd be faculty members"
(Number 24). Another responded, "I would think not. Students have a
limited perspective. There's no long term commitment to decisions. At
the state colleges where they let students be part of the collective
bargaining process, they took no responsibility" (Number 31). "A lot of
radicals get involved. . . it is such a transient population. The last
generation of students pushed for the Southwest complex (a housing pro-
ject on the Amherst campus), and now this generation is stuck with it
(Number 57).
In response to the first question in Section III (issues in the
election)
,
one faculty member answered that a major issue for him was
student participation in governance:
X don’t think that the faculty needs a say in day-to-day operations
of the university; faculty should be involved in teaching and
re-
search. That is why you hire competent people to administer.
For
this same reason, it bothers me why so many students want
to get
involved in other than learning. . . . Students just haven t had
enough experience in universities to expect to be able to
govern
them (Number 16).
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One professor thought that the students should decide on how
they wanted to participate and then present their suggestions to the
faculty for a vote. He saw two options for students: "(1) as repre-
sentatives at the faculty bargaining table, or (2) as a separate union"
(Number 53). "Student evaluations are crucial; there is definitely a
place for students in the promotion process, but not in the negotiation
process" (Number 64).
• /
Few University of Massachusetts faculty felt comfortable with
students as bargainers. It may have been because they felt that the
issues would force students to side with the administration or simply
because the role reversal was so extraordinary. Whatever their reasons,
the sample faculty was no exception to a general nation-wide feeling
against student collective bargaining.
—Questions 5 and 6 : Familiarity with Grievance Procedures and
Administrative Workload
—Question 5 : "Are you fully familiar with the grievance procedures?"
Questions 5 and 6 did not reveal any terribly surprising data.
Faculty responses demonstrated that a large number of faculty were not
familiar with grievance procedures, again an indication perhaps of the
size of the university or of the adage that if one is not aggrieved,
there is no real reason why one would bother finding out about
the
grievance procedures. The rationale behind the question was an
attempt
to elicit any untold bad experience which the faculty
member might have
had, and which could have influenced his/her vote. In
only one case
did the story come tumbling out at this point in
the interview. The
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individual had been very surly with the researcher but had agreed to
the interview and was answering the questions with "yes-no-maybe" an-
swers. It seemed as if someone had told him to agree to the interview,
and yet he was regretting it. Perhaps if this question had not been
asked, the researcher would have left finding out little except that
the individual was not satisfied with the interview.
The faculty member explained that when he had been considered
/
for a promotion two years ago, he was not told by his Dean which evi-
dence he could submit for the record. (He apparently had not asked for
this information.) Wien the consideration was made, he felt that his
share of the teaching load (in comparison to other department members)
was overlooked; also, he had not been able to publish anything from his
research. He explained that he worked sixty-two hours a week on his re-
search and that he was upset because it "hadn't seemed to pay off." Hie
final straw came when he volunteered to be department chairperson and
was not named to that position. His bitterness toward the Dean and the
departmental "oligarchs" was intense.
More than half (fifty-four percent) responded that they either
did not know what the grievance procedures were or that they were "vague-
ly" familiar with them; the remainder said that they were cognizant of
the procedures. Two individuals, one an acting department chairperson
and one a department head, answered that they were "not too familiar
with them," which seemed extraordinary for someone with that kind of
administrative responsibility not to be thoroughly familiar with the
grievance procedures.
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—Question 6 : "How much time would you say you spent on faculty
governance matters?"
The majority (sixty-four percent) of faculty members spent less
than fifteen percent of their time doing administrative work. Of those
who were not department chairpersons or heads (they usually answered
seventy-five percent or more), seven answered that they spent thirty
percent (or more) of their time doing administrative work. Most faculty
members responded that it really depended on the time of year— that in
the fall and winter when the personnel committees had a great deal of
work, it could be as high as fifty percent of their time which was spent
on personnel work alone. In the spring, they noted that it leveled off
to a minimum.
A few studies have attempted to link the amount of time which a
faculty member spends working on a committee to that person's voting
preference. This study could show no correlation (beyond that of the
department chairpersons or heads) between administrative time and voting
behavior
.
—Question 7 : Quality of Education
The final question in Section III could be the entire subject of
study
:
—Question 7 : "How do you think a union contract might affect the
'quality of education'?"
The seventy-six responses to this question were
broken into
The quality of education:three major categories.
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1. will be negatively affected because the campus will be politi-
cized over non-educational issues;
2. will be improved because a union contract will stabilize a pro-
fessor s economic and political position, thereby enabling the
individual to put more effort into his/her teaching;
3. will not be affected at all by a union contract.
Group 1 had about thirty perpent of the vote; Group 2 had fifteen per-
cent; and Group 3 had forty-five percent. Six individuals stipulated
that it really would depend on the contract and identity of the bargain-
ing agent.
Some of the responses were particularly interesting because they
often related back to the professionalism issue. Number 2 responded,
"The effect of unionism would be detrimental in the sense that it tends
to minimize the missionary dedication aspect of teaching." "The quality
of education would suffer," responded Number 6; "it is one more step
toward the organization man instead of the scholarly man, and I'd pre-
fer being associated with the latter."
One faculty member (Number 34) hesitated to answer: "I feel un-
comfortable answering this because I have no data. My bias is that col-
s lective bargaining would gradually erode the quality of education and
promote a comfortable mediocrity." Finally, "the effect would be bad,
I'm refering to the management/labor adversarial position. It is just
not right to have this in a university. Having grown up in an academic
family, I have ideas about what a university should be" (Number 60).
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"Well", responded one member (Number 52), "it might increase the
morale around here, and that would have a good effect; on the other hand,
if it meant wiping out the merit system and going to a step system, it
might decrease productivity in the area of research." A "no" voter an-
swered, Might improve it. . . might perk up some people who have coasted
along for years" (Number 49)
On the whole, the "yes" voters felt that a collective bargaining
/
agreement would not effect the quality of education, and that the two
• t
were really not related. To the extent that the contract incorporated
academic governance, it is believed that the quality of education would
be affected. Six individuals concurred by stating that the quality of
education might be affected positively or negatively, depending on the
contract. In a tight fiscal period, a union contract could provide a
> far more secure atmosphere for faculty and therefore, a better learning
environment for students. The reverse effect could also happen if fac-
ulty were forced to spend a great deal of time dealing with the legisla-
ture instead of on more scholarly aspects of their careers.
The question is undoubtedly best answered by Number 34 when he
said, "I feel uncomfortable answering this because I have no data." The
problem is that we will not know the affects of collective bargaining
on college and university education for a long time, if ever. After all,
who can say substantively how collective bargaining has affected the
quality of primary and secondary education? There is an urgent need for
; a study of unionized colleges and universities, as compared to non-
unionized institutions before any far-reaching decisions can be made.
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Faculty Attitudes Toward the November 15-16 Election
(Section IV of Interview)
The purpose of Section IV was to determine how aware faculty mem-
bers were of the MSP-AAUP and CCF campaigns. Each group presented issues
to the faculty, some of which were thought to be more pertinent than oth-
ers. In addition, as Lozier and Mortimer have pointed out in their study
of the Pennsylvania colleges^ the national affiliation of the bargaining
agent makes a difference in voting behavior and in measuring attitudes.
The Pennsylvania study demonstrated that there were significant differ-
ences in the composite profiles of APSCUF-PAHE and AAUP supporters.
Such differences might have existed at the University of Massachusetts
if there had been more than one union vying for representation. In fact,
if the individuals with AFT membership had organized, the NEA affiliate
might have had to respond to an entirely different set of issues from a
competing national organization.
The major issue of Section IV is that of control. To what extent
did either group (MSP-AAUP or CCF) control the election by the suggestion
of issues? For instance, if salary and working conditions were clearly
not issues, it would have been foolish for either side to build its plat-
form on a salary increase or a decrease in work load. The subject of
tenure and the possibility of administration imposed tenure quotas was
clearly something that the Massachusetts Society of Professors empha-
sized. Faculty’s reactions should indicate, then, that tenure
was an
issue. To the extent that it was mentioned (of third highest
importance)
indicates that the MSP-AAUP was successful, but certainly
not to any large
felt that there were no issues at all.degree, since most
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—Question 1 : Awareness of Election
The first question: "How did you become aware of the issues sur-
rounding the election?," met with a fairly predictable response—newslet-
ters. Most faculty (seventy-nine percent) felt they had been inundated
from both groups by newsletters depicting all of the pertinent arguments
and answers. Most felt that, there was too much paper; that one-half as
many documents would have been a better use of time and money. The sec-
>
ond way that faculty said they had become aware of the issues was through
. r
s departmental meetings held by MSP-AAUP and the CCF. Faculty also men-
tioned that certain friends who had been more knowledgeable than they
helped them to learn about the issues.
—Question 2 : Perception of Union Groups
The second question: "Would you explain your perceptions of the
MSP-AAUP coalition?," received some amusing responses. There was no
clear case depicting the MSP-AAUP as having a "good" or "bad" image.
Many (twenty-six percent) indicated that the union had done a good job,
and that the campaign had been fair. Twelve individuals felt that the
MSP-AAUP was not a "good" group of individuals and had not run a good
campaign (for a variety of reasons).
Nineteen individuals answered the question as if the emphasis
were on the word "coalition" and responded that either
MSP or AAUP
needed the other for prestige and economic reasons. Most
felt that the
coalition was beneficial to the union cause. All other
reactions were
random.
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Th© author found one interesting and fairly humorous pattern:
eight individuals, all male, referred to the Massachusetts Society of
Professors and AAUP coalition as a "marriage" of some sort. "A marriage
of necessity, one individual responded. "MSP gave the practical, func-
tional teeth to AAUP. . . MSP had the awareness and willingness to oppose
the right injustices and they .perceived the administration correctly"
(Number 23). Another took the view that it was "a marriage of conven-
ience. . . most professors would prefer to identify with AAUP. . . it's
more gentlemanly. . . the MSP gained respectability" (Number 3). "It
was just sort of a wedding of people who may not have been in love,"
said a pensive respondent. "They did a good job. If the election were
held today, they'd win. They said tenure was a problem and now we are
finding out that it is" (Number 51) . "A marriage which was not made in
heaven" and "a Catholic/Jewish wedding, but I'm 'not sure which is which."
Then there were the "uneasy bedfellows" and "odd bedfellows. . . . AAUP
is traditionally concerned with faculty academic freedom. . . . MSP is
more militant" (Number 14).
Number 25 was "impressed by the civilty of the campaign. I am
not aware of any pressure tactics." Another "yes" voter felt that the
campaign "was relatively sensible, well conducted. . . there was zero
ill will after the election" (Number 38) . Three individuals who were
members of AAUP were surprised by the coalition. One individual, as
has already been mentioned, was angered by it. He felt that the Execu-
tive Committee members of AAUP had "abused the responsibility of their
offices" by voting to coalesce without the consent of the general body
(Number 31)
.
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In three of the faculty members' responses, one could detect
the theme of professionalism coming forth again. "The coalition was
wierd. The lesser of two evils.
. . a pragmatic necessity.
. . the fac-
ulty saw the MSP eroding their personal integrity" (Number 20). "They
ran a used car campaign and I'm not into used cars" (Number 21). This
individual may have been referring to The Chronicle article describing
/ Eduardo Robreno's campaign style at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst, November 12, 1973. 'The article began with: "A collective bar-
gaining election at the University of Massachusetts' main campus here
this week will test a much-debated proposition about unionizing profes-
sors: that a faculty can be organized in much the same way as an auto-
mobile factory. The lead-in was not really the gist of the story
which went on to describe how the Massachusetts Society of Professors
had been formed. Many faculty working for MSP felt that the story was
unfortunate coming so close to the election date. There is some ques-
tion as to whether a significant number of faculty saw the article;
both because of its proximity to the election and because few faculty
members read The Chronicle of Higher Education .
Although three faculty members mentioned how much they respected
the faculty members affiliated with MSP-AAUP , four individuals said that
they did not like the MSP "professionals". One "affirmative" voter
said, "I liked the local MSP-AAUP people but I didn't like the MSP
bureaucrats. ... I don't trust Robreno; he's a trade union type"
105
philip Sernas. "Union is Given 50-50 Chance at University of
Massachusetts," The Chronicle of Higher Education , November 12, 1973,
pp . 1 & 8
.
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(Number 61). Another responded, "I was highly impressed with my col-
leagues who were in MSP; but I was not impressed with the MSP profes-
sionals. They just didn't know our interests. I was offended by their
lack of academic viewpoint" (Number 56). Not all felt that their facul-
ty colleagues in MSP were good representatives of the faculty: "There
was bad leadership in the union. The faculty who were involved in MSP
had dropped out of research, teaching. The union was the only thing
le ft for them to do (Number '69) . Another (Number A9) responded, "The
MSP had an axe to grind. Younger faculty were in MSP; the older, more
secure faculty were in CCF. ..."
Number 53 had a unique response: "MSP-AAUP was an elitist
group of people which had already worked themselves up through the old
system. . . conservative. . . and so much the intellectual bag. They
saw no connection between themselves and the food services people. . . .
Some of iny friends who are more politically into unions said that the
leadership in MSP was too conservative. I agreed."
Four faculty members who had voted "no" in November said that
now they might change their votes to yes. Their reasons? One person
^
mentioned tenure, another merit; but generally, it could be speculated
upon that it was the timing of the election which favored the non-union
vote. Spring means tenure and promotion decisions. It was evident
from the interviews that many faculty were still uneasy about decisions;
they were angry with the administration for what they felt was a delay-
ing tactic. Generally, too, tempers seemed shorter, the winter had
taken its toll, and faculty were anxious for change. In the fall, people
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weie just beginning the year, classes and students were newer and more
exciting. During the fall term, the faculty may be far more willing
to give the administration a chance. There is time for a "wait and
see attitude. By the time spring has arrived, there is the feeling
that it is too late for anything except a sudden change.
Questions—3 and 4 : Knowledge of Collective Bargaining in
Massachusetts
/
Question 3: 'On November 26th, Governor Sargent signed a new law
enabling public employees to bargain for wages and hours. Would
the earlier passage of this law have effected your vote?"
—Question 4 : State College Contract
Question 4^ "Prior to November 15-16, had you heard about any of
the state college contracts negotiated in the past sixteen
months?"
Questions 3 and 4 were an attempt to see if the University of
Massachusetts faculty were well informed about issues outside of the
University which might have affected them. The results indicated that
most faculty were unaware of the new law and answered that they thought
a union could bargain for wages. Those who had worked directly with
MSP-AAUP knew of the law and its probable passage. Interestingly, one-
half of the faculty said that they knew about the state college contracts
through one of the two newsletters. (The law had also been covered in
the newsletters, but apparently did not have as good readership.)
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on6 individual said that if the law had passed before
November 15-16, he would have changed his vote to yes. He commented
that he didn't mind a union bargaining for wages, but he did not want
it involved in governance. Without the ability to bargain for wages,
he felt that a MSP—AAUP contract would be almost totally governance-
oriented (Number 52) . Another faculty member answered that he thought
if the law had been passed earlier, the election would have come out
differently. The MSP-AAUP would have won (Number 12). Noting the to-
tal responses to these questions, the researcher believes that this was
not the case.
Seventy-seven percent of the faculty were not aware of the pre-
sent law or new law, and believed that this union, if elected, would be
able to bargain for wages. Forty-seven percent of the faculty members
knew of the contracts negotiated in the Massachusetts State College
System. Over half responded that their knowledge came through the news-
letters distributed to faculty during the campaign.
Both campaigns seem to have been as effective as they could have
been, given a clear lack of pressing issues. No faculty member spoke
of intensive battles between the two factions, which might have occurred.
Having read the literature of the two groups, both seem to have relayed
the issues fairly. Obviously, each group's bias is clear; but that
only makes for a good campaign.
Three faculty members mentioned that they did not like the amount
of money which they thought the (MTA) NEA was giving to the Massachusetts
Society of Professors. They felt that it was unfair to the other
group.
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Both groups asked for donations and/or dues from its members (MSP had
/ five hundred members at the time of the election). It is true, how-
ever, that the MSP membership dues was supplemented by outside funding.
The issue of control is a critical one for a union organizer,
or for an anti-union force. In Appendix 8, the question of the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts administration's possible "control" of the elec-
tion is considered and compared to the election at Michigan State Uni-
versity. The MSP-AAUP coalition can be said to have certainly influ-
• r
enced the election more than any other one group. The items of concern
usually came out first in an MSP-AAUP newsletter, to be answered or con-
tradicted by the CCF. The tenure issue appears to be a campaign strate-
gy of MSP. Given another month (and one in which tenure decisions might
have been clearer)
,
MSP might have been better able to substantiate the
claims of tenure quotas, though still perhaps unable to prove it.
The Committee for Concerned Faculty did an excellent job of
counteracting the MSP-AAUP claims, and were particularly adept at using
V the entire "professionalism" attitude which is pervasive in molding fac-
ulty opinion. The Tippo letter, printed by CCF, is an example of that.
CCF newsletters consistently pointed out where another college contract
had limited faculty rights and privileges and even abolished tenure
(November 1, 1973).
It is interesting to imagine an election involving more chan one
agent. If this had been the case, the issues would have to have been
far more closely related to individual faculty's needs; because
not only
would a faculty member have to choose whether or not to
unionize, but
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the type of representation as well. Often a multi-agent election has a
second run-off election which can completely diffuse the question of
whether or not to have a union (see Mortimer /Lozier study and Hawaii
elections)
.
A credit to both organizations was the ninety-seven percent
turnout on November 15th and 16th. Without a CCF, there certainly would
not have been as strong an "anti-union force" and perhaps faculty would
/
not have been as aware of the two sides. One of the Committee’s most
• f
recurring themes, at least in the newsletters, was "if you want to keep
what we’ve won (i.e., through the Morris and Wellman documents and fac-
ulty representation to the Board)
,
then do not elect a union because all
of that will be up for grabs." It is questionable whether that is true
(see James Begin, ACBIS Report, May 1974). Nevertheless, CCF made it a
vote-getting issue.
CHAPTER TV
THE CASE STUDY SYNOPSIS
The interviews conducted in April of 1974 with seventy-six Uni-
versity of Massachusetts faculty had one principal aim. Through ques-
tioning each faculty member, the researcher sought to collect the data
i
which would support or reject the general hypothesis of the study; name-
* r
ly i that when there were no major issues in a collective bargaining
election, the political and social predisposition of a faculty member
was more influential in determining voting behavior than the indices
of achieved status of the faculty member (i.e., tenure, rank, school
affiliation, etc.). In Chapter III, the faculty’s responses to the in-
terviews have both been compared with pertinent national studies as well
as discussed in light of the hypothesis presented here. The second chap
ter provided a brief historical and legal background for some of the
more critical components of the study; namely:
1. Faculty attitudes toward traditional academic governance;
2. The development of the faculty professional association; and
3. The recent national growth of faculty collective bargaining.
All of the interviews were conducted in the spring of 1974, f ive to six
months after the election and are, therefore, retrospective. The dis-
cussion of the interviews has occurred during the years 1976-1977, and
should be viewed in that context in the collegiate sector. Although
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collective bargaining is still in its developmental stage, several trends
are beginning to surface. These trends were viewed in the context of
the long and prestigious history of higher learning in both the American
and European university communities. When the faculty member at the
University of Massachusetts/Amherst feels integrated into that history,
he or she may be moved to question deeply a change in the traditional
process of university governance. A matter of even greater concern to
that faculty member, however,' is the faculty governance system which em-
bodies the tenets and values of this profession. Where the structure
for making academic decisions is threatened, the effectiveness of the
faculty itself becomes open to serious questions, insofar as its role in
governance is concerned
.
In the autumn of 1973, the opportunity arose for faculty intro-
spection on these matters. The Amherst campus faculty was asked whether
they would choose or not choose to form a union. In order to gather
data on the faculty's reaction to the election, an interview was designed
to elicit faculty opinion on collective bargaining (in general)
,
faculty
governance, the University of Massachusetts situation in the fall of
1973, and specific issues promulgated by the two opposing faculty groups:
the Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP) and its affiliate, the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) ; and the Committee
of Concerned Faculty (CCF)
.
Faculty responses to the interview questions provided excellent
data on their attitudes toward unionism, academic governance and the
issues involved in the November 1973, election. In retrospect, however,
it now seems clear that the researcher should have asked certain
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questions pointed more towards evoking data concerning individual pre-
disposition. Although information gleaned from faculty members' re-
sponses to the first question (When the term collective bargaining is
used, what comes to your mind?) and that on (family or personal) union
membership gave the researcher some basis for inferring the faculty mem-
ber's predisposition, this one aspect should have been more directly
probed
.
/ t
The results from the five sections of the interview have been
summarized below in the form of numbered conclusions. Section V of the
interview, the demographic characteristics of the faculty sample, has
been presented first in this summary as it was in Chapter III. Each
section of the interview evoked topics which were discussed fully in
the third chapter, but which are summarized here.
Summary of Results
Section V of the Interview ;
Demographic Characteristics
Age
1. The age range of the sample was twenty-eight years to sixty-
three years. Median age was thirty—six. Average age was
thirty-nine.
2. There was no significant correlation of age to voting behavior
for those faculty between the ages of twenty-eight and
forty-
five. Faculty members whose ages were between forty-six
and
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sixty-three years favored the" "no union" by a margin of two to
one.
Sex
Although the faculty sample was not designed to include a repre-
sentative number of male and female faculty, the sex of the faculty mem-
ber was correlated to his/her voting behavior. The number of female fac-
ulty members (thirteen) in the sample was too small to draw any subtan-
• if
tial conclusions with regard to the general female voting population.
3. Seventeen percent of the faculty sample were female.
4. The female vote showed a heavy "no union" emphasis with sixty-
nine percent (nine people) voting against the union, twenty-
three percent for MSP-AAUP (three people) , and seven percent
not voting (one person)
.
Academic Rank
5. Professors constituted 30.3 percent of the total sample. Asso-
ciate professors constituted 28.9 percent of the total sample.
Assistant professors constituted 36.9 percent of the total sam-
ple. Instructors constituted 3.9 percent of the total sample.
6. There was little correlation between academic rank and
voting
status, although within the professorial rank, sixty-five
percent
of the professors voted against the union. The
associate pro-
fessors, however, favored the union by a significant
percentage
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(fifty four percent to forty-one percent). Among the assistant
professors, fifty-seven percent voted against the union, while
all three instructors voted for the MSP-AAUP affiliate.
Tenure
7. 63.7 percent of the total sample was tenured. 35.5 percent was
not tenured. 1.3 percent (one faculty member) was not on a ten-
H
ure track.
•
<r
8. There was some correlation between voting behavior and one's ten-
ure status. Fifty-seven percent of the tenured faculty in the
sample voted against the union reflecting the campus-wide mar-
gin, while a slight majority of the non-tenured faculty who
voted chose the union. If the non-tenured faculty members who
either did not vote or would not say are counted, however, there
is an even split within the non-tenured ranks; and, therefore,
the sample voting results are not reflective of the November
election results.
School Affiliation
9.
With the exception of the School of Food and Natural Resources
(at that time termed Agriculture) , there were no terribly sur-
prising results from the cross-correlation of school affiliation
and voting behavior. Predictions about the University of
Massachusetts' School of Agriculture were apparently predicated
on the voting behavior of similar departments reported in other
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studies which pointed toward a conservative faculty group which
would vote against a union. In both the University of Hawaii
study and the report compiled by Professors Ladd and Lipset ag-
ricultural faculty demonstrated a heavy "no union" choice. The
University of Massachusetts' Agriculture faculty, however, voted
in a clear majority for the MSP-AAUP affiliate. The reasons be-
came clear in several interviews with these faculty members.
Time and an expanding university had benefited the liberal arts
faculty, they stated, to a far greater degree than the agricul-
tural faculty. Faculty members felt that their salaries had not
kept pace with other Amherst campus faculty, nor had their work-
ing conditions. The Social Science faculty's vote predicted to
have been strongly pro-union resulted in an even split between
the MSP-AAUP affiliate and no union. On the other hand, the
faculties from Natural Science, Nursing and Physical Education
voted predominantly against the union. Again, faculty interviews
revealed that the reasons for the particular departmental differ-
ences were complex and varied, dealing primarily with predisposi-
tion toward unionism as a concept versus the faculty's attitude
toward the specific affiliate seeking to represent the University
of Massachusetts faculty.
Tenure Status Within Schools and Voting Behavior
10. The three-way analysis comparing tenure status to voting behav-
ior within each school showed no surprising results. The few
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exceptions, to which allusions have been made above in the sep-
arate school and tenure results, are summarized below.
11. Within the School of Food and Natural Resources (Agriculture),
sixty-eight percent of the tenured faculty as well as sixty-
eight percent of the non-tenured faculty voted for the MSP-AAUP
affiliate, providing a direct contrast to most national studies.
In these studies, tenured faculty generally voted against the
/ M
union, and within the institutions whose vote has been analyzed,
r
the faculty in schools or departments of agriculture were anti-
union as well.
12. The School of Education faculty provided an interesting analy-
sis because one-hundred percent of its tenured faculty voted
for the union and all of its non-tenured faculty voted against
the union. As was explained in Chapter III, the faculty members'
dissatisfaction of their school administration was considered
to be the primary reason for their voting behavior.
13. The Social Science non-tenured faculty, who were expected to
vote in favor of a union, were evenly split between the union
and no—union choice. A plit occurred in the tenured faculty
as well, making the overall group of departments more anti-union
than either the MSP or the CCF groups expected.
14. The Natural Sciences showed a heavy no-union vote among both
tenured faculty (where seventy—eight percent of the faculty
voted "no") and non-tenured faculty (seventy-five voted against
the union)
.
The Number of Years at the University
15.
Faculty members in the sample had spent between one and thirty-
six years at the University. The median length of stay was be-
tween five and six years. The average length was nine years.
A cross analysis of the number of years spent at the university
with a faculty member's voting behavior showed little correla-
tion. Divided into length of stay of one to ten years, eleven
to twenty years and twenty-three to thirty years, only in the
period "eleven to twenty years" did a majority of faculty vote
for the union (by a margin of sixty-eight percent to thirty-two
percent). In both other time spans, a majority of faculty voted
against the union.
Membership in a Faculty Organization
16.
The relationship of individual membership in a faculty organiza-
tion (such as AAUP, MSP-AAUP or an outside union) to a faculty
member's voting behavior was low except in the MSP-AAUP cate-
gory where the two faculty who held membership in each of the
two organizations voted for the MSP-AAUP option. As has been
mentioned earlier, membership in AAUP did not necessarily imply
support for the alliance nor of faculty collective bargaining.
Administrative Title
17.
There was a high correlation between one's administrative title
and his or her voting behavior. All program directors and
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department heads voted againsp the union, while department
chairpersons were evenly split between the two choices. De-
partment heads are appointed by the administration whereas de-
partment chairpersons are more often the choices of their de-
partmental colleagues (as defined by the University of
Massachusetts Provost Office in 1976; footnote 13, Chapter III).
These results, therefore, might lead one to conclude that de-
partment heads are not as likely to vote for a union as depart-
ment chairpersons because they may view their role differently
from that of the department chairperson.
Membership in the Faculty Senate
18. The question pertaining to faculty membership in the senate re-
vealed a correlation that had not been predicted. Of the eigh-
teen faculty members who had been members of the senate (past
or present), sixty-eight percent voted for the union. Since
the purpose of the question was to discover the accuracy of the
hypothesis, that faculty with experience in the Faculty Senate
would be less apt to want a union, the results were most sur-
prising. The hypothesis proved to be completely incorrect; in
fact, the reverse could be proposed.
Membership on Department Committee
19. Membership on a departmental committee proved to be of little
consequence as a predictor of faculty voting behavior. Of the
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twenty-three faculty who were, members of their own department’s
personnel committee, sixty-three percent voted against the union,
not an overwhelming percentage considering its close parallel to
the total vote.
Section V :
Summary of Issues
V l
In other collective bargaining studies involving faculty attitudes
f
and voting behavior, the results have shown that age, academic rank, ten-
ure status, and departmental affiliation are related to a faculty member's
vote. Those studies (as reviewed in Chapter III and mentioned specifi-
cally in footnote 7, Chapter III), however, have been conducted, for the
most part, on faculties which have recently unionized. The hypothesis of
this study proposed that when there were no major "bread and butter" is-
sues (i.e., problems directly challenging the stability of the faculty
group)
,
faculty members would vote according to their personal predispo-
sitions, as determined by upbringing and general background. As a result,
the use of academic demographics by themselves could not predict a faculty
member's vote whenever major issues dividing one group from another were
absent from the campus. For instance, if tenure quotas had been an is-
sue, those faculty who were yet to be tenured or who were not on a tenure
track might be more inclined to vote for a union which promised to rid
the University of tenure quotas. But in the absence of such local bread
and butter" issues, the demographics of the faculty at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst could not have been a predictor of the outcome
of the election. As mentioned in Chapter III, although administrators
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were sought out for their historical perspective on the study, they were
not included in the study sample.
Because there were no critical or partisan issues, faculty who
represented a variety of ages, disciplines and levels in their careers
voted alike because their attitudes toward unionism in general were sim-
ilar, not because they were clustered by demographic statistics around
one side of an issue or another.
i
• r
Section I of the Interview :
Faculty Atticudes Toward Unionism
Section I of the interview consisted of questions designed to
v learn the faculty member's attitudes toward collective bargaining and
unionism in general. To the first (what collective bargaining implies)
and second questions (blue collar vs. white collar) concerning a faculty
member's impressions of collective bargaining, faculty responded gener-
ally in two ways.
20. Most anti-union faculty members felt that unions belonged to
the blue-collar segment of the work force. They contended that
for professional people, the adversary relationship assumed to
characterize a blue-collar union-management work setting was
both unnecessary and uncongenial to their expectations for the
work of a professor on a campus.
21. The pro-union voter usually answered the question by giving a
"definition" of the term. They would generally give a group of
llective bargaining, and then define how varioussynonyms for co
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people use collective bargaining to achieve their goals. For
the most pai L (with one exception), there were very few emotion-
al responses among the pro-union voters, unlike the responses of
the anti-union voters.
22. Question 3 queried faculty on whether or not faculty in higher
education should be able to unionize. This question was similar
to those asked by other national surveys; and as with the other
/ I
studies, the proportion of the faculty at the University of
• r
Massachusetts answering yes to this question was two-thirds.
Yet, they often added a qualifying phrase such as "but not here,"
or "depending on what is being bargained for."
\
23. The items which the faculty members felt should be included in
a collective bargaining agreement were the traditionally con-
tractual items such as salaries, working conditions (teaching
load, student-teacher ratio, hours, etc.) and grievance and per-
sonnel procedures. One-third of the faculty mentioned governance
as a contract item.
24. A great majority of faculty responded that a strike should be
used by faculty in higher education if other alternatives have
been exhausted. Many expressed their opinions about whether or
not a strike could occur at the University of Massachusetts; and
a few wore concerned about the effects of a faculty str ike.
Many faculty members believed that, whether or not they person-
ally would strike, the faculty as a body would strike to win an
Issue
.
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25. In answer to the question regarding personal or family member-
ship in a union, over one-half of the faculty members responded
that either they, or a member of their family, or both had held
union membership at some time. There was no correlation between
this membership and the individual's voting behavior. The reac-
tions to this question were never a simple "yes" or "no" answer;
and interestingly, the individuals often gave a synopsis of
4* M
their family background including an explanation or rationale
as to how past or present union affiliation affected their cur-
rent feelings about unionism.
26. To the question asking faculty whom they would include or exclude
in a bargaining unit, responses were mixed. Less than half of
the sample (twenty-six) would have included department chairper-
sons and department heads in their unit. The great majority,
however, would have included just department chairpersons and
themselves (full-time faculty)
,
and excluded the department
heads (see conclusion 17 for comparison) . There was little un-
derstanding among faculty members of the complex subject of the
bargaining unit.
Section I :
Summary of Issues
Ybe first section of the interview revealed many faculty attitudes
toward both unionism and indirectly toward the faculty election in
November of 1973.
.
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One of the dominant themes in the four subjective parts of the
interview was "professionalism"; and here in Section I, faculty mentioned
it the most often. The notion of individuality, of being one’s own boss
as Number 46 responded, "I choose to spend my time the way I want to.
. . . A professor does nothing you can regulate by hours"—was indica-
tive of this "professional" sensibility.
The ability to choose one's colleagues is another feature prized
• V i
in the work place by professionals. Lawyers do it through law examination
boards or law schools, the state bar examinations, and the American Bar
Association. Doctors have similar routes of selection. The individual
who seeks the academic life must be able to get through a series of tests
similar to those imposed upon the doctor and lawyer. Faculty employed at
the University also were required to pass through a series of tests: en-
trance into college, graduate record examinations, graduate school, prior
teaching experiences and, to some extent, the publishing/research screen.
Once inside the institution, the routines of department affiliation, com-
mittee structure, promotion and tenure patterns all affect the selection
of colleagues, and are perceived by faculty members as critical to their
profession. As this study demonstrates, the fear of a major change in
this system occurring under collective bargaining was very much on the
minds of the anti-union voters at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst
The notion of professionalism was expressed in other ways when
those interviewed discussed the types of faculty who were connected with
the MSP-AAUP affiliate.
1
One person was of the opinion that the faculty
^See Chapter III, pages 163-172.
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members connected with the Massachusetts Society of Professors were
those who had not "made it" elsewhere in the University. In other words,
pro-union faculty were those who had not followed the "professional"
code as it was traditionally hallowed within the highest standards of
academe
.
One of the sample faculty described the professional as the per-
son with a "code of ethics" in his or her work. To identify oneself with
the academic profession is to -cloak oneself in the history and set of val-
ues underlying the dogmas of academic freedom and research at the fron-
tiers of knowledge. When the faculty at the University of Massachusetts
talked about the differences between blue and white collar workers, they
were simply declaring themselves unready for any change in the histori-
cal concepts governing their profession. They were insisting on their
right to sustain the values of their special status as academics. To
threaten their self-image as professionals by introducing a mode of con-
duct deemed foreign to it must not occur while the old governance regime
still appeared to function.
Professionalism was not the only potent image of the academic
profession. For many faculty, the symbols of individualism and autonomy
were also powerful emblems of the professional status. As Piofessor
Tippo declared in his letter to the faculty, we are a "community of schol
ars. . . (who) devote their primary attention to the ancient functions
of teaching and seeking the truth. ... We are all decision-makers
and
we are all officers of the University." What Professor Tippo repeated
was only what many of the faculty would later stress in
the interviews—
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that the need for control over one's own professional life is critical.
The argument that a group of outside people, felt by certain faculty
members to have no connection to the faculty, would represent the Amherst
campus faculty to the University administration was an idea both foreign
and odious.
Many faculty knew also that individually, they could negotiate
a variety of personnel and departmental issues with certain administra-
tors a benefit which they feared would be denied them under union rule.
For many faculty members, their sense of individuality was as important
to them personally as they felt the separate campus autonomy was to the
i
University of Massachusetts system. The Amherst campus, referred to as
the "Flagship Campus," had a history as the University's birthplace.
Amherst was the center of research, the home of the many graduate schools
and their faculties. Teaching loads, faculty-student ratios, advising
functions, and committee assignments in a university where faculty are
understood to be scholars presuppose a radically different function
that the job definitions of teaching at the secondary or even community
college level. Faculty did not want to lose what they felt had been
built up over a long period of time— the seniority and the elite posi-
tion in the system of public higher education in the Commonwealth. In
the words of Professor Tippo, an appeal was made to his colleagues on
November 14, 1973: "I ask. . . all faculty colleagues who share with
me the dream that one day a great state university will arise at Amherst
to vote against collective bargaining for the campus.
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Many of the comments made by the faculty during their interviews
paralleled national studies on professionalism. These studies were dis-
cussed in the treatment of the first and second parts of the interview.
Also included in the discussion of the first section of the interview
were related collective bargaining issues such as the strike, the bar-
gaining unit and the question of multiple campus representation. The
National Labor Relations Board has made a number of conflicting decisions
.
4* 1
regarding the feasibility of single and multi-campus units, as have a
variety of state labor relations boards. University court cases which
best exemplify this important unit issue (which was later resolved for
the University of Massachusetts in October of 1976) were discussed in
Chapter III.
Section II; Attitudes Toward the Current (Fall 1973)
University of Massachusetts Situation
Section II of the interview concentrated on the faculty's atti-
tudes toward the current situation in the Amherst campus with regard to
major issues affecting the election, salary, working conditions, and per
sonnel policies.
2
27. Twenty-four percent (the largest group) of faculty felt that
there were no critical issues on the Amherst campus; or at
least if there were, they were not of significant importance
to warrant changing to a collective bargaining system. The
2 See Chapter III, Table 30, page 174.
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second largest number of faculty (nineteen percent) felt that
the growing polarization between faculty and administration on
the Amherst campus was the major issue. That the third largest
number (sixteen percent) thought the real issue was whether or
not the faculty actually wanted an outside force (i.e., a union)
speaking for them—in other words, the question of unionization
itself. Only ten faculty members felt that tenure quotas were
/ *
the issue, reflecting the results of a campaign theme by the
MSP-AAUP
.
28. Faculty responses to Questions 2 and 3 demonstrated that neither
salary nor working conditions were believed to be unfair or un-
satisfactory. For the most part, faculty at the University felt
that they had been fairly treated in terms of promotion and ten-
ure. Those untenured faculty who were concerned about their
tenure status stated that it was because of the period of econ-
omic recession and the fiscal crisis in state government, not
because of an inherently unfair system.
29. Many mentioned that the merit system was confusing and, therefore,
of concern. This issue, however, probably arose after the elec-
tion and before April 1974 (the time of the interviews), during
a period of merit examination by President Wood and the Univer-
sity Board of Trustees.
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Section II :
Summary of Issues
Although the faculty on the Amherst campus did not find any major
issues in the November of 1973 election, many seemed to sense that all
was not well on the campus. Indeed, those who articulated the growing
polarization between faculty and administration and those who mentioned
the increasing bureaucracy of the University's central Boston Office were
,
«* v
forecasting the future quite perceptively. Their sense of disquiet was
• r
all the more significant since many of these faculty had been at the
v
University for a number of years and, therefore, were capable of drawing
on a longer experience for comparison.
The study of the college faculty of Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity revealed a faculty which saw the power of their university on the
wane, while that of the state legislature was on the rise. In this in-
stance, the rupture was between the world of academe and the world of
the legislative authority over the campus budget. According to Mortimer
(as discussed on page 176 of Chapter III), it was this exact circumstance
— the decreasing power of university administrators and trustees, and the
growth of the budget authority of the state legislature—that would whet,
at least in the public sector, the faculty's appetite for unionization.
Recent history suggests that Mortimer was correct.
A collective bargaining contract has almost always brought about
a standardized wage scale for employees. Many of the first contracts
for faculty in higher education contained salary agreements which ap-
peared to raise wages. Such salary increases may be the result of cost
r Vs muQ, X- b J
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influence a faculty member's vote in November of 1973. As he or she
<
marked the ballot, the faculty member had to wrestle with one fundamen-
tal question: "Do I want a union representing me at this university?"
For most, the answer was no because this researcher believes it would
mean too great a change in the perceived academic environment. In the
minds of many, a vote for a union would replace the community of academ-
ic professionals with a labor-management instrument typical of the assem-
/ \
bly line. To some faculty, membership in a union would connote that they
• r
were merely "teachers" rather than "professors". "The professor inno-
vates, stimulates and deals with abstract relationships—the teacher, by
3
contrast, conserves and transmits."
In the early experience of many faculty, a union drew a sharp
line of demarcation between those who worked and those who managed.
They felt the'ir individuality would be compromised under a union; and
that the image of faculty would be erased once and for all as their role
was transformed from what Professor Tippo termed officer of the Univer-
sity" to that of mere employee. As such, the majority of the faculty at
Amherst did not feel under sufficient personal or collective threat to
vote to adopt a process of governance which most had grown up to equate
with blue collar workers.
^Jessie Bernard. "Teachers and Professors" in
Anderson and
Murray, The Professors , page
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of living factors alone, however, \ather than the actual result of union-
<
ization. Although one study, conducted by staff and faculty at Michigan
State University (see footnote 56 of Chapter III), showed marked in-
creases in unionized faculty salaries at five major universities, that
same study warned that the inflationary factor alone during that time
period increased non-unionized faculty salaries to a similar degree.
Promotion and tenure, the subject of the fourth question in Sec-
/ t
tion II, is at the heart of any university. In the last decade, tenure
has become a problem foj: most colleges and universities as the era of
fast growth in the sixties was succeeded by a time of reduced enrollments
and budget austerities. Many young faculty had been hired and were moving
along the tenure track only to face the harsh reality of a department
which had an overabundance of tenured faculty already ensconced.
In 1973, the Committee on Academic Tenure in Higher Education
produced a major set of recommendations on the granting of tenure. If
a union were to adopt the basic tenor of this report, the collective
bargaining agreement would not radically alter any of the current prac-
tices defining the award of tenure. Yet because the Commission did
recommend increased rigor in the area of performance appraisal, the prob-
lem of teacher evaluation itself would be at issue under collective bar-
gaining. Many faculty might believe that peer review, the judgemental
appraisal of one's colleagues and a treasured academic concept, would
face dilution within an academic union.
Based upon the responses of the faculty to Section II
of the in-
conclude that there were no major local issues toterview, one can
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Section III :
Faculty Perceptions of University Governance
In Section III, faculty members were asked about perceptions of
the Amherst campus governance system. In the first two questions, fac-
ulty were asked to discuss the areas over which they felt they should
have governance influence and the actual extent of that influence.
/ r
Question 1
'
. f
30. Respondents felt that for faculty governance, the three criti-
cal realms were curriculum, personnel policies and teaching
loads
.
Question 2
31. Opinions varied, however, as to the extent to which the faculty's
authority should be final .in each of these areas. Of those who
felt that "personnel policies" should be subject to faculty au-
thority, fifty-five percent felt that the faculty should have
final authority over these matters, although they also thought
that the administration should be able to review their deci-
sions. Since they believed that their current control was suf-
ficient, control over curriculum was not an issue in the fac-
ulty's minds. The growing bureaucracy and size of the institu-
tion was of concern to a number of faculty who cited poor com-
'(-munications rather than administrative incompetence as the rea-
son for their concern.
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Question 3
r
The question asked faculty to weigh the effectiveness of the cur-
rent faculty governance system—namely
,
the Faculty Senate.
32. Sixty-four percent of the respondents felt that the Faculty
Senate did not provide an adequate voice and platform of repre-
sentation for faculty concerns. Their answers were often apol-
ogetic descriptions of 'the faculty senators’ lengthy and bogus
discussions on "less than relevant issues. Many felt that given
a faculty member’s priorities in terms of teaching and research,
little else could be expected.
Question 4
33. To the question on student involvement in collective bargaining,
forty-eight percent of the faculty responded negatively, saying
that they did not want students involved in collective bargain-
ing at all. Thirty-five percent of the respondents said that
students should have a voice and some chance for input into
those areas which concerned them—specifically, student-teacher
ratio, work loads and faculty teaching evaluation. Only eleven
percent of the faculty felt that students should be represented
in the actual negotiations.
Question 5
34. Question 5 sought to reveal the degree of familiarity faculty
members had with the university grievance procedures. Few
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faculty members were fully knowledgeable about personnel poli-
cies and grievance procedures, including even some department
heads and chairpersons. Those faculty who had personally
brought a grievance to the University's attention were naturally
the most familiar with the actual grievance steps.
Question 6
9 "
35. The majority of faculty (sixty-four percent) spent less than fif-
teen percent of their time on tasks involving faculty governance
matters. Department personnel committee members stipulated that
during certain times of the year, as much as fifty percent of
their time was spent evaluating colleagues for promotion and/or
tenure.
Question 7
36. Question 7 asked for faculty opinions on how collective bargain-
ing would affect the quality of education. There were three cat-
egories of response. First, forty-five percent of the faculty
felt there would be no effect of collective bargaining on the
quality of education. Second, thirty percent believed the qual-
ity of education would be negatively affected because the campus
will be "politicized" over non-educational issues. Third, fif-
teen percent believed the quality of education would be improved
because faculty could put more effort into their teaching (if
a
union contract had stabilized their economic security).
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Although the faculty in the second group were, for the
r
most part, anti-union, there were also a few pro-union voters
who felt that education would be adversely affected. The first
group included both pro and anti-union voters; and the third
group was largely made up of pro-union voters, although it did
include two or three anti-union voters.
Section III :
Summary of Issues
|
Faculty governance has not been strongly affected by unionization,
at least in the relatively short history of collective bargaining on col-
lege campuses. In the research by Begin, Clark and Fisk on college gov-
ernance before and after collective bargaining, although some of the
studies showed a change in the faculty's attitude toward governance be-
fore and after unionization, the procedures themselves had not radically
altered
.
Several contractual agreements did modify governance systems
through the inclusion of third party binding arbitration. The traditional
system of peer review concerning faculty grievances was supplemented by
an outside arbitrator. Of course, many have argued that peer review is
not without flaws. Burton Clark has discussed at some length the facul-
ty "oligarch"— the professor who gained departmental authority through
seniority and scholarship, and then dominated junior faculty in the role
of the quasi-administrator. Clark and McConnell both regard this measure
of nower as unfortunate, yet nevertheless to be preferred over
what they
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envision would happen under collective bargaining. In McConnell's words,
unionization would.
. . "doom the system of shared governance." Accord-
ing to most studies, however, whenever a true system of shared governance
existed before the advent of collective bargaining, it existed afterwards
as well. In some cases, a union contract created a system of government
more equally shared by faculty and administrators.^
Student representation $nd participation in academic collective
bargaining had recently (1972-1973) become an issue both in New York City
and in the state of Massachusetts. In three non-traditional faculty con-
tracts negotiated with the Massachusetts State College faculty, students
not only participated in the negotiations but were awarded a degree of
participation in the governance structure subsequently incorporated into
the contract itself. As has been noted earlier, several student groups
(Maine, Oregon and Montana) have succeeded in getting state laws passed
which will have a significant impact on the future of collective bargain-
ing. Thus, as a result of the changing pace of collective bargaining, it
may not be inconceivable that a college president will have to consider
managing five different unions:
(1) Administrative staff;
(2) Faculty;
(3) Students;
(4) Hourly employees; and
^See Chapter III, page 200, Massachusetts State College
Contracts.
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(5) Teaching assistants.^
Although faculty governance and student participation were of concern
to faculty in 1973, they were by no means issues which would have forced
faculty to unionize.
Section IV :
Attitudes Toward the November Election
i
In this section, faculty were questioned on their general impres-
sions of the actual election, the MSP-AAUP and CCF groups, and their
overall knowledge of collective bargaining issues.
37. Seventy-nine percent of the faculty responded that they obtained
most of their information concerning the election from the news-
letters distributed by both the MSP-AAUP and the CCF. Most felt
that there was "too much paper"— in fact, that they had been
overloaded. The department meeting with experts from the two
organized groups was the second most noted vehicle of communi-
cation.
38. Faculty impressions of the Massachusetts Society of Professors
and the Committee of Concerned Faculty were, for the most part,
favorable. There was often a distinction made between the MSP-
AAUP professional staff faculty working for that organization,
with equal numbers of faculty noting positive and negative
5
See Chapter III, page 217 for a description of The University
of Wisconsin, Teaching Assistant Negotiations.
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factors about each group. Many anti-union voters felt that
the staff and faculty involved in MSP-AAUP lacked the academic
star quality which they felt was evident within the CCF fac-
ulty. They said that they were influenced personally by that
apparent contrast.
39. Questions 3 and 4 attempted to discern the faculty's knowledge
of outside, yet related, collective bargaining issues. Both
the new collective bargaining law and the Massachusetts State
College contracts had been mentioned in the MSP-AAUP and CCF
newsletters; and yet there was very little awareness of either
development on the part of most faculty. Those faculty who had
worked with the MSP-AAUP organization during the campaign were
more knowledgeable about these two issues than any other identi-
fiable group.
Section IV :
Summary of the Issues
The control of an election is usually in the hands of those people
who can best articulate the real and felt desires of the voting popula-
tion. The faculty at the University of Massachusetts clearly had two
conscientious and active groups seeking to articulate a strategy for vic-
tory: for the union, the Massachusetts Society of Professors/AAUP affil-
iate; and against the union, the Committee of Concerned Faculty. The
problem for the union group was that there were no major local issues
5* with which they could dramatize for a doubting faculty the need for so
fundamental a change. It is possible that with a lower turnout at the
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polls, the forces seeking a union would have won. Yet the voice of oppo-
sition proved loud and clear during the open and vigorous debate between
the two groups, bringing ninety-seven percent of the faculty to the bal-
lot box and a verdict from a true majority. Both sides sought to give
the impression that the pro-union forces began. For the MSP-AAUP alli-
ances, their aid from the outside— from the National Education Association
and the Massachusetts Teachers Association—was a sign of the strength a
campus union could rely upon. For the CCF, these forces were "outsiders"
a "foreign entity"—and enabling them to carry an "underdog" image as
they worked to get out their vote.
The question of who really controlled the Amherst campus arose in
two ways during the campaign by the union coalition. In the newsletter
of the MSP-AAUP, the faculty were asked to consider: How much do you ac-
tually decide about your own destiny here? The newsletter drummed away
at the theme of the increasing centralization of the University in the
bureaucracy of One Washington Mall^ and the consequent removal of real
authority from the Amherst campus. The Hay Report substantiated those
claims and became a critical issue in many faculty members' minds. Nev-
ertheless, neither of the campaigns could, by themselves, dictate, the
election outcome since there was no single overriding issue of concern
to the faculty.
6
The address of the University President's Office in downtown
Boston.
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Conclusions
What do these conclusions indicate about the 1973 election at
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst?
None of the demographic data could have predicted faculty voting
behavior. With perhaps the two exceptions of tenured faculty in the
School of Agriculture and Natural Sciences division, few departments or
schools voted heavily in one direction or another. No faculty profile
of the pro-union or anti-union voter can be compiled from these figures.
Among the sample faculty, there were strong sentiments both for
or against the concept of collective bargaining, as well as the particu-
lar group seeking to become the faculty's bargaining agent—MSP-AAUP.
No faculty member indicated that he or she was indifferent to the out-
come of the election. Four to five months after the election, only a
few respondents felt that they would then like to switch their "no rep-
resentative" vote, although they often revealed they knew of several fac-
ulty like themselves who, at the time of the interview , would have voted
for the union. Both pro and anti-union voters said that the lack of lo-
cal issues was the principal reason why the MSP-AAUP was not elected to y
represent the faculty at the University in 1973.
Attitude changes come only slowly when there are no critical
reasons to do otherwise. This study gives evidence that change, partic-
ularly when it relates to an individual's or a group s status or self-
esteem, proceeds at an even slower pace. In the absence of major campus
issues involved in a collective bargaining election, the predisposition
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and socialization, or political culture of a faculty member rather than
his or her achieved status will be more influential In determining vot-
ing behavior
. The hypothesis of this study has thus been proven con-
firmed .
There were several faculty members in the study whose opinions
were in sharp contrast to the majority of their faculty colleagues.
Two faculty members in the School of Agriculture placed themselves on
the conservative end of the political spectrum. They came from working
class, rural, farm-based families. In youth, their lifestyle had been
independent and isolated as opposed to the gregarious lifestyle of the
urban dweller. These faculty members both commented that they did trust
unions; that under any other conditions, they would have voted against
the union; but that the University administration had so mistreated and
angered them, that they felt a union was their only method of retalia-
tion. In other words, the issue for them was critical enough to make
them vote contrary to the presumed predisposition of people with similar
rural, independent, conservative backgrounds.
The two tenured faculty in the School of Education had a similar
type of conflict. Both stated that they had no real desire to see a
union on the campus, but felt such animosity toward their dean that a
vote for such an "outside" force would be a vote against the University
administration which had allowed the dean to amass powers they felt ar-
bitrary and excessive. Again, the immediate issue for these faculty
members was important enough to supersede predispositions hostile
to a
campus union. These four examples, however, were the
exception. Tn
*
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this sample, they accounted for two of the ten schools and only four of
the seventy-six faculty.
In the majority of cases, faculty members repeated in their own
words the following comments: "You know, I did not really know how I
was going to vote until I actually got into the election room. I was
filled with such conflicts. . . I heard many of my friends say the same
thing." For the Amherst campus , faculty
,
there was little reason to
change "academic business as ( usual" unless they began with the belief
that a union would simply be a better form of government. Many persons
did, in fact, believe that collective bargaining had brought workers a
better life, including a more equitable level of wages and improved
working conditions. These faculty believed fundamentally in the power
of unions and saw that the faculty at the University had little signif-
icant power. Without a strong reason to vote against this particular
union, in most instances (though not all) they felt that they had to
vote for the MSP-AAUP option.
Under stress, an individual will often revert to his or her con-
ditioned responses; i.e., those actions which make that person tne most
comfortable and which result in the lowest risk solution. An example
of the faculty member who chose the path of least resistance for him
is illustrated in his response to the first question in the interview
(when the term "collective bargaining" is used, what comes to your mind?)
This individual selected the type of system which he felt the most
com-
fortable with and which upheld his political beliefs. Number
11 answered
"Men in coal fields, salt of the earth, working class,
fighting oppres-
sion—all very positive things, lump in the throat.
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Later, during the interview, he added: "... but in the spe-
cific form it took here, I had some problems; I didn't like the MSP
group. They were reactionary kinds of people.
. . in the end though, I
just couldn t bring myself to vote against a union— it would have been
denying all of the feelings that I have inside about unions." The vote
for a union presented the leqst conflict for this individual.
The faculty member who chose the academic profession precisely
to escape his union background in the working class ("When I walked out
of that part of my life") had sought to leave behind him what he viewed
was the enforced society of the working class. A vote in the November
election for a union would have entailed the denial of his most basic
self-image—the self-made professional. For such an individual, the
issue that would be critical enough to change his vote would have to
challenge the very roots of academe and his place within the academic
institution. In selecting the college teaching profession, a person
chooses an orientation toward life. It is not the argumentative/defense
posture of the lawyer, nor the healer/hero sensitivity of the doctor.
It is a combination of inquisitor, knowledge seeker, imparter of wisdom,
and a sense of collegiality and individuality relatively free of exter-
nal demands.
The traditional notion of collective bargaining— that of individ-
ual dependence on an organization to negotiate for the group's needs—is
antithetical to the idealized notion of the college professor, indepen-
dent in his or her research, and dependent only upon other faculLy mem-
bers who can discuss discipline-oriented concepts on an equal level. As
long as these qualities of academe are not directly threatened, a faculty
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member fully socialized into this traditionally academic lifestyle will
be unlikely to opt for a change from the tradition of peer governance to
that of collective bargaining. Yet if one's predisposition is such that
unions are beneficial for individual members, then a vote in favor of a
faculty union is entirely likely, in the absence of local issues which
would argue otherwise. In capsule form, the results of the interviews -V *
confirm the original hypothesis of this study. Compared to the other
9
studies reviewed, this study possesses distinctive characteristics and
I ;
findings. The first is the faculty sample. Other surveys were conducted
with
:
(1) Faculty who previously had chosen a union and were being quer-
ied on the reasons for their selection of that union;
7
or
(2) Faculty who may never have actually voted in a collective bar-
g
gaining election.
For the first series of studies—on faculties who had already adopted
a union— it is obvious that there had been issues of enough importance
to mobilize a faculty to unionize. In the second type of study, one of
which was conducted by Everett Ladd and Seymour Lipset, hypothetical
questions on collective bargaining were asked to faculty members who,
for the most part, were unlikely to come from unionized institutions.
7
Moore, "Attitudes Toward Collective Negotiations";
Haehn, "A
Study of Trade’ Unionism"; Lozier and Mortimer, "Anatomy";
Seidman, Kelley
and Edge, "Faculty Choices"; Falcone, "Collective
Bargaining.
8
Ladd and Lipset, Professors and Unions, pp. 36
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However, no distinction between faculty from non-unionized and those
from unionized institutions was made in the Ladd and Lipset study. Be-
cause their research was gathered in 1969 and 1972, it can be assumed
that the number of unionized faculty was small. Faculty (in the 1969
study) were asked to respond to the statement, "Collective bargaining
by faculty members has no place in a college or university." In the
second study, in 1972, faculty were asked a similar question: "Do you
9
agree or disagree that the recent growth of unionization of college and
university faculty is beneficial and should be extended?" This type of
analysis, although tremendously valuable, does not determine how those
same faculty members would actually vote in an election because faculty
in the Ladd/Lipset Survey were being asked to hypothesize, not choose
between harsh realities. Similarly, a considerable majority of Univer-
sity of Massachusetts faculty in the study sample responded that faculty
should be able to bargain collectively; yet they did not choose that
route for themselves. The difference between theoretical and actual
responses to faculty collective bargaining is often vast because it is
easy for a faculty member to agree that faculty members as a group should
be able to unionize, and at the same time, to resist such a course of
action for himself or herself.
As the researcher tried to fully develop in Chapter III, the
mystique of the professional in American society often appears to have
become almost a "class consciousness." In this way, some faculty mem-
bers may have chosen their professional livelihood precisely in order to
escape a working class upbringing. As a convert, such an individual may
strongly identify with the idealized professional status of the
"academic".
In keeping with their notion of professionalism, the faculty at the
^University of Massachusetts voted not to unionize in November of 1973
because the majority was afraid of losing what sense of professional
autonomy it felt remained. Chancellor Bromery and Professor Tippo were
correct in their assumption that the Amherst faculty wanted to consider
themselves part of an elite core of faculty in higher education, like
the Michigans, Harvards and Berkeleys where faculties showed no desire
for collective bargaining. ^tatus and status quo alike were being chal-
lenged by the NEA affiliate.
What the election and this study also demonstrate, however, is
that a growing number (albeit a minority) of faculty saw beyond the is-
sues of "professional" elitism toward what they felt to be a more impor-
tant issue at hand—that of the depletion of faculty power, vis-a-vis
both the Amherst administration and the central administration in Boston.
.I
Yet the faculty’s decreasing ability to control the "bread and butter"
issues affecting them most directly was only beginning to surface in
the fall of 1973. For those faculty either affected directly by that
powerlessness or who perceived that it was so, a union with national
strength such as the MSP-AAUP seemed to be the only solution. Their
vote was a strong statement on behalf of a newer view of the status of
the faculty. Many faculty members remarked in their interviews that
they had hoped the union would lose, but only by a small margin. In
this way, the administration would get the message that the faculty was
beginning to flex its muscles—that it had the power to change the sys—
* tem of governance, but that it was willing to continue one last time to
try to make the traditional academic structure work. Ironically, only
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three years later the number of faculty who saw this increased power-
lessness would become the slight majority; and in February of 1977,
would vote to adopt a bargaining unit to represent their professional
interests.
In the early 1970's, the rise of faculty movement for unionizing
the campus was not a simple power struggle between the "haves" and "have
nots, between management and labor, between trustee and teacher. It
was a struggle between a somewhat idealized conception of the university
faculty, a self-regulating elite capable of collegial governance, and a
viewpoint
—
perhaps no less idealized—of the values of collective bar-
gaining as a means to preserve and extend faculty privilege. Institu-
tions of American higher education are torn between the conflicting her-
itages of the aristocratic ethos of the European colleges and universities
and the democratic ethos of American civil society. Most Americans have
wanted higher education to promote a more equitable society, not to sim-
ply reward the intellectual elite. Thus, the evolution of the American
college has been a history of strain between these two forces. The early
colleges trained ministers, and then later expanded this role to include
other professions and the liberal arts. Yet in later years, the demo-
critic ethic grew more influential as it was argued that the more citi-
zens who received a college education, the better educated and informed
a society would be. Only then could democracy work effectively. From
this philosophy came a great deal of the legislation in the late 1800 s
and early 1900' s, such as the establishment of the Land Grant univer-
sities; and much later, the G.I. Bill; and finally, open admissions—
all part of the expanding enrollments of higher education in America.
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As the numbers of students and teachers in higher education grew,
so too the budgets of the campuses grew. As their financing became a
sizeable proposition, especially in the public institutions, control of
the academic profession became a critical issue. Even as late as the
1960 's, state governments had little difficulty in providing ever in-
creasing allocations toward their colleges. The 1970's, however, have
proven to be a different story. The fiscal crisis in state governments
and the general downturn in £he national economy have both slowed the
rate of expansion within public higher education and brought much closer
supervision by state government.
The long history of unionism in the American work force provided
inspiration for the elementary and secondary level teachers in public ed-
ucation who badly needed to increase their economic and professional
power. Laws which once covered only industrial laborers began in the
years after World War II to give real clout to white-collar workers,
both in the private and public sectors. Thus, the 1950 's and 1960 's
provided an era of slow but steady growth for the union movement, and
provided ample opportunity for the professional to organize as well.
In order to understand the mood of the faculty in the 1973 elec-
tion, it has been necessary to trace the historical development both of
the American college and of the labor movement on the campus. Quite
simply, the interview evoked faculty attitudes towards their profession;
and without an historical context from which to interpret and understand
these attitudes, the outcome of the election would be far more difficult
to explain.
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V.
In the earlier discussion of professionalism, in Chapter III,
one important feature of professionalism was noted. The professional
owes a duty not only to his or her client, whether patient, defendant x
or student, but also to his or her professional colleagues and to the
principles of their respective code of ethics. As Platt and Parsons
argue, it is the "professionalization of the faculty role" that funda-
mentally shapes not only the university system itself, but all of high-
er education.
The main institutional structure of the arts and sciences sector of
the university community has come to be organized about the patterns
of tenure and academic freedom, together constituting a pattern of
institutionalized individualism. Furthermore, the keystone of this
structural arch is the core academic profession. The central defi-
nition of the roles of its members is that they are exercising a fi-
/ duciary responsibility on behalf of the other sectors of the society.
Fiduciary responsibility must be grounded in commitment to values;
in this case, the value of cognitive rationality.
As Platt and Parsons add, academic professionals are presumed
—
especially in the higher echelons of academic life—to be committed to
these values of cognitive rationality and to their "fiduciary responsi-
bility" on behalf of these values. Central to this role is its institu-
tionalized individualism
,
they argue, which is a "privileged status" de-
fined both by academic freedom and academic tenure.
Since tenure and academic freedom in different ways build in exemp-
tions from pressures which operate in other organizational settings,
there must be a presumption that the model incumbent can be trusted
to perform his expected functions without the detailed controls
for instance, through market competition, bureaucratic enforcement
or democratic accountability to a defined constituency which operates
in other sectors. 9
9Ta.lcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt. The American University.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973,
Chapter IV,
p. 123.
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This conception of the role of a faculty member as a special
kind of professional" was suggested again and again in the interviews
with the University of Massachusetts faculty. Yet, through collective
bargaining
,
these assumptions came more and more under challenge. When
"push" comes to academic "shove," at least on the battleground of salary
and working conditions, the prized role model of the scholarly "individ-
ua l" the tradition of academic man—may be set aside in order that more
egalitarian tools can be used against those who would tamper with faculty
' 7
perogatives or benefits. To this degree, at least, democratic account-
ability in the words of Platt and Parsons takes the place of institution-
alized individualism.
The critical questions of course remain. Can a union contract
on a campus uphold a system of democratic accountability while permit-
ting the older values of the individual scholarly professional to be
sustained? Will the bargaining tables become the final arbiter of aca-
demic values? The fundamental question which follows is whether increased
unionization of faculties will affect the traditional measures of "qual-
ity" in higher education in America. Yet, related to this question is
another: is this "quality" under siege anyway, though from other sources?
At the time of the interview, in the spring of 1974, the Amherst campus
faculty did not know the answers to these questions, although many had
strong opinions. At the present time, many of these same faculty, now
unionized, probably have no more definitive answers. One must assume,
however, that the 1977 faculty group felt sufficiently dissatisfied with
changes in the general campus "climate" to justify a majority to choose
a bargaining agent as their representative. It should be noted here that
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the faculty voting in the February of 1977 election was not the same
faculty group as voted in November of 1973. In fact, some might argue
that the inclusion of the Boston campus faculty of the University of
Massachusetts lent a different perspective on the election and, there-
fore, may have altered the outcome of the vote. However
* since no study
has been made of actual faculty voting behavior in the 1977 election (by
campus), this theory must remain pure conjecture
.^) It may be that it was
Q
not faculty attitudes toward unionism which had changed as much as their
' tf
attitudes towards the conditions of their "profession" had changed in
the wake of the growing academic austerities. The study of the 1973
elections permits the speculation that more faculty in 1977 were like
their colleagues in the schools of Education and Agriculture three years
before. They felt greatly enough angered by the current situation to
risk changing the status quo . ) In summary, it would seem that the intru-
sions into the Amherst campus by 'the office of the University President,
the increased influence of the governor's office on the University's bud-
get, and increasing bureaucratization of the campus itself provided the
sparks that illuminated urgent and critical need for change.
In 1973, what had seemed a status quo worth preserving had pre-
sumably come by 1977 to be an illusory dream. A union might be seen as
a path into the unknown, leading far from the secure environs of the aca-
demic groves. In 1973, the faculty was not ready to forsake their sense
of privilege and academic community and take so fundamental a step into
an unknown world. Four years later, issues which were believed by
the
majority, to adversely effect the lives of faculty, would cause them to
unionize and become part of a slow but steadily growing labor
force in
America
.
277
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AAUP Bullet in. "The Statement of Collective Bargaining," 58, 4 (December
1971): 423.
AAUP Policy Documents and Reports. Washington, D.C.: AAUP, 1971.
AAUP Policy Documents and Reports. Washington, D.C.: AAUP, 1973.
*
AAUP Redbook. Washington, D.C.: American Association of University
Professors, October, 1972.
Agreement Between the Board of Trustees of State Colleges and the Boston
State College Faculty Federation, American Federation of Teachers,
1943, AFLCIO, April 3, 1972.
Agreement Between the Board of Trustees of State Colleges and the Worcester
State College Faculty Federation, Local 1270, American Federation
of Teachers, AFLCIO, September 28, 1972.
Anderson, Charles H. and Murray, John D., eds. The Pro f essors: Work and
Lifestyles Among Academicians. Cambridge: Schirkman Publishing
Company, Inc., 1971.
Aussieker, Bill. "Bargaining Without Unions in California," Industrial
Relations 13, 1 (February 1974): 40-49.
Aussieker, Bill and Garbarino, Joseph. "Measuring Faculty Unionism:
Quantity and Quality," Industrial Relations XII, 2 (May 1973):
117-124.
Aussieker, Bill and Garbarino, Joseph. "Reply to Dr. Gold," Industrial
Relations 13 (October 1974): 332-334.
Ballentine , Law Dictionary . Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Cooperative
Publishing Company, 1948 Edition.
Barbash, Jack. "Academicians as Bargainers with the University," Issues
in Industrial Society 3 (1970): 22-28.
Bayer, Alan E. "College and University Faculty: A Statistical Description,"
ACE Research Reports 5, 5 Washington, D.C.: Office of Research, ACE,
1970.
278
• i •
•
Bayer, Alan E. "Teaching Faculty in Academe," ACF. Research Reports 8, 2.
Washington, D.C.: Office of Research, ACE, 1973.
Bedford, Henry F. Socialism and the Workers in Massachusetts: 1886-1912
,
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966.
Begin, James P. and Chernick, Jack. "Collective Bargaining Agreements:
Grievance and Job Allocation Provisions," The Journal of CUPA
23, 3 (May 1971): 52-63.
Begin, James P. "Collective Bargaining Agreements in Colleges and Univer-
sities: Union Activity, Pay provisions, Employee Benefits, Pro-
cedural Clauses," The Jourrtal of CUPA 22 (August 1971): 27-38.
Begin, James P.
si ties
:
series)
"Collective Bargaining Agreements in Colleges and Unlver-
Union Security Provisions," The Journal of CUPA (2nd in
23, 22 (March 1971): 33-43.
^,-V Begin, James P. "Faculty Governance and Collective Bargaining; An Early
Appraisal," Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service,
May, 1974 (mimeographed).
Begin, James P. "Faculty Bargaining in 1973: A Loss of Momentum?," The
Journal of CUPA 25, 2 (April 1974): 74-81.
Begin, James P. "Employee Organization Among Members of the CUPA," The
Journal of CUPA 22, 1 (December 1970): 12-26.
Belcher, A. Lee; Avery, Hugh P. ; and Smith, Oscar S. Labor Relations in
Higher Education. Washington, D.C.: College and University Per-r
sonnel Association, 1971.
Belik, Albert. "Public Employee Unionism is Here to Stay," The Journal of
CUPA 25, 2 (April 1974): 99-103.
Bell, Daniel. The Reforming of General Education . Garden City, New York:
Anchor Book, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968.
Ben-David
,
Joseph. "Professions in the Class System," Current_
S
ociology
12 (196*3-1964): 247-330.
Bernard, Jessie. "Teachers and Professors: Subject Matter Areas," m
The Professors: Work and Lifestyles Among Academicjans , edited
by^Charles H. Anderson and John D. Murray. Cambridge:
Schirkman
Publishing Company, Inc., 1971.
279
Bernstein, Merton C. "Alternatives to the Strike, The Non-Stoppage Strike "AAUP Bulletin 58, 4 (December 1972): 404-412.
Birnbaum, Robert. "Unionization and Faculty Compensation," Educational
Record 55, 1 (Winter 1974): 29-32.
Blaclcj—Law Dictionary. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company,
1951 (4th Edition)
.
Bodner, Gerald A. "The No Agent- Vote at N.Y.U.: A Concise Legal History,"
Washington, D.C.: Academic Collective Bargaining Information
Service, August, 1974.
v Bok, Derek, C. and Dunlop, John T. Labor and the American Community
,
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
Bonham, George W. "The Carbondale Disease," The editorial Change Magazine
6, 4 (May 1974): 11-14.
Borg, Walter. Educational Research: An Introduction . New York: David
McKay, 1965,
/Boyd, William B. "Collective Bargaining in Academe: Causes and Conse-
quences," Liberal Education 57, 3 (October 1971): 306-318.
4** Boyd, William B. "The Impact of Collective Bargaining on University
Governance," Association of Governing Board Reports 16, 3 (November/
December 1973): 26-31.
Boyer, William W. "The Role of Department Chairmen in Collective Bargain-
ing: The University of Delaware Experience," The Journal of CUPA
25, 2 (April 1974): 49-54.
Brogan, Howard. "Faculty Power: Pretense and Reality in Academic Govern-
ment," Journal of Higher Education 40, 1 (January 1969): 23-30.
Brown, Hartna A. "Collective Bargaining on the Campus: Professors
Associations and Unions," Labor Law Journal (March 1970): 167-181.
Brown, Ralph S. Jr. "Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," Michigan
Law Review 67 (March 1969): 1067-1082.
280
Brown, Ronald C. "Professors and Unions: The Faculty Senate, An Effective
Alternative to Collective Bargaining in Higher Education?," William
and Mary Law Review 12 (Winter 1970): 252-270.
Browning, Robert A. Collective Bargaining in Massachusetts Schools
.
E. Weymouth, Mass.: Denison Press, Inc., 1968.
Brumbaugh, Robert B. and Flango, Victor E. "Preference for Bargaining
Representative: Some Empirical Findings," Report No. 4. Kutztown:
Kutztown State College Education Development Center, May, 1972.
Buclclew, Neil S. "Administering a Faculty Agreement," Journal of the Col -
lege and University Personnel Association 22 (May 1971): 46-51.
Carr, Robert K. and Van Eyck, Daniel K. Collective Bargaining Comes to the
Campus . Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1973.
Cary, Harold Whiting
. The University of Massachusetts: A Hi s tory of 100
Years . Springfield, Mass.: Walter Whittum, Inc., 1962.
Christenson, Arlen. "Collective Bargaining in a University: The University
of Wisconsin and the Teaching Assistants Association," Wisconsin Law
Review 1971, 1: 210-228.
Clark, Burton R. "Interpretations of Academic Professionalism," in The
Emerging University and Industrial America , edited and introduced
by Hugh Hawkins. Lexington, Mass.: Heath and Company, 1970.
Clark, Burton R. The Open Door College: A Case Study (Carnegie Series)
.
New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1960.
Coe, Alan Charles. "A Study of the Procedures Used in Collective Bargaining
With Faculty Unions in Public Universities," The Journal of CUPA
24, 2 (March 1973): 1-22.
Cole, Stephen. The Unionization of Teachers: A Case Study of the UFT .
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.
Committee on Repre sentation . "Background Memorandum on Recent Issues
~Conc erning University Governance and Faculty Representation,’
AAUP, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, July, 1970 (mimeo-
graphed) .
281
Crane, William.
December
Letter to the Editor,"
17, 1973.
The Chronicle of Higher Education .
Dale, Verda.. "Faculty Collective Bargaining: Special Report of the FacultyAffairs Committee," University of Massachusetts, Amherst. A reportprepared for the 171st meeting of the Faculty Senate on March 4
1971, Senate Document 71-028.
Davis, Bertram H. "Unions and Higher Education: Another View," AAUP
Bulletin 54 (September 1968): editorial page.
"The Decision of the New Jersey Superior Court (AAUP et . al. vs. Bloomfield
College et. al.)," AAUP Bulletin- 60. 3 (Autumn 1974): 320-330.
Dembart, Lee. "The Public Disdain of Public Employees," (Week in Review),
Sunday New York Times (June 27, 1976): 3.
t
Demerath, Nicholas J; Stephens, Richard; and Taylor, Robb R. Power, Presi-
dents, and Professors
. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 19677*
Doh, Herman. "Collective Bargaining in SUNY : The Story of the Senate
Professional Association," The Journal of CUPA 25, ] (January 1974):
22-39.
Doh, Herman and Johnson, Stanley. "Collective Bargaining in SUNY: The
Experience of FFB Local SPA Leaders During the First Year," The
Journal of CUPA 25, 2 (April 1974): 55-73.
Dunlop, John T. and Healy, James J. Collective Bargaining, Principles
,
and Cases . Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963, Revised
Edition.
jl >. Duryea, E. D. and Fisk, Robert S. "Impact of Unionism on Governance," in
The Expanded Campus: Current Issues in Higher Education
,
edited
by Dvckman W. Vermilye. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass,
Inc.', 1972.
Duverger, Maurice. Art Introduction to the Social Sciences With Specia l
Reference to Their Methodology. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1964.
Emmet, Thomas Dr. "Public Legislation for Post-Secondary Institutions,"
Special Report No. 4. Washington, D.C.: Academic Collective
Bargaining Information Service, August, 1974.
282
Faculty Collective Bargaining Notes.
Pierce Lets Chips Fall Where
Education
. December 2, 1974,
’’Faculty Participation at Franklin
They May," The Chronicle of Higher
p. 6.
Faculty Participation in Strikes," AAUP Bulletin. (AAUP Polirv on
54 (Summer 1968): 157. ;
4*-^ Falcone, Michael A. "Collective Bargaining: Its Effects on Campus Govern-
ance, Washington, D.C.:, Academic Collective Bargaining Information
Service, Report No. 16, February, 1975.
Fein, Sherman E. A Proposal for the Arbitration of Academic Freedom and
Tenure Disputes, Ed.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts
195?:
reinsinger
,
Nathan P. and Roe, Eleanore J. "The University of Wisconsin,
Madison Campus—TAA Dispute of 1969-70: A Case Study," Wisconsin
Lav Review 1971, 1: 229-274.
'
Ferber, Marianne A. "Professors, Performance and Rewards." Industria l
Relations 13, 1 (February 1974): 69-77.
Ferguson, Tracy H. "Collective Bargaining in Universities and Colleges,"
Labor Law Journal (December 1968): 778-804.
Ferguson, Tracy H. and Bergan, William L. "Grievance - Arbitration
Procedures and Contract Administration," in booklet. Unionization
on the College Campus . Reprinted from Journal of College and
University Law through joint cooperation of the National Assoc-
iation of College and University Attorneys and the Academic
Collective Bargaining Information Service, Summer, 1974.
Feuille, Peter. "Faculty Unionism Among the Fir Trees," Industria l
Relations 13, 1 (February 1974): 50-68.
Finkin, Matthew. "Collective Bargaining and University Government,"
Wisconsin Law Review 1971, 1: 125-149.
283
Garbarino, Joseph W. "Creeping Unionism and the Faculty Labor Market,"
prepared for the Higher Education and the Labor Market, forth-
coming publication of the Carnegie Commission, 1971.
Garbarino, Joseph W. "Faculty Unionism from Theory to Practice,"
Industrial Relations 11. 1 (February 1972). Reprinted by
Carnegie Commission.
Garbarino, Joseph W. "Faculty Unionism in the West: Symposium Intro-
duction," Industrial Relations 13, 1 (February 1974): 1-4.
Garbarino, Joseph W. "Precarious Professors: New Patterns of Repre-
sentation," Industrial Relations 10 (February 1971): 1-20.
Reprinted by Carnegie Commission.
r
Garbarino, Joseph W. "Professional Negotiations in Education" Industrial
Relations 7 (February 1968): 93-106.
Graham, Harry E; Sinicropi, Anthony V. and Veglahn, Peter A. "The Extent
of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: A Pilot Study,"
The Journal of CUPA 24, 3: 45-59.
Gram, Christine E. G. H. "Impact of Collective Bargaining on Faculty
Salary Structures in Michigan Community Colleges." Ph.D.
dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1971.
Haehn, J. 0. "A Study of Trade Unionism Among State College Professors."
Ph.D. dissertation, The University of California at Berkeley,
1969.
Hatcher, Harron. "Address," as cited by Ronald C. Brown. Professors
and Unions: The Faculty Senate: An Effective Alternative to
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," William and Mary
Law Review 12, 2 (Winter 1970): 271.
Haug, Marie R. and Sussman, Marvin B.
1 Professionalization and Unionism.
A Jurisdictional Dispute?," American Behavioral Scientist 14, 4
(March, April 1971): 525-540.
Hawkins, Hugh, ed
.
Lexington:
The Emerging University and Industrial America,
d7~C. Heath and Company, 1970.
284
i
Hechinger, Fred M. "Unions on the Campus," New York Times
, (Week in Review,
Education Section), December 1, 1968, p. 7B.
Hixon, Richard A. "Problems in Negotiating for Professors," Colleges and
Universities Department, American Federation of Teachers, November
1970.
Hodgkinson, Harold L. "Collective Governance: The Amazing Thing is That
it Works at All," Report No. 11, Eric Clearinghouse on Higher
Education, July, 1971.
Hofstadter, Richard. Academic Freedom in the Age of the College
,
New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969.
Hofstadter, Richard and Metzger, Walter. The Development of Academic
Freedom in the United States . Ne^j York: Columbia University
Press, 1955.
Hughs, C. "Collective Bargaining and the Private Colleges," Intellect
101 (October 1972): 41-42.
Jacobson, Sol. "Faculty Collective Bargaining at the City University of
New York," School and Society 99, 2335 (October 1971): 346-349.
Jencks, Christopher and Riesman, David. The Academic Revolution . Garden
City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969.
Jones, Dallas L. "Arbitration and Industrial Discipline," Report No. 14,
Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations,
The University of Michigan, 1961.
Kadish, Sanford. "Comment," AAUP Bulletin (March 1972): 58-59.
Kadish, Sanford. "The Strike and the Professoriate," AAUP Bulletin 54, 2
(Sximmer 1968): 160-168.
Kadish, Sanford* VanAlstyne, William W. ; and Webb, Robert K. The Mani-
fest Unwisdom of the AAUP as a Collective Bargaining Agency: A
Dissenting View," AAUP Bulletin 58, 1 (March 1972): 57-61.
285
Keast, William R. and Macy
,
John W. Jr. Faculty Tenure: A Report and
Recommendations by the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher
Educatio n. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers? 1973.
Keck, Donald J. "Faculty Governance and the ’New Managerial Class,'"
National Education Association Reports
. No. 5, November, 1971.
Kelley
,
Edward P. Jr. "Update on College Campuses Having Undergone
Collective Bargaining October 19, 1974," Academic Collective
Bargaining Information Service, October, 1974.
Kennedy, Ralph E. "National Labor Relations Board Report D-9709 on
"Northeastern University." Printed by NLRB and reprints made
available to University of Massachusetts Department Chairmen
in Fall, 1975.
(
1
Kriegel, Leonard. "Surviving the Apocalypse: Teaching at City College,"
Change (Summer 1972).
Kugler, Israel. "The Union Speaks for Itself," Educational Record (Fall
1963): 414-418.
Kugler, Israel and Brown, Ralph S. "Collective Bargaining for the Fac-
ulty," Liberal Education LVI (March 1970): 72-85.
Ladd, Everett C. Jr. and Lipset, Seymour Martin. Professors, Unions, and
American Higher Education . Berkeley, California: Carnegie Com-
mission, August, 1973.
Ladd, Everett C. Jr. and Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Unionizing the Profes-
soriate," 5, 6 Change (Summer 1973): 38-44.
Leslie, David W. and Satryb, Ronald P. "Management of Conflict: Collec-
tive Bargaining and the Proposed Research Directions," The Journal
of CUPA 25, 2 (April 1974): 512-522.
Lieberraan, Myron. "Preface: Collective Negotiations in Higher Education,"
Wisconsin Lav; Review 1971, 1: 1.
Lieberman, Myron.
61-70.
"Professors, Unite!" Harpers Magazine (October 1971):
286
Light
,
Richard V. "The Faculty Credit Hour: A Definition of Workload,"
Association of Governing Boards Reports 16, 9 (July/August 1974).
Lindermann, L. W. "Five Most Cited Reasons for Faculty Unionization,"
Intellec t 102 (November 1973): 85-88.
Livingston, Frederick R. and Christensen, Andrea S. "State and Federal
Regulations of Collective Negotiations in Higher Education,"
Wisconsin Law Review 1971, 1: 91-111.
Livingston, John C. "Collective Bargaining and Professionalism in Higher
Education," Educational Record 48, 1 (Winter 1967): 79-88.
Lorenz, Fred J. "Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," The Journal
of CUP
A
23 (December 1971).
,
Lozier, G. Gregory. "A Classic Vote for No Representation: Michigan
State University," Academic Collective Bargaining Information
Service, Washington, D.C., January, 1974.
Lozier, G. Gregory. "Changing Attitudes Toward the Use of Strikes in
Higher Education," The Journal of CUPA 25, 2 (April 1974): 41-48.
Lozier, G. Gregory and Mortimer, Kenneth P. "Anatomy of a Collective
Bargaining Election in Pennsylvania's State-Owned Colleges,"
Center for the Study of Higher Education, The Pennsylvania State
University, February, 1974.
Lussier, Virginia Lee. "Albion College Votes No Agent : A Case Study,
Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service, Special Report
No. 7, Washington, D.C., July, 1974.
Lussier, Virginia Lee. "National Faculty Associations in Collective
Bargaining: A Comparative Discussion." Washington, D.C.:
Academic Collective Bargaining Information Service, Special
Report No. 8, July, 1974. (Unpublished Reports).
McConnell, Thomas R. and Mortimer, Kenneth P. The Faculty in University
Governance . Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in
Higher Education, 1971.
287
\
McConnell, Thomas R. The Redistribution of Power in Higher Education:
Changing Patterns of Internal Governanc e. Berkeley: Center
for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1971.
McCough, George. "A Letter to the Editor," Congress News
, August 23, 1971.
McDowell, Banks, "Should University Faculties Be Unionized?," The Boston
Globe
,
June 18, 1972, p. 32 (Editorial).
*
McHugh, William F. "Collective Bargaining With Professionals in Higher
Education: Problems in Unit Determination," Wisconsin Law Review
1971, 1: 55-90.
,
McKnight, William E. "NLRB Unit Determinations at Private Institutions
of Higher Learning," The Journal of CUPA 24, 2 (April 1973):
23-36.
McLaughlin, Mary M. "Intellectual Freedom and Its Limitations in the
University of Paris in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries."
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952.
Maeroff, Gene. "Study of College Degree Finds its Value Declining,"
New York Times
,
August 14, 1975, p. 1.
I
Malatnud, Phyllis. "Faculty: Labor or Management?," Change 3, 5 (September
1971): 2C-21
.
Mannix, Thomas. "Community College Grievance Procedures: A Review of
Contract Content in (94) Ninety-Four Colleges," The Journal of
CUPA 25, 2 (April 1974): 23-40.
Marmion, Harry A. "Unions and Higher Education," Educational Record
49, 1 (Winter .1968): 41-48.
Martin, Theordore D. Building A Teaching Profession . Middletown, New
York: The Whitlock Press, 1957.
Marx, Andrew. "Discontent With Wood Growing Among Faculty," The Amherst
Record
,
August 6, 1975, pp. 1 & 4.
Mason, Henry L. College and University Government: A Hanbook. o.f_ Principle
and Practice. New Orleans'" Tulane University Press, 1972.
288
Means, Howard B. and Sernas, Philip W.
,
eds. A Chronicle of Higher Education
Handbook: Faculty Collective Bargainin g. Washington, D.C.:
Editorial Projects for Education, The Chronicle of Higher Education
.
Metzger, Walter P. ''Two Historical Interpretations of Universities and
Business," in The Emerging University and Industrial America,
edited by Hugh Hawkins. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company
1970, pp. 69-78.
Michigan State University Faculty Affairs Committee, "An Impartial Review
of Collective Bargaining By University Faculties," March 9, 1971
(mimeographed).
Mintz, Bernard. "The CUNY Experience," Wisconsin Law Review 1 (1971):
112-124.
‘
Mintz, Bernard and Golden, Allan. "Faculty Collective Bargaining and the
Arbitral Process," The Journal of CUPA 25, 3 (July/August 1974):
33-39.
Moore, John William. "Attitudes of Pennsylvania Community College Faculty
Toward Collective Negotiations in Relation to Their Sense of Power
and Sense of Mobility." Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State
University, 1970.
Mortimer, Kenneth P. and Lozier, G. Gregory. "Collective Bargaining:
Implications for Governance." University Park, Pennsylvania:
Center for the Study of Higher Education, 1972.
Moskow, Michael. "The Scope of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education,"
Wisconsin Law Review 1971, 1: 33-54.
Moskow, Michael H.; Loewenberg, Joseph J.; and Koziara, Edward C. Collec-
tive Bargaining in Public Employment . New York: Random House,
1970.
Nelson, Richard R. and Doster, James L. "City Employee Representation
and Bargaining Policies." U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, November, 1972.
Nigro, Peter D. "What Does A Unionized Faculty Mean?," College Managemen t,
(January 1970): 40-41.
289
Parsons, Talcott and Platt, Gerald M. The American University. Cambridpp*
Harvard University Press, 1973.
Ping, Charles J. On Learning to Live With Collective Bargaining," The
Journal of Higher Education 44. 2 (February 1973): 102-113.
Pitts, Jesse R. "Strike at Oakland University," Change 4, 1 (February
1972): 16-19.
Platt, Gerald M. and Parsons, Talcott. "Decision Making in the Academic
System: Influence and Power Exchange," edited by C. E. Kruytbosch
and S. L. Mes singer. The State of the University: Authority and
Change
,
Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1970,
pp. 133-180.
Proulx, Pierre-Paul. "Collective Negotiations in Higher Education:
Canada," Wisconsin Law Review 1 (1971): 177-186.
Raskin, A. H. "Shanker’s Great Leap," New York Times
,
Sunday, September
9, 1973, p. 74.
Raskin, A. H. "Unionism and the Content of Education: What are the
Bounds?,” New York Times
,
January 8, 1973, cited by Everett C.
Ladd and Seymour M. Lipset. Professors, Unions and American
H igher Education
,
Berkeley, California: Carnegie Commission,
August, 1973, p. 90.
Rehmus
,
Charles M. "Collective Bargaining for Academic Personnel,"
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 8 (Autumn 1968)
:
7-13.
The
"Report of the Adhoc University Committee on Collective Bargaining," at
Michigan State University, January 31, 1972 (unpublished).
Riesman, David; Gusfield, Joseph; and Gamson, Zelda. Academic Values
and Mass Education
,
New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
Anchor Books, 1971.
Rudolph, Frederick. The American College and University . New York:
Random House, Vintage Books, 1962.
290
Sandler, Bernice. "Women on Campus and Collective Bargaining: It Doesn't
Have to Hurt to Be a Woman in Labor," The Journal of CUPA 25, 2
(April 1974): 82-89.
Sands, C. Dallas. "The Role of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education,"
Wisconsin Law Review 1971, 1: 150-176.
Scheier, Robert. 'What's MSP-AAUP All About, Anyway?," Massachusetts
Daily Collegian
,
November 15, 1973.
Schein, Edgar H. Professional Education: Some New Directions
,
Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education Series, No. 10. Berkeley,
California: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972.
Schmeller, Kurt R. "Collective Bargaining and Women in Higher Education,"
College and University Journal 12, 3 (May 1973): 34-36.
t
Schmidt, Charles T. Jr.; Parker, Hyman; and Repas, Bob. "A Guide to
Collective Negotiations in Education." East Lansing: Social
Science Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1967.
Seidman, Joel; Kelley, Lane; and Edger, Alfred. "Faculty Bargaining
Comes to Hawaii," Industrial Relations 13, 1 (February 1974):
5-22.
Sernas
,
Phillip W. "Four More Faculties Reject Unionization: Runoff Due
At N.Y.U.," The Chronicle of Higher Education , November 26, 1973,
p . 1
.
Sernas, Phillip W. "Hawaii Faculty Turns Down Union Contract," The
Chronic le of Higher Education , December 3, 1973, p. 1.
Sernas, Phillip W. "New Jersey Teachers Vote 3-1 for Strike," The Chron-
icle of Higher Education , December 10, 1973, p. !•
Sernas, Phillip W. "Two Courts Limit Topics That Must be Bargained,"
The Chronicle of Higher Education , February 17, 1976, p. 8.
Sernas, Phillip W. "Union Hits MUP for its Position on Tenure Quotas,
The Chronicle of Higher Education, December 10, 1973, pp. 1 <*
291
Sernas, Phillip W. "Union is Given 50-50 Chance at the University of
Massachusetts," The Chronicle of Higher Education, November 12
1973, pp. 1 & 8. ~
Sernas, Phillip W. "Union’s New Chief Sets Sights on Colleges," The
Chronixle of Higher Education
. September 3, 1974, pp. 1 & 4.
Shark, Alan R. "Current Status of College Students in Academic Collective
Bargaining," Washington, D.C.: The Academic Collective Bargaining
Information Service, Summer, 1975.
Shark, Allan R. "Letters to the Editor," New York Times. December 16
1972.
Shark, Allan R. "Student’s Right to Collective Bargaining," Change
(April 1973): 9 & 62.
Sherman, Frederick E. and Loeffler, David. "Universities, Unions, and
the Rule of Law: The Teaching Assistants at Wisconsin," Wiscon-
sin Law Review 1971, 1: 187-209.
Stevens, Carl M. "The Management of Labor Disputes in the Public Sector,"
AAUP Bulletin 58, 4 (December 1972): 399-403.
Strohm, Paul. "Faculty Search Committee and Review Committees: What to
do Until the Bargaining Agent Comes," AAUP Bulletin 60, 3
(Autumn 1974): 288-290.
"Tenured Faculty Members at U.S. Colleges and Universities, AAUP Survey,
Economic Status of the Professor," The Chronicle of Higher Educa-
t ion
,
July 21, 1975, p. 11.
Tice, Terrence N. and Holmes, Grace W. eds. Faculty Bargaining in the
Seventies . Ann Arbor, Michigan: The Institute of Continuing
Legal Education, 1973.
Tippo, Oswald. "Letter to the Editor," in The Amherst Record , November
14, 1973.
Tyler, Gus. "The Faculty Joins the Proletariat," Change 3, 8 (Winter
1971-1972): 40-45.
292
Van Dalen, Diobold V. Understanding Educa tional Research. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962
Veblen, Thornstein. The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on
the Conduct of Universities by Business Men . New York: Huebsch
,
1918. Reprint edition, New York: Hill and Wang, American
Century Series, 1957.
Walker, J. Malcolm. "Transition to Bargaining in a Multi-Campus System,"
Industrial Relations 13, 1 (February 1974): 23-39.
Walters, Donald E. "Collective Bargaining: Helping to Restore Collegi-
ality," The Chronicle of Higher Education
,
November 26, 1973,
p. 24.
Walters, Donald E. "Comment," College Management
,
May, 1973.
Walters, Donald E. and Graham, David L. "Bargaining Process," in Faculty
Unions, and Collective Bargaining
,
edited by Duryea, Fisk and
Associates. New York: Jossey-Bass Publisher, 1973, pp. 44-65.
Weinburg, William M. "Structural Realities of Collective Bargaining in
Public Higher Education," The Journal of CUPA 25, 2 (April 1974):
4-11.
Wolfe, Alan. "The Professional Mystique," in An End to Political Science
The Caucus Papers
,
edited by Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe. New
York: Basic Books, 1970, pp. 288-309.
Wollett
,
Donald. "The Status and Trends of Collective Negotiations for
Faculty in Higher Education," Wisconsin Law Review 1971, 1:
2-32.
Zald
,
Mayer N. Occupations and Organizations in American Society: The_
Organizat
i
on-Dominated Man ? Chicago: Markham Publishing Company,
1971.
293
APPENDIX 1
Letter to Faculty
Dear
During the month of April, I will be interviewing between 70 and
80 faculty members at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst campus,
on their perceptions of the MSP/AAUP election, November 15 and 16, 1973.
The material gathered from these interviews will be the basis for my
dissertation in the area of collective bargaining in higher education.
I am a candidate for the Ed.D. at the School of Education, University
of Massachusetts. *
v
In constructing a stratified sample for by study I chose tenure
status and school affiliation as the two variables. Within those
parameters the sample is random. I will be calling you within the next
ten days, and it would be very helpful to me if we could arrange a
time and place at your convenience for the interview. All the interviews
will be completely confidential.
My dissertation committee consists of the following members:
William Lauroesch, Chairman
Joseph D. Burroughs, Human Development
Robert R. Wellman, School of Education
Donald E. Walters, Negotiator for the Massachusetts State
College System.
Please feel free to call me or members of my committee if you
have any questions.
Sincerely,
Anne L. Bryant
222 Northeast Street, Apartment 12
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
413 253-7089
wf
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APPENDIX 2
Faculty Interview
April, 1974
Par t I : Attitudes Toward Unionism
1. When the term "collective bargaining" is used, what comes to your
mind?
. Is there a distinction in your mind between collective bargaining
(union) for blue collar workers and white collar workers? If yes,
what is the distinction?
3. Should faculty at a university/college be, involved in collective
bargaining?
4. Should collective bargaining in higher education include any or
all of the following:
V
a. Economic Issues: wages, salary, equity
b. Working Conditions: work load, advisee load
c. Job Security: promotion, grievance, tenure
d. Governance
5. Should faculty in higher education be able to strike?
6. Have you or has any member of your family ever been a member of a
local or national union?
Mother Father Sibling Wife Child
Which union?
7. Who would you include in a bargaining unit? (Explain generally what
a bargaining unit is to the faculty member.)
Part II: Faculty Attitudes Toward Current University of Massachusetts/
Amherst Situation
1. What did you perceive to be the major issues affecting the MSP-AAUP
election on November 15-16?
Could you state which of these affected your vote (prioritize and
discuss)
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2. Is salary an issue to you? Are you satisfied with your current salary
at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst?
3. Are you satisfied with your current working conditions at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts/Amherst
,
i.e., teaching load, number of advisees,
time for research, etc.?
4. Do you feel that you have been fairly treated in terms of promotion
and tenure at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst?
5. Do you think that the personnel policies are fairly implemented at
this University? (Are they effective?)
*»
i
Part III : Faculty Perception of University Governance and the Effect of
Collective Bargaining on University Governance
1.
In what areas should faculty have influence in university governance?
2. Should faculty have final authority over these matters, or should they
make recommendations to the:
Chancellor, President, or the Board of Trustees?
3. In your opinion, does the present system of faculty governance provide
for faculty voice over these matters adequately?
Very Well Fairly Well Not Very Well
4. Do you think that students should be involved in collective bargaining?
5. Are you familiar with the grievance procedures at the University of
Massachusetts/Amherst? Do you feel that these procedures are effective?
6. Would you rate the amount of time/interest which you spend on faculty
governance matters?
1 hour/month 1 hour /week 1 hour /day
less than above. more than above
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7. Do you think that a union contract might affect the quality of education
at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst? (Try to have faculty member
define "quality of education.")
Faculty Perceptions of Local Campus Issues and the Effect on
Their Vote
1. How did you become aware of the issues surrounding the election?
From another faculty member?
At a department meeting?
Through a CCF or MSP-AAUP newsletter?
Collegian?
University bulletin?
Other?
2. Would you explain your perceptions of the MSP-AAUP coalition?
3. On November 26, 1973, Governor Sargent sighed a new law enabling all
public employees to bargain for wages and hours. Would the earlier
passage of this law have affected your vote at the University of
Massachusetts/Amherst?
Yes No
4. Prior to November 15-16, 1973, had you heard about any of the state
college contracts negotiated in the past 16 months? If yes, what
had you heard?
Part V : Faculty Demographic Data
1. What is your age?
2. What is your sex?
3. What is your academic rank?
Instructor Assistant Professor Associate Professor
Professor Lecturer Other
4. Are you tenured? Yes No
5. If no, what is the nature of your contract?
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6.
What school are you affiliated with?
Food and Natural Resources
Business
Humanities
Social Science
Home Econoraics/Human Development
Engineering
Health Sciences
Natural Science
Education
Physical Education
7
.
How many years have you been at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst?
8.
Are you a member of a professional organization?
Name
•9. Do any of the following pertain to you?
Department Head Department Chairman/woman
Cluster Chairman/woman Program Director
10. It would be helpful to this analysis if you would tell me whether you
voted for or against the MSP-AAUP coalition. It will be kept in con-
fidence as will the entire interview.
Yes No
11. Are you a member of the Faculty Senate? Yes No
12. Are you a member of a University-wide committee? Yes No
13. Are you a member of a departmental committee? Yes No
Personnel? Yes No
APPENDIX 3 i
AAUP Policy Document and Reports
"Statement on Collective Bargaining
©b
299
Statement on Collective BargainingO O
The statement which follows was prepared by the Association's Committee N and
approved jor publication by the Council in October, 1972. It supersedes the Statement
of Policv on Representation of F.conoinie and Professional Interests, approved by the
Council in I96S and amended in 1969.
Collective bargaining, in offering a rational and equitable
means of distributing resources and of providing recourse
for an aggrieved individual, can buttress and complement
the sound principles and practices of higher education
which the American Association of University Professors
has long supported. Where appropriate, therefore, the
Association will pursue collective bargaining as a major
additional way of realizing its goals in higher education,
and it will provide assistance on a selective basis to inter-
ested local chapters. 1
As large segments of the American faculty community
manifest an interest in collective bargaining, there is a
pressing need to develop a specialized model of collective
bargaining in keeping with the standards of higher edu-
cation. From its vantage point as the paramount national
organization in formulating and implementing the prin-
ciples that govern relationships of academic life, the Asso-
ciation has the unique potential, indeed the responsibility,
to achieve through its chapters a mode of collective bar-
gaining consistent with tlx best features of higher edu-
cation To leave the shaping of colle’ctivc bargaining to
organizations lacking the established dedication to prin-
ciples developed by the Association and widely accepted
by the academic community endangers those principles
To the extent that the Association is influential in t’nc
shaping of collective bargaining, the principles of academic
freedom and tenure and the primary responsibility of a
faculty for determining academic policy will be secured.
The long-. uncling programs of the Association are
means to achieve a number of basic ends at colleges and
universities: the enhancement of academic freedom and
tenure; of due process; of sound academic government.
Collective bargaining, properly used, is essentially another
means to achieve these ends, and at the same time to
strengthen the influence of the faculty in the distribution
of an institution's economic resources. The implementa-
tion of Association-supported principles, reliant upon pro-
1 Operating procedures for assisting chapters interested in
collective ha, g tiring arc available from the Associations
Washington Othcc.
fcssional traditions and upon moral suasion, can be effec-
tively supplemented by a collective bargaining agreement
and given the force of law.
Policy for a Chapter Which
Achieves Representative Status
A. When a chapter of the Association attains the status
of representative of the faculty, it will seek to:
1. Protect and promote the economic and professional
interests of the faculty as a whole in accordance
with the established principles of the Association.
2. Establish within the institution democratic struc-
tures vvhjch provide full paiticipaiion by all faculty
members in accordance with the Statement on y
Government of Colleges and Universities.
3. Obtain explicit guarantees of academic freedom and
tenure in accordance with the 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the
12I8Statemcnr on Procedural Standards in Faculty
Dismissal Proceedings, the 1971 Statement on Pro-
cedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrcncwa! of
Faculty Appointments, and other policy statements
of the Association.
4. Create an orderly and clearly defined procedure
within the faculty governmental structure for
prompt consideration of problems and grievances
of faculty members, to which procedure any
affected individual or group shall have full access.
B. In any agency shop or compulsory dues check-off
arrangement, a chapter or other Association agency
should incorporate provisions designed to accommodate
affirmatively asserted conscientious objection to such an
arrangement with any representative.
C. It is the policy of the Association (with which
chapters should comply whether or not they are acting in
a representative capacity) to call or support a faculty
strike or other work stoppage only in extraordinary situ-
ations which so flagrantly violate academic freedom or the
principles of academic government, or which are so re-
sistant to rational methods of discussion, persuasion, and
conciliation, that faculty members may feel impelled to
express their condemnation by withholding their services,
either individually or in concert with others. It should be
assumed that faculty members will exercise their right to
strike only if they believe that another component of the
institution (or a controlling agency of government, such
as a legislature or governor) is inflexibly bent on a course
which undermines an essential element of the educational
process. (See the Association’s provisional Statement on '
Faculty Participation in Strikes.)
APPENDIX 4
MSP-AAUP
Professional Unity Agreement
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This Agreement is entered into by the local chapter of
the Massachusetts Society of Professors, hereinafter called the
MSP, as a local affiliate of the Massachusetts Teachers
Association, hereinafter called the MTA
,
and the local chapter of
the American Association of University Professors, hereinafter
called the AAUP.
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS it is apparent to the membership of the Massachusetts
Society of Professors of the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst that the American Association of University Professors
carries with it great prestige , in the minds of the University
of Massachusetts faculty, and
WHEREAS it is apparent to the membership of the American
Association of University Professors of the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst that the Massachusetts Society of
Professors carries with it great power, expertise, and re-
sources in the matter of collective bargaining through its
affiliation with the Massachusetts Teachers Association and
through the latter with the National Education Association, and
WHEREAS the membership of the AAUP and the membership of the
MSP accept the principles of the AAUP "Red Book','' while main-
taining that for certain matters, including the rights of non-
tenured faculty, the "Red Book" must be strengthened and extended and,
WHEREAS it is clear to both parties that the organization of the
faculty of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst for the
purposes of collective bargaining is a matter of pressing and
urgent need, such that rapid certification of an effectual
legal bargaining representative is the most important consid-
eration /
BE IT RESOLVED, THEREFORE, that the membership of the Massachusetts
Society of Professors and the American Association of University
Professors at the University of Massachusetts at. Amherst will act
jointly in the natter of collective bargaining according to the
articles of association agreed to as follows:
ARTICLE I
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Public Higher Education in the Commonwealth is a highly complex
entity, necessarily subject to political influence, and constantly
involved in changes vital to its playing a continuing role of
service to the Commonwealth. The University faculty must play
a strong and important role in the structures and in the processes
of change in public Higher Education.
We believe that a united faculty, with its role in these structures
and
-
process es established legally through collective bargaining,
must constantly seek to uphold high professional standards in the
face of the pressures of stress and change in the University, while
contributing its expertise and experience to the formulation and
March 1973
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execution of educational policies in the Commonwealth.
he believe that as the situation on every campus is unique, a
collective bargaining organization should reflect the needs of
the particular campus, with no strictures imposed by state or
national organizations.
We believe that a collective bargaining organization should be
governed by the highest standards of professional conduct, and
that it should work for structures and changes consonant with
those standards.
Wc ievo that a balance of powers between the faculty and the
administrative structure of the University, given a legal basis in
a binding contract, is the best assurance of fruitful cooperation
between these two entities in the University.
Wc believe that a legally binding contract is the firmest safeguard
v of academic freedom and due process for all faculty, both tenured
and untenured, in a public system of higher education.
We bel
i
eve that a legally binding contract, developed through
collective bargaining, is the firmest assurance of full utilization
of faculty experience and expertise in the formulation of
University policies.
t
Wc believe that the principles which have in the past resulted
in our huid-won Personnel and Governance structures, principles
^
which are presently implemented through Personnel Committees,
through the evaluation of faculty on the has;.. vL individual per-
v formancc, and through the Faculty Senate of the University, must
in the future be given the legally effective status which a
v' Collective Bargaining contract can provide, if these principles
are to continue to serve the cause of quality education and academic
frecdoirt at the University.
ART I CPH II_
mi-.mbITrship
A. For the purposes of effective servicing of a contract, political
strength, and expertise in all matters relevant to concerns of
faculty in collective bargaining, the local bargaining agency
will be affiliated with the Massachusetts Teachers Association.
Membership in the MSP-AAUP-MTA bargaining unit will be open to
pny academic professional employee at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst in the following categories:
Professor
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor
Instructor
Librarians of ranks I through V
Chairpersons and Heads of Departments
Certain Program Directors
This bargaining unit membership will be subject to legal con-
firmation-
B. Members of the MSP-AAUP-MTA will pay the appropriate current
dues. (Sec Attachment A: "Dues Structure")
C. Payment of MSP, or AAUP, and Mi'A duos will be a requirement
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for membership commencing July 1, 1973.
D. Members of the MSP or AAUP at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst at the time of the ratification of this Agreement,
will automatically become members of the combined MSP-AAUP-MTA.
ARJIOT l^H
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
A. General Assembly:
1. Membership: the combined membership, in Rood standing,
of the MSP-AAUP-MTA shall constitute the General Assembly.
2. The General Assembly shall have the power to ratify a
collective bargaining agreement.
3. Voting ri gilts in the General Assembly slial 1 be on a "one-
man - one vote" basis.
4. The General Assembly shal 1 meet at least once during each
academic semester.
5. Signatures of 5 ?s of the members of the General Assembly
shall be sufficient to call a special meeting. The Chair-
person of the General Assembly shall call such a meeting
within two (2) weeks of receipt of written petition as
described herein.
6. Twenty-five percent (25*0) of the membership of the General
Assembly shall constitute a quorum.
B. Executive Board:
1. The MSP-AAUP-MTA Executive Board will be 'formed within
three (3) weeks of the ratification of this Agreement.
2. There will be ten (10) members on the Executive Board.
Seven (7) members will be designated by the membership
of the MSP-MTA, three (3) by the membership of the AA'JP-MTA,
to serve until three mon :hs before the expiration of the
first Collective Bargain. ng contract. At that time there
shall occur the annual election of the Executive Board
with its membership to be based proportionally on the
membership of AAUP-MTA and MSP-MTA. At no time, however,
shall representation of either the MSP-MTA or the AAUP-MTA
be less than one member of the Executive Board.
3. The Executive Board will supervise and set general policy
for the purpose of MSP-AAUP-MTA joint certification as a
collective bargaining agent.
4. Upon certification, the Executive Board will supervise
and set general policy for the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement.
5. The Executive Board will supervise and set general policy
for the enforcement of the negotiated collective bargaining
agreement
.
6. The Executive Board will be responsible for the day-to-day
affairs of the MSP-AAUP-MTA and for the general supervision
of officers and staff.
7. Members of the Executive Board will serve from time of election
until April 15, 1974. Thereafter the AAUP-MTA and the MSP-
MTA will conduct elections every year, according to the pro-
cedures outlined in Article II and in Article III. Such
elections shall be conducted no later than April 1.
8. The Executive Board shall advise and consent on all committee
appointments made by the Chairperson.
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C. Officers:
1. The Executive Board will select from within its own
membership a Chairperson, a Secretary and a Trcusurcr.
2. lhe duties of the Chairperson shall include:
al To act as spokesman for the General Assembly.
M To chair meetings of the executive Board.
c) To chair meetings of the General Assembly.
d) To call meetings of the General Assembly as specified
in Article II A.
e) To appoint special committees for research and negotiations
in connection with collective bargaining or any other
matter with the consent of the Executive Board.
3. The duties of the Secretary shall include:
a) The responsibility for recording and maintaining
the minutes and documents of the Executive Board and
the General Assembly.
b) lhe coordinating of secretarial and other support resources
for the General Assembly and the Executive Board.
c) To serve as Acting Chairperson in the absence of the
Chairperson
.
4. The duties of the Treasurer shall include the maintenance
of financial records, and the periodic reporting of the
financial status of the MSl’-AAUP-MIA bargaining unit.
ARTICLE IV
MISCELLANEOUS
,
A. The Executive Board shall have the power to interpret this
Agreement
.
B. The Agreement shall go into effect upon ratification by the
respective chapters and signature of appropriate MTA officers
and appropriate AAUP officers.
C. The MTA agrees to undertake responsibility for financing and
staffing of the certification process and the negotiation and
servicing of the contract. Financing and staffing will be
provided by the MTA consistent with MrA financing and staffing
policies.
D. This Agreement shall remain in effect for the duration of the
joint certification of MSP-AAUl’-MTA.
E. Amendments to this document shall be made only upon recommendation
of the Executive Board to the General Assembly at regularly
scheduled meetings. Ratification of such proposed amendments
by the General Assembly shall require a two-thirds (2/3)
affirmative vote. All amendments shall be distributed to the
membership at least two (2) weeks ahead of meetings. Upon
commencement of the second (2nd) collective bargaining contract,
amendments to this document may be recommended directly to
the General Assembly upon written petition of five percent (5%)
of the membership.
F. If an election for the determination of a collective bargaining
agent on the University of Massachusetts at Amherst campus is
not^ held before March 1, 1974, this Agreement will be submitted
to the membership of the participating organizations for re-
ratification.
Name
Address
I certify that I desire to be represented by an exclusive
bargaining agent for the purposes of collective bargaining
and the settlement of grievances, according to law, and
hereby designate and authorize the MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY
OF PROFESSORS-MASSACHUSETTS TEACHERS ASSOCI AT ION-AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS /AMHERST CHAPTER, its
agents or representatives, to petition for recognition and/
or certification by election in order that it may act in
that capacity on my behalf.
1 recognize my legal right to revoke thi3 authorization at
any time by written notification to the State Labor Re-
lations Commission.
Signature Date
Witness
(
This is NOT an application for membership in MSP-MTA-AAUP
.
Name.
Address
I certify that I desire to be represented by an exclusive
bargaining agent for the purposes of collective bargaining
and the settlement of grievances, according to law, and
hereby designate and authorize the MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY
OF PROFESSORS-MASSACHUSETTS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION-AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS/AMHERST CHAPTER, its
agents or representative^, to petition for recognition and
/
or certification by election in order that it may act in
that capacity on my behalf.
I recognize my legal right to revoke this authorization at
any time by written notification to the State Labor Re-
lations Commission.
Signature Date
Witness
This is NOT an application for membership in MSP-MTA-AAUP
.
ATTACHMENT "A"
The following dues structure will be obligatory:
I. Effective immediately upon ratification by both parties:
Local AAUP: $18.00 Local MSP: $3.00
MTA: $00.00 MTA: $15.00
Effective July 1, 1973:
-
Local AAUP: $4.00 Local MSP $3.00
MTA: $76.00 • MTA: - $76.00
National
:
optional National
:
optional
. Upon signing of first collective bargaining contract l
Local AAUP: $4.00 Local MSP: $3.00
MTA: $76.00 MTA: $76.00
National
:
$20 . 00-$36 . 00 National
:
$25.00
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Board of Trustees Statement on University Governance
I. TRUSTEE POLICY ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE
A. ENDORSEMENT OF AAUP STATEMENTS ON GOVERNANCE
1. The Board of Trustees has all authority, responsibility, rights, privileges,
powers and duties of organization and government of the University of Massachusetts as
provided in Chapter 75 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth. Nothing in the
following statement shall be taken as contravening that authority or any applicable
federal or state law or regulation; anything contravening such authority, law or
regulation is void.
2. Nevertheless, as an established university discharges its obligations and respon-
sibilities to society by the advancement and dissemination of knowledge, the variety
and complexity of its tasks require and ensure the interdependence of the governing
board, the administration, the faculty, and the students, a; well as other groups.
The Board of Trustees has long recognized this interdependence
,
both among campuses
within the system and among the various components within a campus, and now formally
/ adopts the principle of joint effort in governing the University.
3. Joint effort in University governance will take a variety of forms depending on
the issue and the situation, lhe administrative officers or the Board may in some
instances propose recommendations for the consideration 'o f the faculty and/or students
before taking final action. The faculty and/or students may in other instances pro-
pose recommendal ions subject only to the endorsement of the administration and the
Board. In all instances, however, the principle of joint effort requires that com-
ponents within the University remain sensitive to the intercscs of other components.
4.
The Board of Trustees therefore endorses in principle the 1966 Stat ement on
Government of Co lleges and Un iversi ties adopted by the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors, the American Council of Education, and the Association of Governing
Coacds of Universities and Colleges, and the 1970 statement on Student Participation
in Col lege and Urnve rs i tv Government formulated by the three aforementioned organiza-
tions, insofar as both are consistent with this Trustees' Statement on University
Governance. Tn endorsing these two statements, the Board, while retaining its ulti-
mate legal authority in governing the University, recognizes that the faculty, the
students, and other groups within the University have tne right, the responsibility,
and the privilege of advising on policies affecting the University. The Board will
ensure these rights, responsibilities, and privileges through the various governing
bodies --both representative bodies such .as senates and assemblies, and administrative
bodies such as departments, schools, and colleges --established by its by-laws and
other actions.
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES IN GOVERNANCE
1. The Board of Trustees recognizes that while it must exercise general authority
over the University, certain components of the University, such as the President s
office, the campus administrations, and the representative and administrative gov-
erning bodies of the faculty and the students have, by virtue of interest, training,
and experience, u special concern and competence in certain areas. Subject tc prece-
dents established by components on each campus and/or the restraints and procedures
specified in their constitutions, these components shall have primary responsibility
in their areas of special competence and concern. Whenever the phrase 'primary
responsibility" appears in this statement, it shall mean the capacity to initiate
recommendations
,
after appropriate consultation, in accordance with the procedures
specified in section II. D below. Such recommendations will be overruled only by
written reasons stated in detail. While it in no way is intended. to contravene the
authority and participation of the Board of Trustees in governance, the following is
a general statement of primary responsibility in the major areas ot University .) e:
fiCAPKMIC MATTERS: By virtue of its professional preparation and its cential
'rn with learning and teaching, the faculty will exercise primary
responsibility
jeh academic matters ns curriculum, subler.t matter and methods ot instruction,
arch admissions , libraries, and other aspects of University
life which <W C tly
309
DOC. T73-098: 2
relate to the educational process. Student* shore this concern and they will be
assured the opportunity of participating In developing academic policies and In eval-
uating degrees, programs, and courses.
3. FACULTY STATUS: The faculty will hove primary resoonsiblllty for matters of
faculty status, such os appointments, re
-appointments
,
jiromot Ions
,
tenure, and.salary
adjustments. Students will also be assured the opportunity of participating in the
evaluation of a faculty member's effectiveness.
4. STUDENT AFFAIRS: Students will have primary responsibility for services and
activities which ore designed primarily to serve students or those which are financed
primarily by students, managing student political affairs and organizational matters,
and setting standards for student behavior, conduct, and discipline.
5. PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT AND BUDGET: The President is responsible for exerting edu-
cational leadership in the planning and development of the University, both before
the Board of Trustees and on the various campuses. He shall coordinate the planning
and development on the separate campuses, keep current a University master plan, and
ensure that all appropriate components of the University have the opportunity to make
recommendations before planning and development decisions are rendered. The President
is also responsible for coordinating, preparing, and presenting to the Board of
Trustees the University's annual budget request. He 6hall represent the budget re-
quest approved by the Board to the Governor and the General Court. Tne Chancellors
are responsible for coordinating, preparing, and presenting to the President budget
requests from the campuses. The President is responsible for continually improving
the budget process and developing a calendar which allows adequate time for consul-
tation and study by all interested components of the University.
1 1 . RESPONSIBILITIES, DUTIES, FUNCTIONS , AND PROCED'.B-'.r S OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES.
THE PRESIDENT. THE CAMPUS ADMIMS1 RATOi-S
,
AND THE CAMPUS GOVERNING BODIES IN UNIVER-
SITY GOVERNANCE
The Board of Trustees is the final authority in all matters concerning the University
of Massachusetts and may establish the general policies governing the University,
pursuant to Chapter 75 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth. Hie authority of the
Board shall include, but is not limited to, the following specific powers:
A. BOARD OF TRUSTEES
1. The Trustees will consider, upon the recommendation of the appropriate faculty
and student governing bodies and/or other appropriate groups, the academic plans,
personnel policies, and admissions policies of each campus and of the University as a
whole; plans for the establishment of new campuses, schools, institutes, and colleges,
and plans for the closing of already established units and programs.
2. The Trustees will consider, upon the recommendation of the appropriate governing
body(s), the establishment of degrees.
3. Hie Trustees will consider' the budget requests of the University and the capital
outlay budget requests and major amendments thereto. In addition, they will consider
new student housing and ocher loan construction programs, accept gifts, and approve
service agreements, rental agreements, and leases. Further they will consider
policies governing the solicitation of grants and research contracts*
4. Hie Trustees will appoint the President, the Chancellors,* the Treasurer, and the
Secretary of the University, set their salaries, end periodically evaluate their per-
formance. When appointing the President or a Chancellor the Board will seek nomina-
tions from a search committee appointed by the Board broadly representative of the
appropriate constituencies. The Board will determine the charge to and the composi-
tion cf the search committee after seeking the recommendations of the appropriate
campus governing body(s) and, when appropriate, other components of the University.
The Board will appoint faculty and student representatives to the search
committee
upon nomination by the appropriate governing body(s).
* Hie term "Chancellor" shall include the Dean of the
Medical School wherever
appropriate.
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5.
The Trustees will consider long range development and design plans for eachcampus in relation to long range academic plans and any major amendments to theseplans. They will approve consulting architects, landscape architects executive
dCSiFnS £01‘ bUlldin£S ^ °‘h “’ of puS^on the
T
^
UStCCS Wl11 conslder al * policies concerning the University’s relationship
with local, state, and federal governments and all policies concerning public infor-
mation. In this regard the Beard will consider policies concerning the University’s
relationship with other segments of higher education.
7. The Trustees will make the final selection of all honorary degree recipients and
will name all buildings and facilities.
B. PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY
1.
The President is the principal academic and executive officer of the University.
He will exercise executive authority over the campuses comprising the University
subject to the direction of the Board of Trustees. He will serve as chief spokesman
and interpreter of the University and represent it to the general public and its
representatives
.
2. The President will be responsible for presenting policy recommendations to the
Board of Trustees and ensuring that the campuses develop ways of implementing
Trustees' policy. He will develop, coordinate, and keep current a master plan of the
University, lie will be responsible for the coordination and preparation of the annual
budget request and its presentation to the Board of Trustees and to the Governor and
the General Court. He will also be responsible for the allocation of the appropriated
budget and all other funds.
3. The President will appoint, promote and grant salary adjustments to personnel in
the President's office. He will supervise the operations of the officers and 6taff
in the President's office.
4. The President will appoint the Vice Presidents with the concurrence of the Board
of Trustees.
5. The President will appoint members of the faculty to tenure with the concurrence
of the Board of Trustees.
6. The President will coordinate the work of all campuses of the University and
promote the general welfare of the University as a whole and in its several parts,
lie will ensure as much campus autonomy as possible commensurate with achieving the
central purposes of the University or fulfilling his duties as specified herein. The
President will establish and maintain an effective communications system within the
University that allows for the prompt identification of needs and problems and their
analysis. In particular, the President, in concert with the Chancellors, will ensure
that all appropriate components of the University have the opportunity to make recom-
mendations prior to the establishment of policy.
7. The President may refer for Investigation and report any matter of institutional
concern to administrative staff, governing bodies, faculty, or students. The channel
for official communications between the President and the verious campus groups in
such matters will be through the Chancellor.
C. CAMPUS CHANCELLOR
1. The Chancellor Is the chief academic and executive officer of the campus, lie
will exercise executive authority over the campus subject to the direction of the
President. He will be responsible to the President for administering the various
schools, colleges, divisions, departments, and other units on the campus.
2. In the formulation of policy the Chancellor will represent his campus to the
President and the Board of Trustees, and upon the adoption of policy he will ensure
its implementation on campus. He will develop, coordinate, and present to the
Pres-
ident immediate and long range plans for the campus . The Chancellor will
also coor-
dinate, prepare., and present to the President the annual budget request of
the campus
and oversee campus expenditures.
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3. Hie Chancellor will appoint the Vice Chancellors. the Trovost, and the Dean, ofthe campus with the concurrence of the President and the Board of Trustee*, set their
cell^'-tf"'5.
pcriodlcal
Jy ^
vall,atc performance. When appointing, a Vico Oian-Cd or with line responsibilities, a Provost, or a Dean, tho Chancellor will seek
nominations from a search conmittec broadly ropresontativc of the constituency of the
J
“ r
.
° be ®PP°^ted. The Chancellor and the appropriate governing body(t), rep-
resentative and/or administrative, will mutually spree upon the composition and the
charge of the search committee. The Chancellor will appoint faculty and student
body
C
(->
ntaLiVCS t0 thG SUarCh committce u pon nomination by the appropriate governing
U. The Ctiancel lor will nppolnc, promote, and grant salary adjustments to professional
and non-prolcss tonal personnel on campus.
5. The Chancellor will coordinate the work of the various units of the campus and
promote the general welfare of the campus as a whole and in its several parts. Hs
will ensure as much autonomy as possible to the various units of the campus commen-
surate with achieving the central purposes of the campus and the University as a
whole or fulfilling his duties as specified herein. He will assist the President in
maintaining an effective communications system within the campus that allows for the
prompt identification of needs and problems and their analysis. In particular, the
Chancellor will assist the President in ensuring that all appropriate components of
the campus have the opportunity to make recommendations prior to the establishment of
policy.
6. The Chancellor may refer for investigation and report any matter of institutional
concern to administrative staff, governing bodies, faculty, and students.
D. CAMPUS GOVERNING BODIES
I
1.
Faculty and students may be organized into governing bodies, such as senates and
assemblies, departments, schools, and colleges. The constitutions of the major gov-
erning bodies must be approved by the Board of Trustees.
2.
When appropriate, governing bodies shall have the privilege of recommending
policies and procedures affecting the campus and the University as a whole, including,
among other matters, academic matters, matters of faculty status, and student affairs.
Also when appropriate, governing bodies will have the privilege of contributing to
long range planning, the preparation of the annual budget request, and the allocation
of available resources.
3.
The Chancellor, the President, and -the Board of Trustees may approve recommenda-
tions from the campus representative governing bodies at any time. Subject to prece-
dents established by components of each campus and/or the restraints and procedures
specified in their constitutions, and in accordance with the preceding statements of
primary responsibility (Section I.B of this statement), recommendations adopted by the
campus representative governing bodies will become policy unless (1) disapproved or
sent back for reconsideration by the Chancellor within twenty days of receipt of noti-
fication from the governing body; (2) disapproved, sent back for reconsideration, or
deferred by the President within twenty days of receipt of notification of the Chan-
cellor's approval or within twenty days following the expiration of the twenty dey
period for the Chancellor's consideration; (3) disapproved by the President during a
special thirty dav deferral period (if the President chooses to defer his decision he
vill notify the governing body; the deferral period will begin at the end of the Pres-
ident's initial twenty day period of consideration); (A) disapproved by the Board of
Trustees within these specified time limitations. The governing bodies will notify
the Chancellor, the President, and the Board of Trustees of their actions as soon as
possible after their adoption. Any matter not acted upon within seventy days of re-
ceipt of notification by the Chancellor of an action by a governing body will be taxon
as approved by the Eoard of Trustees. When a recommendation is disapproved, the gov-
erning body vill receive r/ritten reasons in detail for the adverse decision.
III. MULTICAMPUS COMMITTEES
In recent years the University of Massachusetts has developed Into a multicampus
institution with campuses in Amherst, Boston, and Worcester. In order to coordinate
the various campuses of the University with the President's office, the Board of
Trustees establishes the following University committees, and also the following
procedures for forming multicampus ad hoc committees and study groups:
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A. MULTICAMPUS BUDGET COMMITTEE
1. The Multicampus 3udget Committee will advise the President on budget requests and
budget allocations In light of the long range plans and objectives of the University.
2. The Multicampus Budget Committee will be composed of no more than two faculty
members end two students each from the Arrhcrst, Boston, and Worcester campuses chosen
by the respective governing bodies. The President of Llie University or his repre-
sentative, the Chancellor of each campus or his representative, and the Chairman of
the Multicampus Planning Committee will serve on the Committee ex officio
.
The
Committee will elect its own Chairman from among its non-e_x o fficio members. Members
will report periodically to their respective constituencies on the deliberations of
the Committee.
3. The Multicampus Budget Committee will meet with the Multicampus Planning Committee
at least once a year to discuss matters of mutual concern.
B. MULTICAMPUS PLANNING COMMITTEE
1. The Multicampus Planning Committee will advise the President on the development,
coordination, and updating of a master plan for the future development of the Uni-
versity.
2. The Multicampus Planning Committee will be composed of no more than two faculty
members and one student each from the Amherst, Boston, and Worcester campuses chosen
by the respective governing bodies. The President of the University or his repre-
sentative, the Cnar.cellor of each campus or his representative, and the Chairman of
the Multicampus Budget Committee will serve on the Committee ox officio . The Com-
mittee will elect its own Chairman from among its non-ex officio members. Members
will report periodically to their respective constituencies on the deliberations of
the Committee.
3.
The Multicampus Planning Committee will meet with the Multicampus Budget Committee
at least once a year to discuss matters of mutual concern.
C. MULTICAMPUS AD HOC COMMITTEES AND STUDY GROUPS
1. From time to time multicampus ad hoc advisory committees and study groups may be
established by the President for the purpose of studying and making recommendations
on special problems and issues of University wide concern prior to action by the
President and the Board of Trustees. The composition, charges, and membership of suen
ad ho c coaimit tees and study groups will be drawn up in consultation with the appro-
priate campus governing bodies and the Board of Trustees.
2. Multicampus £d hoc committees and study groups will seek the advice of and, when
appropriate, submit their recommendations to the appropriate governing bodies and
administrative officials for comment and action prior to presenting a final report to
the President and the Board of Trustees. Members will report periodically to their
respective constituencies on the deliberations of the committee or study group.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Provisions for implementing the foregoing policies and procedures of
University
governance shall be subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees.
V. APPROVAL AND EVALUATION
The Board of Trustees reserves the right to alter, amend, or
revoke the foregoing^
§
Statement on University Governance, in part or in whole, at any
i .
the Board of Trustees will evaluate the foregoing policies
and procedures of Uni
versity governanci two years after their adoption.
Voted hy the Board of Trustees# April 4, 1973
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APPENDIX 6
Political Orientation Scale
The 1969 Survey
Disagree,
no place on campus
for faculty collec-
tive bargaining
Agree
,
faculty strikes
can be legiti-
mate action
Self -characterization
of politics as"left"
or "liberal"*
All faculty (n=60,028) 59 47 49
Academic discipline *
social sciences (n=7,053) 70 63 69
humanities (n=10,434) 65 56 60
natural sciences (n=12,783) 55 45 42
business applied (engineering,
business adm.
,
agricultural,
eto.) (n=8 , 229) 47 34 28
T
The 1972 Survey
Do you agree or disagree that the recent growth of
unionization of college and university faculty is
beneficial and should be extended?
Uncertain; Self-characterization
conflicting of politics as "left"
Agree assessments Disagree or "liberal"*
All faculty (n=471)
Academic discipline
social sciences and
43 13 44 49
humanities (n=182) 55 12 34 64
natural sciences (n=103)
business applied (engineer-
ing, business adm., agri-
40 14 46 43
cultural, etc.) (n=110) 28 15 57 23
*"rlcw would you characterize yourself at the present time?"
APPENDIX 7 i
Condensation of Labor Relations Commission
Definition of University of Massachusetts
Bargaining Unit
COMMONWEALTH 01' MASSACHUSETTS
BEFORE THE LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
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********* *************** * ^T**************^
In the matter of *
* *
* BOARD OF TRUSTEES, *
* UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, *
£ Employer *
* *
* and *
*
*
'* MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY OF PROFESSORS/ *
* FACULTY STAFF UNION *
* MASSACHUSETTS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION/NEA,
*
* Petitioners *
* *
* and *
* *
* AMHERST AND BOSTON CHAPTERS OF THE *
* AMERICAN ASSOCIATION CE *
* UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, *
* Interveners *
* * * * * * * * * * * *******************************
Case? Nos. SCR-2079,
SCR-2082
Date Issued:
October 22, 1976 ^
Commissioners participating
:
James S. Cooper, Chairman
Madeline H. Miceli, Member
Appearances
:
)
Esq. )
Arthur P. Menard, Esq.
Nicholas DiGj.ovanni, Jr.,
Joan G. Dolan, Esq.
Carolyn I. Folovry, Esq.
Counsel for
Counsel for
Counsel for
Counsel for
the Employer
the Employer
Petitioners
Interveners
AMENDED ORDER AND
DIRECTION OF ELECTION
The original Order and Direction of Election in this matter
neglected to include all positions listed in the Decision as included
within the appropriate unit. Furthermore, it is necessary to clarify
that the positions of Staff Associates and Staff Assistants are in-
cluded in the Direction of Election only for the purpose of participat-
ing in the election process. Persons holding those gob titles shall
vote subject to Commission challenge.
Page 1 of Pages
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University of Mass.
Amended Order SCR-2079,SCR-2082
Now, therefore, in accordance with the evidence and the stipulations
of parties, the Commission concludes:
1. That a question has arisen concerning the representation
of certain employees of the University of Massachusetts
within the meaning of Section 4 of the Law;
2. That the unit appropriate for collective bargaining is
as follows:
All faculty including:
Full Professors;
Associate Professors;
Assistant Professors;
Instructors;
Faculty of Stockbridge College;
Program Directors (not otherwise excluded)
Non-tenure track faculty;
v
Lecturers
;
Faculty on terminal contract^
Full-time faculty whose titles have
been changed
;
Visiting faculty in their second year
of teaching at the University;
Part-time faculty who have taught at
least one course for three consecutive
semesters or who have taught at least
one course for two consecutive semesters
and who are teaching their third conse-
' cutive semester;
^ Department chairmen;
^Cluster chairpersons;
.
Faculty members of Campus Governance
and Personnel Committees;
Librarians I-V;
Coaches who hold faculty rank;
Staff Associates and Staff Assistants
in the following programs
(at the specified locations)
:
At Boston: Tutorial Program; Academic, /vdvisors;
University Year for Action; . Vocational
Counseling ; Evaluation- Instructional
Specialists; Media Services; Cooperative
Education; Spanish-Speaking Student
Advisor; Center for Alternatives; Foreign
Student Academic Advisor.
Page 2 of 5 Pages
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At. Amherst: University Without Walls;
Communications Skills Program;
Women's Studies; Student
Development Center; Center
for Instructional Resources
and Improvement; Student
Center for Educational Research;
Language Laboratory; University
Year For Action; Center For
Outreach; Bilingual Collegiate
Program; Special Students'
Program; Media Center; Cassiac;
Inquiry Program.
Excluding
:
Deans, Associate and Assistant Deans,
Provosts, Assistant and /associate
Provosts
;
Teaching Fellow, Teaching Associates,
and Students;
Professors emeriti who are not eligible
in another category;
Director and Associate Directors of the
Amherst Library;
Director and Associate Director of the
Boston Library;
Extension Specialists;
County Extension Agents;
Visiting faculty employed by the federal
,
government;
Director of Control Services;
Director of Athletics;
Trainers and Physiotherapists;
Director of Public Health;
Director of Nursing;
Clinical nursing faculty and preceptors;
Adjunct faculty;
Director of the Center for International
Agriculture
;
Professor Adam Yarmolinsky and Professor
Franklin Patterson and all other
employees
.
3. That an election shall be held for the purpose of determining
whether or not a majority of the employees in the aforesaid
unit desire to be represented by the Massachusetts Society
of Professors/Faculty Staff Union/ Massachusetts Teachers
Association/Ma tional Education Association or the Amherst
and Boston Chapters of the American Association of University
Professors or by no employee organization, for the purposes
of collective bargaining.
Page 3 of 5 Pages
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4. That the election shall be conducted by secret ballot
on site, but that the mail ballets shall bo sent to members
of the bargaining unit who are on sabbatical leave for
the Fall Semester of 197G or who are absent fron the
campus because of official University business for the
Fall Semester of 1976, provided that the Employer shall
submit a list agreed upon by the Petitioner and the
Intervenor of persons eligible for absentee ballots on
or before October 26, 1976.
K5. That the list of eligible voters shall consist of all those
persons included within the above-described unit whose names
appear upon the payroll of the Employer for the week ending
October 15, 1976 and who have not since quit or been dis-
charged for cause.
By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the Commission by
Chapter 150E of the General Laws as aforesaid,
IT IS HEREBY DIRECTED, as part of the investigation authorized by
• \the Commission, that an election by secret ballot shall be conducted
under the direction and supervision of representatives of the Commission
among the employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit at such time and
place and under such conditions as shall be contained in the Notice of
Election issued by the Commission and served on all parties and posted
on the premises of the Employer together with copies of the specimen
ballot.
In order to assure that all eligible voters will have the opportunity
to be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to
vote, all parties to this election should have access to a list of
v
voters and their addresses which may be used to communicate with them.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY FURTHER DIRECTED that three (3) copies
^ of an election eligibility list, containing the names and addresses
of all the eligible voters must be filed by the Employer with the
Page 4 of 5 Pages
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Executive Secretary of the Commission, Leverett Saltonstall building,
100 Cambridge Street, Room 1604, boston, Massachusetts 02202, no
later than seven (7) days from the date of this decision unless otherwise
extended by order of the Commission.
The Executive Secretary shall make the list available to all parties
to the election. Since failure to make timely submission of this list
may result in substantial prejudice to the rights of the employees and
the parties, no extension of time for the filing thereof will be granted
except under extraordinary circumstances. Failure to comply with this
direction may be grounds for setting aside the election should proper
and timely objections be filed. \
COMMONWEALTH OF_ MASSACHUSETTS
"O
LABC : RELATICjfe COMMISSION
COOPER, AIRMAN
>7 vi / ' R 0 0/ V r? A t) -
MADE H. MICELI
,
^COMMISSIONER
Page 5 of 5 Pages
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APPENDIX 8
A Comparison of The Michigan State University
Collective Bargaining Election and
The University of Massachusetts Election
It is the opinion of several faculty at the University of Mass-
achusetts y Amherst that their administration was following a road-map
which had already been tested and found sucessful by the administration
of Michigan State University during a campus-wide faculty election at
that university the previous fall, October, 1972. The results of the
Michigan State University election provided an overwhelming victory for
the "no-union" side: 1,213 (no union) to 438 (MSU Faculty Associates)
with AAUP getting only 280 votes. Eighty-two percent of the MSU faculty
voted during the two-day election.
A comparison of the two campaigns may prove interesting, (wheth-
er or not the two institutions actually collaborated on administrative
tactics.) Certain aspects of the Michigan election appear to correspond
1
to events in the election at Amherst. Those aspects, of the Michigan
election which are particularly reminiscent of the Amherst election are
summarized below.
1. The ballot gave the faculty at Michigan State University (MSU) a
choice among three alternatives: "no agent," "the MSU-Faculty Assoc-
iates" (an affiliate of the Michigan Education Association, MEA it-
Material supplied by the Academic Collective Bargaining Informa-
tion Service was most helpful in gathering these facts, particularly a re-
port by G. Gregory Lozier, "A Classic Vote for No Representation: Michigan
State University", (Washington, D.C.: ACBIS, January, 1974).
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self an affiliate of the National Education Association, (NEA)
,
or
a local AAUP bargaining representative.
2. To become better prepared for the election period and potential
bargaining sessions afterwards, the administration hired an assis-
tant vice president for "Personnel and Employment Relations." His
function was similar to the assistant to the Chancellor at the
University of Massachusetts/Amherst
,
both individuals having trade
union backgrounds.
3. NEA paid for one full-time staff member for the two months of the
x k
fall campaign; NEA sent two staff members from Washington D.C. for
the final month of the election. The NEA and MEA provided funds
for offices at a local motel plus additional monies for printing
advertisements and for clerical help.
4. Although the AAUP was involved in the campaign for unionization,
several members, in fact many of the "staunchest" members of AAUP be-
came active in the "no union" campaign.
5. The MSU "anti-union" faculty formed a group called the "Committee of
Concerned Faculty" five weeks before the election. They were not con-
nected to the administration. The Michigan CCF strategy was to go
after the heavily "discipline-oriented" faculty and by doing so re-
cruited many of the faculty "stars" to their side (prestigious and
more highly paid faculty at MSU). All costs to the "no-union" cam-
paign were covered by voluntary contributions from faculty members
who were willing to support the CCF group. Approximately $1,875 was
collected from $5 to $25 donations. This was in contrast to the MSU-
Faculty Associates dues structure.
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6. The campaign was based on two issues: salaries (which were of concern
to some MSU faculty) and the question of unionization itself. Many
of the Michigan CCF newsletters stressed the adversary nature of col-
lective bargaining on administration/faculty relationships. The issue
of Michigan State University as a potentially "great" university (and
great universities don't unionize ) was also pointed out by the group,
administration said little in order that it would not be accused
of unfair labor practices and also because it did not wish to become
a target in the election. (The reality is that if a union does win
the election, the administration must deal with the faculty in negotiat—
v
ing the contract and, therefore, does better to assume a very quiet
platform during the pre-election period.)
8. The administration did not remain completely silent, however, using
the period just prior to the election for optimum influence.
9. The administrative viewpoint came in the form of "questions and answers"
from the provost, (a memorandum to department chairmen to urge faculty
to vote) and then, just before the election, a letter from the president.
The provost's responses to the questions stressed faculty individuality
vs. what he feared would be the union's lowest common denominator ap-
proach and the existing (and recently improved) system of academic gov-
ernance at MSU. The Michigan president's letter stressed the importance
Oswald Tippo's letter ended with "I ask all faculty colleagues
who share with me the dream that one day a great State University will
arise. . . ")
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of an informed faculty which would vote. He reminded the faculty
that it was fifty-one percent of the faculty who voted
,
not fifty-
one percent of the faculty which would determine the outcome. He
also mentioned the recent improvements in faculty governance.
10. The newsletter of the Michigan CCF took on the form of questions and
answers usually in direct retaliation to MSU-Faculty Associates'
newsletters
.
11. A letter from the president following the election stated, "I see in
the vote an expression of confidence in the efforts of many individuals
to build a workable system of academic governance at this university,"
b (October 25, 1972).
Are all of these elements coincidental? Perhaps, but doubtful.
The role of the administration is an extremely touchy one during an elec-
tion campaign. It is a period when cases of unfair labor practice most
often are brought about, particularly charges by the employee group against
the employer, often legitimately but sometimes as a delaying mechanism.
Since the administration in a public institution of higher education is
but a part of management, it often finds itself in the awkward, middle-
man position during a pre-election period. The state legislature, the
board of higher education, and/or the board of trustees are also involved
in the eventual negotiations. Therefore, while having to continue to
administer university business during the campaign, the administration
must also gear up for a potential bargaining situation; and while it
may fa^or or oppose such a change in procedure, it cannot campaign on
bBromery ' s letter stated "In my view the election results indicate
decisive support for the present system of faculty governance and^the
tra-
dition of collegial relations between faculty and administration.
Novem
ber 19, 1973.
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behalf of its position. In addition at most major universities a large
percentage of the administrative policy-makers have risen from the ranks
of the institution s faculty. Many will hope to return to the faculty
at some point making the conflict inherent in an "adversarial" relation-
ship (between faculty and administration), a threat to the administrator's
personal stability and comfort. Whether this adversarial relationship
would or would not occur with the advent of collective bargaining is not
significant; it is usually perceived by the administration to be an <-
eventual certainty.
The campaigns of the two institutions were remarkably similar,
and it would make sense with the success of the Michigan State University
election for the University of Massachusetts administration to follow
advice given by that institution. After all, the MSP-AAUP had the ad-
vice and assistance of a national organization (NEA) which had organized
hundreds of collective bargaining elections all over the country. The
University of Massachusetts administration would have been foolish not
to have at least noticed the Michigan election.
VAPPENDIX 9
Letter from Randolph Bromery
November 12, 1973
to Faculty
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST • BOSTON • WORCESTER
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OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR
WHITMORE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING
amherst, Massachusetts 01002 November 12, 1973
Dear Faculty Colleague:
On November 15 and 16, you, the faculty will decide freely
and democratically whether or not you wish to be represented by
a labor union for ourDOses of collective bargaining’. Surely this
is the most vital question the faculty has been asked to answer,
and it is my hope that every member of the faculty will exercise
his or her right to vote.
i
*
During the last few months the union ( and many faculty members
opposed to collective bargaining have conducted a vigorous campaign.
The faculty has been exposed to countless debates over the merits
and demerits of faculty unionism. For our part we have urged the
faculty to inform itself fully about this complex subject.
In recent weeks the faculty of Syracuse University rejected
unionism; in recent months the faculty of Michigan State University
decisively rejected unionism; and at the University of Michigan
there was not even enough support for a faculty union to call for
an election. Even the National AAUP is deeply divided on this issue.
It is of special note that not a single Big Ten university, not a
single Ivy League university and, in fact, not more than a handful
of universities across the country have voted in favor of faculty
unions. Faculty unions have been chosen at community colleges and
state colleges primarily, for they — unlike universities -- are
most like the primary and secondary schools where teachers' unions
are especially strong.
At other institutions the advent of a faculty union eliminated
the faculty senate as a governance body or created, competition between
the faculty senate and the union. We have recently initiated a new
governance system under which our faculty senate has significant decision
making powers. I doubt the compatibility of our present form of faculty
governance with faculty unionism.
Under collective bargaining the administration and the individual
faculty member are not legally free to work out individual problems.
Under most union contracts, the individual faculty member himself may
not process a grievance; he must ask the union to process it for
him
with the University's labor relations representatives. Unionism may
result in a substantial loss of individual freedom.
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Experience at other institutions shows that scholarly distinction
yields to seniority and standardization under collective barqaininq.
This explains, in oart, why faculty unions have become strong
primarily at community colleges and not at the major universities
where the traditions of scholarship and peer evaluation are valued.
Throughout the campaign the MSP-MTA-AAUP has often said that
"the issue" is tenure. They have asserted that there are hidden
'f tenure quotas now and that a faculty union will avoid tenure quotas.
There is no tenure quota system now of any kind, and the campus
administration has consistently and effectively opposed tenure quotas.
The President and Trustees of the University have clearly and of-
ficially expressed their support of the Amherst campus administration
position. Ironically, the City University of Mew York -- which has
had the longest experience with faculty unionism -- has just announced
* a "50% tenure quota system" even under a collective bargaining contract.
There is no evidence at any college or university in America that
f faculty unions have enhanced academic excellence. The oDposite appears
to be the case.
I have been a teaching member of the faculty for more than six
years. It is a faculty which I deeply respect, for both its impressive
accomplishments and potential.
I urqe you to consider long and carefully your decision of
November 15 and 16. Your future professional life depends on your
vote. A simple majority of those voting will decide your future.
It is, therefore, imperative that you exercise your right to vote.
Sincerely,
'J[ Cl).
uph W. Bromery ^—
/
ORandolChancel lor
RWB-.sjs
APPENDIX 10
Letter from Randolph Bromery
November 19, 1973
to Faculty
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST • BOSTON • WORCESTER
OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR
WHITMORE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING
AMHERST, MASSACHUSETTS 01002
iiovember 19, 1973
Dear Colleague:
Last Thursday and Friday the faculty voted in extraordinary
numbers on the question of collective bargaining representation.
Approximately 97% of the faculty cast a total of 1404 ballots.
While most of the faculty voted on the campus, many voted by
absentee ballot from their sabbatical sites here and abroad.
The results of the election,
were as follows:
510 "yes" votes
718 "no" votes
174 "challenged" votes
2 "voided" votes
as you have undoubtedly learned,
votes in favor of collective
bargaining representation by
the MSP-AAUP.
votes against such representation.
votes challenged on many grounds,
most commonly on grounds of
alleged managerial status.
The "no" votes constituted a majority of all votes cast. They
were sufficient in number to make it unnecessary to resolve the
challenged bal lots
.
In my view the election results indicate decisive support for the
present system of faculty governance and the tradition of collegial
relations between the faculty and administration. Considering the
fact that slightly more than 36% of the faculty voted in support of
a faculty union, I also view the election results as a mandate for
the administration to strengthen its commitment to the principle
of self-government on the campus.
During the last few months the faculty has been divided over the
issue of union representation. Sincere and thoughtful faculty members
have actively debated the merits of collective bargaining as an alter-
native to our present governance system. The debate has been lively
and responsible. But the faculty has now expressed its judgment.
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Let us put aside the intense and occasionally hostile feelings
that were generated by the collective bargaining debate. We all
have much to do as teachers, scholars and concerned members of
a university community. Let us turn with vigor to the unending
task of defining the aspirations of the campus and planning
strategies for achieving them.
In many ways the campus has benefited from the collective
barqaininq debate, for it has required us to examine closely and
critically issues that might otherwise have received little
attention. The administration and faculty have learned much about
themselves and about our campus as an educational center. These
lessons, I hope, will contribute valuably to our work in the years
ahead.
From the outset of the collective bargaining debate I emphasized
the importance of broad participation in the election, for the results
of that election -- whatever they might have been -- would inevitably
be of vast importance to the entire campus. My hopes for nearly
complete participation have been realized. This faculty has met
its responsibility as a self-governing body.
My wife joins me in extending to each of you and your families
our warmest wishes for a happy Thanksgiving.
Very truly yours
D r. />
Randolph W. Bromery
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